Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A “paraprofessional” who, for 11 years, had worked in the elementary school library, helped at recess, and taught keyboarding classes, was a member of the union, which had a collective-bargaining agreement with the district. The CBA provided that when “a member of the bargaining unit is required to appear before the Board of Education concerning any disciplinary matter, the staff member shall be given reasonable prior written notice of the reasons for such meeting and shall be entitled to have a personal representative at said meeting.” In 2008, the school principal recommended the employee’s discharge. The employee spoke at the regular meeting of the board, although the concerns at issue had not been specified to her She was discharged. The matter then went to arbitration, as provided in the CBA. The arbitrator ordered a reinstatement. The school district did not comply. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board confirmed the award. The appellate court held that the arbitrator’s award was “clearly erroneous.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. Judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is extremely limited; the question is whether the decision draws its essence from the CBA. The arbitrator had interpreted a quoted provision of the CBA as calling for a dismissal procedure that was not arbitrary, and he found arbitrariness in the lack of information given to the employee prior to her dismissal. View "Griggsville-Perry Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. IL Educ. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010, voters in the Fayetteville School District approved a 2.75 new-debt-service mills that would be a continuing debt service tax until the retirement of proposed bonds to be issued for the purpose of erecting and maintaining new and existing school facilities. The surplus revenues produced by debt service millage would be used for other school purposes. In 2011, certificates issued by the Washington County tax collector resulted in 1.45 mills of that 2.75-mill ad valorem increase being applied to the retirement of redevelopment-district bonds issued in 2005. The School District sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The circuit court found that the assessor's certification was incorrect and that the tax collector improperly applied the 1.45 mills. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the present cause of action was not barred by res judicata; (2) Ark. Code Ann. 14-168-301(18)(B)(i) did not impair the bond-purchase contract and financing of the redevelopment bonds; and (3) the 2.75 expressly pledged the new millage to a bond in accordance with section 14-168-301(18)(B)(i).View "City of Fayetteville v. Fayetteville Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Legislature passed several statutes and included a provision in the 2007-2008 General Appropriations Act that exerted control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees for the Florida university system. Petitioners challenged these statutes as unconstitutional, contending that the 2002 constitutional amendment creating the Board of Governors transferred the authority over tuition and fees to the Board, thus divesting the Legislature of any power over these funds. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Legislature, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature exercised control over the funds was facially constitutional, as (1) the constitutional source of the Legislature's control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees derives from its power under Fla. Const. art. VII, 1(c) and (d) to raise revenue and appropriate for the expenditure of state funds; and (2) the language of the 2002 amendment is devoid of any indication of an intent to transfer this power to the Board.View "Graham v. Haridopolos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a tenured teacher who worked for Defendant, the Memphis City Schools Board of Education. After Plaintiff requested and was granted a substantial amount of sick leave but failed to return from that sick leave, Defendant dismissed Plaintiff without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that her dismissal violated the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and awarded Plaintiff's reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages for the actual harm she suffered, and attorney's fees. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) although a tenured teacher's failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure; and (2) accordingly, Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. View "Thompson v. Memphis City Schs. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case included fifteen minor children and their parents who participated in the family court's truancy court diversion calendar program. The diversion program allowed family court magistrates to conduct court sessions at public schools where truancy had become an issue. Plaintiffs brought an action against the judicial officials who were sitting in the truancy court, family court administrators, and five municipalities. Plaintiffs requested that the superior court declare the previous procedures in the truancy court to be unconstitutional and enjoin the family court from enforcing the prior procedures. The superior court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Supreme Court quashed the superior court's order denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were moot, as (1) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges were obviated by an administrative order that reformed the truancy program and by existing law; and (2) there were no ongoing truancy petitions that continued to be affected by the earlier court procedures.View "Boyer v. Bedrosian" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the parties appealed the circuit court's order authorizing Storm M. H. ("Student"), who resided in Berkeley County, to enroll in the Academic Magnet High School ("AMHS") located in the Charleston County School District ("CCSD") provided she purchase real property in the CCSD with a tax-assessed value of $300 or more. Student resided with her parents in Berkeley County. In January 2010, she applied for admission to the 9th grade class at the AMHS for the following academic year. In her application, Student identified her Berkeley County address. Student was accepted by the AMHS and required to confirm her intention to enroll by January 28, 2010. The Confirmation Form requested a "Charleston County Residence Address." After seeing this request, Student's mother, Gayla S. L. McSwain ("Parent"), spoke with someone at the AMHS and explained that Student could not provide a Charleston County address because she did not "live in Charleston County yet." As a result of this conversation, Parent completed the Confirmation Form by indicating that she would "provide [a Charleston County residence address] prior to enrollment." The circuit court held that the CCSD's policy of requiring domicile for a child to attend a CCSD magnet school violated section 59-63-30(c) because "domicile" by a child and that child's parent or guardian was not required by the statute only property ownership. Both parties appealed the circuit court's order to the court of appeals. Subsequently, Student purchased real property in Charleston County and enrolled in the AMHS on August 18, 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that CCSD's policy of excluding all non-resident children from attendance at its magnet schools was contrary to the plain language of section 59-6330, and the Student was entitled to continue attending AMHS. "We are not unsympathetic to the Board's argument that allowing non-resident children to attend its magnet schools displaces other qualified resident children. However, we are constrained to interpret the unambiguous language of section 59-63-30. . . . As the statute is written, the Board does not have the authority to unilaterally exclude children who qualify to attend its schools." View "Storm M. H. v. Charleston County Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed as a school bus driver, broadcasted that the bus she was driving, which was full of elementary-school children, had been struck by gunfire and that panic had spread among the children. Displeased with the manner in which Plaintiff handled the situation, the Town of Johnson school department requested that Plaintiff no longer be assigned to transport Johnson students. Eventually, Plaintiff left her employment. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination against members of the Johnson public schools (Defendants), alleging that Defendants wrongfully requested that Plaintiff be terminated from her employment. In response to the trial justice's remarks, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to include a claim of tortious interference, which the trial justice denied. Thereafter, the superior court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint without specific findings. Remanded.View "Lomastro v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law

Citizens, unhappy with how public education is funded in Illinois, sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the funding system requires taxpayers in school districts with low property values to pay property taxes to fund local public schools at a higher rate than similarly situated taxpayers in school districts with higher property values, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the complaint was properly dismissed for lack of standing. The funding statute is not a taxing statute; plaintiffs failed to establish that the inequalities alleged are a direct result of the enforcement of the education funding statute or are fairly traceable to defendants’ actions. It is entirely within the discretion of the school districts to determine the actual rate of local property taxes, and the funding statute does not require school districts to tax at a certain rate. Although a district might decide that more local property tax revenues are required in order to provide students with a sufficient education, that decision is left to the school district and is not compelled or required by the educational funding statute. View "Carr v. Koch" on Justia Law

This case concerned an employment discrimination dispute between Portland State University (PSU) and Portland State University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (the Association). Those entities entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included a dispute resolution process for alleged violations of the agreement. That dispute resolution process included a "Resort to Other Procedures" (ROP) provision that permitted PSU to decline or discontinue a grievance proceeding if an Association member brought a claim regarding the same matter in an agency or court outside of PSU. PSU invoked that provision to halt a grievance proceeding after an Association member filed discrimination complaints with two outside agencies. The Association subsequently filed a complaint with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), alleging in part that PSU had engaged in an unfair labor practice by discontinuing the contractual grievance proceeding. ERB concluded that PSU's invocation of the ROP clause constituted unlawful discrimination. It therefore declined to enforce the ROP clause and ordered PSU to submit to the grievance process. On PSU's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that ERB erred by applying the wrong legal standard in ordering PSU to submit to the grievance process, and it therefore reversed and remanded the case for ERB's reconsideration. The Association sought review of that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals's decision, concluding that ERB correctly held that the ROP clause at issue in this case imposed a form of employer retaliation for protected conduct that reasonably would impede or deter an employee from pursuing his or her statutory rights. "The resulting harm is neither theoretical nor trivial, but qualifies as a substantive difference in treatment. The ROP provision is therefore facially discriminatory . . . Accordingly, ERB properly declined to enforce that illegal contract provision. " View "Portland St. Univ. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from issues involving the school-funding system and the disbursement of uniform rate of tax (URT) revenues to Arkansas's public-school districts. Appellees, school districts and their taxpayers ("School Districts"), filed a complaint seeking a declaration that any attempt by Appellants, the commissioner of the department of education and the state treasurer ("ADE"), to demand URT revenues in excess of the foundation-funding amount from Appellees was unconstitutional. The circuit court enjoined ADE from (1) seeking repayment of any portion of the URT revenues assessed for purposes of school funding from Appellees, and (2) withholding monies belonging to Appellees for the repayment of the URT revenues required for school funding from state or federal monies owed to the districts. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and reversed on cross-appeal, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly found that ADE was not authorized by the legislature to recoup and redistribute any URT revenues received from the School Districts that were in excess of the foundation-funding amount; (2) did not err in finding that ADE lacked the authority to withhold monies from the School Districts; and (3) erred in finding that the revenues generated by the URT were state-tax revenues. View "Kimbrell v. McCleskey" on Justia Law