Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Donte Newsome, a university student, was the innocent victim of murder. In 2009, Newsome's mother, Angela Smith, submitted an application to the court of claims seeking reimbursement from the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund for medical expenses, funeral and burial costs, and student loans owed by Newsome at the time of his death. Smith was granted an award for medical expenses and funeral and burial costs but was denied compensation for the student loans. After a hearing, the court of claims denied Smith's request for reimbursement of her son's unpaid student loans pursuant to the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Act, concluding that student loans are contractual obligations that cannot be reimbursed under the Act. The Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for writ of certiorari, holding that Newsome's student loans were not subject to reimbursement under the Act because they were not loans that Newsome was unable to receive or use, in whole or in part, prior to his death. View "State ex rel. Smith v. W. Va. Crime Victims Comp. Fund" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a middle school teacher involved in a physical altercation with a student. The Iowa Board of Educational Examiners issued a statement of charges against Petitioner alleging student abuse. The Board subsequently imposed a ninety-day suspension of Petitioner's teaching license and permanent revocation of his physical education and coaching endorsements. Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review in district court within thirty days of the Board's denial of his application for rehearing but before the Board's final decision on the State's application for rehearing. The district court ultimately affirmed the Board's decision on the merits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's "premature" petition never invoked the district court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the proper time to file a petition for judicial review is within thirty days after the agency's final decision on the last application granted for rehearing; and (2) Petitioner initially appealed prematurely before the Board's final decision on the State's rehearing application, but he later perfected his appeal to the district court.View "Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Examiners" on Justia Law

Without permission and in violation of school policy, a high school student retrieved a wallet and sweatshirt from his pickup truck, which was parked on a public street across from the school. When the student returned to school grounds, the assistant principal searched the student's person, backpack, and wallet, only to discover a cellular telephone and a set of keys. Without the student's consent, the assistant principal then searched the student's truck and found drug paraphernalia. The student was suspended for nineteen days. The school board upheld the suspension. The district court reversed the decision of the board and ordered the suspension and offenses expunged from the student's school record, holding that the search of the truck violated the Fourth Amendment, as the assistant principal lacked probable cause to expand the search to the truck. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the search of the student's truck violated the student's right to be free from unreasonable searches.View "J.P. v. Millard Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

"J.H." appealed an adjudication that she was a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) for being "habitually and without justification truant from compulsory school attendance." J.H. contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the findings; and (2) the court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the question of whether she was habitually truant "without justification." The only witness was a Bennington County deputy sheriff who testified that he served as the County's truancy officer. The officer testified that he ended up transporting J.H. to school on two subsequent days in January. On the third occasion, the officer served a "truancy notice," the purpose of which was to warn a parent or guardian that a truancy case could be brought if their child is continually absent. The officer went to the home twice more in January (the fourth and fifth visits that month) but there was no response from anyone at the residence. At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, J.H.'s counsel moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish that J.H. was habitually truant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that five truancy reports within "a matter of weeks . . . meet[s] the definition of being habitually not at school."  The court also observed it had "no evidence . . . of justification for [J.H.] not being in school." Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the record evidence was fundamentally insufficient to establish that J.H. was truant on the days alleged. "Inasmuch as the evidence here was plainly insufficient under [33 V.S.A. 5102(3)(D)], we are compelled to conclude that the adjudication of CHINS based on truancy must be reversed."View "In re J. H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a superior court order affirming the University of Vermont's denial of his application for in-state tuition status. He raised a host of challenges to the court's ruling, arguing primarily that it was inconsistent with the court's finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Vermont. Plaintiff moved to Vermont in 2007 to enroll as an undergraduate at the University of Vermont ("University" or "UVM"). He paid the out-of-state tuition rate through the first three years of his undergraduate studies, and first applied for in-state tuition status in June 2010. In his application he stated that, although he first came to Vermont to attend UVM, he chose to permanently relocate to Vermont because he loved the area and intended to reside in Burlington after graduating. UVM denied the application, citing several pertinent provisions of UVM's In-State Status Regulations. In his administrative appeal, plaintiff reiterated that he came to UVM because of the reputation of its pre-medical program and medical school, and he explained that during his freshman year he was accepted into a premedical program that leads to automatic acceptance to UVM medical school for students who complete the program. Plaintiff also explained that, although he needed only one more course to complete his graduation requirements, he was seeking in-state tuition status to enable him to take additional electives in the fall of 2010 and spring of 2011 to become "a more diversified medical school applicant." UVM denied his administrative appeal. In light of the review standards the University used in denying Plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff's reliance on the superior court's "finding" was misplaced: "[f]or our purposes here, the critical findings are those of the University, not the trial court. UVM was the adjudicator of the facts in this matter, and the record is clear that it employed the original version of Regulation 3, which both parties agree governed plaintiff's application." Moreover, UVM made no finding as to plaintiff's common-law domicile, but rather concluded on the basis of its review of the record that plaintiff did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was eligible for in-state tuition. The Court concluded that the record contained ample competent evidence to support the University's determination, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Roberts v. University of Vermont" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action before the Supreme Court, the issue for review concerned the validity of two legislative instruments enacted during the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (SCR 99) and 2012 La. Acts 2 (Act 2 or "Act"), each of which addressed funding and a mechanism for the state to pay for the tuition costs of elementary and secondary school students physically attending, or otherwise undertaking individual course work, from nonpublic schools. SCR 99 and Act 2 were challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying argument was that those legislative instruments diverted funds constitutionally reserved for public schools. Upon review of the record, the instruments themselves and the constitutional provisions at issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that once funds are dedicated to the state’s Minimum Foundation Program for public education, the constitution prohibits those funds from being expended on the tuition costs of nonpublic schools and nonpublic entities. Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court found the procedures employed to enact SCR 99 violated the constitution inasmuch as that legislative instrument was intended to have the effect of law, but several requirements for enacting law were not observed. Furthermore, after severing the unconstitutional provisions of Act 2, the Court held that Act 2 did not violate the constitution's "one-object" rule. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Relators in this case were instructors who were hired to instruct students in the Jefferson County's virtual learning academy (VLA), a cyber school for grades K-12. In 2008, the State Teachers Retirement Board of Ohio (STRS) determined that the VLA instructors were independent contractors instead of employees and refunded all contributions made by Jefferson County Educational Service Center Governing Board (Jefferson County ESC) on the VLA instructors' behalf. Relators sought writs of mandamus to compel the STRS to accept employer and employee contributions to its retirement fund and to compel the Jefferson County ESC to make employer contributions to the retirement system on their behalf. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relators failed to establish that the STRS abused its discretion in determining that they were not "teachers" within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code 3307.01(B)(5) because the instructors were independent contractors, and not employees, of the Jefferson County ESC. View "State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Ret. Bd. of Ohio" on Justia Law

Petitioners were paraprofessionals employed in the New York City schools and were defendants in civil suits brought by students who alleged that Petitioners hit them. Petitioners did not dispute the actions they were found to have committed violated a rule of the Board of Regents prohibiting corporal punishment. Both petitioners asked the City of New York to defend the lawsuits for them. The City refused in both cases. Petitioners brought these proceedings to annual the City's determinations, and the lower courts dismissed the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the challenged determination, holding that employees of the New York City Department of Education who are sued for using corporal punishment are entitled to a defense provided by the City even though the employees' conduct violated a State regulation. Remitted for further proceedings. View "Sagal-Cotler v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law

After an administrative hearing by a Fayette County Public Schools tribunal, Appellee, an elementary school teacher of twenty-two years, was found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" and was suspended without pay from her employment for a period of time. The circuit court reversed. Appellants, the superintendent of the Fayette County Public Schools and the County Board of Education, appealed, arguing that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority by substituting its own judgment of the facts for the tribunal's findings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charge of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" lodged against Appellee was not sustained by the evidence and was not supported by the tribunal's findings; and (2) remand to the tribunal for further adjudication was not appropriate where the Court accepted in full the facts found by the tribunal.View "Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. Hurley-Richards" on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant Virginia College's motion to compel arbitration. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Virginia College, LLC v. Blackmon" on Justia Law