Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), states that provide special education funds are eligible for federal funds to implement state-wide special education programs that guarantee a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to eligible disabled children, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). Pennsylvania enacted 24 P.S. 25-2509.5, its special education funding formula, under which each school district receives a base supplement, calculated by apportioning the total amount of base supplement money available among all districts based on the average daily membership of the district from the prior year under the assumption that 16% of students in each district are disabled. Plaintiffs, disabled students who attend schools in districts with a 17% or greater enrollment of special needs students and with a market value/personal income ratio of .65 or greater, claimed that Pennsylvania’s method violates IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act The district court found that the formula did not deprive the class of a FAPE as required by the IDEA and did not discriminate in violation of either the ADA or RA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that any class member was deprived of a service available to nonclass members. View "CG v. PA Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit on behalf of current and former students, alleging that Corinthian engaged in a deceptive scheme to entice the enrollment of prospective students in violation of California law. Corinthian moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in plaintiffs' enrollment agreements. The court concluded that the Broughton-Cruz rule, which exempted claims for "public injunctive relief" from arbitration, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2. In the alternative, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were within the scope of their arbitration agreements and plaintiffs were required to arbitrate their public injunction claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying Corinthian's motion to compel arbitration and remanded. View "Ferguson, et al. v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his parents filed suit against the District alleging violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 and 794a, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because plaintiff failed to present evidence of bad faith or gross misjudgment by the District. View "B.M., et al. v. So. Callaway R-II School Dist." on Justia Law

Florida VirtualSchool, a Florida state agency, appealed the district court's dismissal of its trademark infringement suit against K12 for lack of standing. At issue on appeal was whether Florida VirtualSchool was authorized under Florida law to assert such claims, or whether that authority lies exclusively with Florida's Department of State. The court found that the relevant Florida law was ambiguous on the issue and certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. View "Florida VirtualSchool v. K12, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children’s school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a “bad father.” Bovee claims that this alienated his children’s affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. “The suit is about words, and only words.” Bovee’s lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause. View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law

College Newspapers challenged the ABC's ban on alcohol advertisements as violative of the First Amendment. The court concluded that the challenged regulation violated the First Amendment as applied to the College Newspapers where a regulation of commercial speech must satisfy all four Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. prongs in order to survive an as-applied challenge, and the regulation at issue here did not satisfy the fourth prong. The district court erred in concluding that the challenged regulation was appropriately tailored to achieve its objective of reducing abusive college drinking. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the ABC. View "Educational Media Co. v. Insley" on Justia Law

After 15-year-old B.K. was barred from showing livestock at 4-H exhibitions, B.K.'s father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the unincorporated 4-H Association and two 4-H officials. The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief from the claimed denial of B.K.'s constitutional right to procedural due process. The court inferred that 4-H membership and participation was a "right or status" open to all South Dakota children interested in a career in agriculture, subject to reasonable, non-discriminatory terms; the record clearly demonstrated that the ban deprived B.K. of the opportunity to participate in a public program that was important to her education and career development and from which she obtained significant personal income; and, therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that B.K. had a fair chance of proving that defendants published a defamatory ruling that deprived her of a right or status conferred by state law and that she was entitled to the constitutional protection of the Due Process Clause. Further, B.K. was not afforded minimal procedural due process protection; there was a sufficient showing of the threat of irreparable injury; and the balance of the equities and the public interest supported the issuance of the injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kroupa v. Nielsen, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the handcuffing and removal from school of then eleven-year-old C.B. by Sonora Police officers. The district court rendered a verdict ostensibly in favor of defendants, but the district court concluded that the verdict was incomplete and inconsistent and directed them to re-deliberate. On appeal, the court concluded that the unscripted supplemental jury instructions, together with the problematic verdict form, gave the jury the misimpression that its initial answers to Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were internally inconsistent and needed to be revised. The court also concluded that Officers McIntosh and Prock were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the law was, and still is, not "clearly established" that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from school to a relative's place of business implicated Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the verdict and judgments, remanding for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of individual defendants McIntosh and Prock as to the 1983 claims. The court did not address whether defendants were entitled to an offset of the amount paid in settlement by the school district and one of the school's teachers. View "C. B. v. City of Sonora, et al." on Justia Law

In first grade (2000-2001 school year), S.H., who is African-American, was placed in Title I classes with her mother’s consent. S.H. received Title I services through fifth grade, but continued to struggle. In fifth grade she was diagnosed with a learning disability. An Individualized Education Program team considered S.H.’s personal sentiment that she did not want to be in special education and obtained her mother’s approval for services. In 2009, at her mother’s request, S.H. was evaluated by an independent psychologist, who concluded that S.H.’s learning disabled designation was, and always had been, erroneous. S.H. was removed from special education and, as of 2012 had been accepted at several colleges. She and her mother sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that the district misdiagnosed S.H. for several years, and was liable for compensatory education and compensatory damages. The district court rejected the claims. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that would create a genuine dispute as to whether the district knew, prior to the 2009 evaluation, that S.H. had likely been misidentified as learning disabled and that The DIA only permits a child with a disability to bring a claim; S.H. is not disabled. View "S. H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professor, filed suit alleging that university administrators retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment for distributing a short pamphlet and drafts from an in-progress book. The court held that there was an exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos for teaching and academic writing. Pickering v. Board of Education governed such teaching and writing by publicly employed teachers. The court affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiff prepared and circulated his pamphlet pursuant to official duties; reversed its determination that the pamphlet did not address matters of public concern; concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that the in-progress book triggered retaliation; and held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity given the uncertain state of the law in the wake of Garcetti. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Demers v. Austin" on Justia Law