Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Dongguk, a prominent Korean university, filed suit against Yale claiming that Yale acted negligently and engaged in reckless and wanton conduct when responding to an inquiry about whether Jeong ah Shin had received a Ph.D. from Yale. Yale mistakenly confirmed Shin's doctoral degree and Dongguk hired Shin as an art history professor. The court concluded that Dongguk has failed to present any evidence that any individual at Yale who was responsible for publication of a defamatory statement acted with actual malice and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Yale's favor on the defamation claim. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Dongguk's negligence claim where Dongguk failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact as to whether Yale's Associate Dean's statement caused Dongguk reputational injury, Yale Deputy General Counsel acted with actual malice when making a negligent statement, or additional harm occurred as a result of Yale's delay in correcting its misstatements. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the reckless and wanton conduct claim given the absence of evidence or allegations that Yale's conduct created a risk of bodily harm to an individual at Dongguk. View "Dongguk University v. Yale University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled student, filed suit arguing that he was entitled to remain at a private school he had been attending since the age of seven. The Department issued a formal notice that plaintiff's special education placement at the school would end when he turned 20 years old. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to remain at the school until he was 22 years old. At issue on appeal was whether the "stay put" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415j, applied to a student who has exceeded a state-imposed age limit on eligibility for public education. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for stay put. Plaintiff was entitled to remain at the school as his stay-put placement from the date he filed his administrative complaint and he was entitled to remain there until his case was finally resolved. View "A.D. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Ashurov, a Tajikistani citizen, entered the U.S. under a visitor’s visa in 2007 and later sought a student visa. The application required submission of Form I-20, the school’s petition to sponsor a student. Ashurov stated that he planned to study English as a Second Language at the CMG School. CMG certified the form and Ashurov signed it without an oath, as required. The application was granted. In 2009 and 2010, Ashurov presented identical forms. In 2010, federal authorities determined that CMG was not providing students the required 18 hours of weekly in-class instruction. The school was closed and its designated official indicted. A jury convicted Ashurov under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), which punishes a person who “knowingly makes under oath, or ... under penalty of perjury ... knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any ... document required by the immigration laws ... or knowingly presents any such ... document which contains any such false statement or which fails to contain any reasonable basis.” The district court granted an acquittal, finding that the oath requirement applied to both the “knowingly makes” and “knowingly presents” clauses and, alternatively, applying the rule of lenity. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute is “grievously ambiguous.” View "United States v. Ashurov" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs principally claimed that their school districts have an obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., to provide them with a word-for-word transcription service so that they can fully understand the teacher and fellow students without undue strain and consequent stress. The court held that courts evaluating claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, and Title II must analyze each claim separately under the relevant statutory and regulatory framework. In these cases, the district courts legally erred in granting summary judgment by holding that plaintiff's Title II claim was foreclosed as a matter of law by the failure of her IDEA claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the grants of summary judgment on the ADA claims in both cases and on the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51, 52, claim in K.M. v. Tustin, remanding for further proceedings in both cases. View "K. M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Keep A Breast Foundation educates young women about breast cancer and believes that negative body image inhibits awareness. To “start a conversation about that taboo in a lighthearted way” and break down inhibitions keeping young women from performing self-examinations, the Foundation began its “I [heart] Boobies!” initiative, which included selling bracelets emblazoned with that motto, KEEP A BREAST” and “check yourself!” The School District banned the bracelets. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the ban. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Supreme Court precedent does not sustain the ban. Under those decisions plainly lewd speech, which offends for the same reasons obscenity offends, may be categorically restricted regardless of whether it comments on political or social issues; speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd but that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be categorically restricted if it cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues; and speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues may not be categorically restricted. The bracelets are not plainly lewd and comment on a social issue. The District did not show that the bracelets threatened to substantially disrupt school. View "B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Thomas M. Cooley Law School, accredited by the ABA, enrolls more students than any other U.S. law school and plans to expand. Cooley charges full-time students tuition of $36,750 per year, exclusive of other costs, and, according to U.S. News & World Report, has the lowest admission standards of any accredited law school. The school has a very low retention rate. In a 66-page complaint, 12 graduates claimed that the school disseminated false employment statistics, upon which they relied as assurances that they would obtain full-time attorney jobs after graduating. The graduates did not obtain the kind of employment the statistics advertised; some found employment at all. They claimed that, had they known the truth, they would not have attended Cooley or would have paid less tuition, and sought, among other relief, partial tuition reimbursement, which they estimated for the class would be $300,000,000. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Michigan Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the facts. The complaint shows that one of the statistics on which they relied was objectively true and reliance on the statistics, without further inquiry, was unreasonable. View "MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the school district over an alleged violation of First Amendment rights because plaintiffs' third-grade son was prevented from distributing a "candy cane ink pen" with a laminated card containing a religious message. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction because it was well-established under Texas law that the district's governmental immunity was not a mere defense to suit but rather was complete immunity from suit. And because governmental immunity from suit defeated a trial court's jurisdiction, whether a trial court had jurisdiction was a question of law subject to de novo review. Section 110.06 of the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 110.001-110.012, required pre-suit notice in the form of certified mail, return receipt requested. The court concluded that the district's governmental immunity was not waived because it was undisputed that plaintiffs' demand letter did not comply with the jurisdictional pre-suit notice requirements. View "Morgan, et al. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a due-process complaint against the DOE seeking tuition reimbursement after plaintiffs enrolled their autistic child in a private school because the DOE failed to provide the child with a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court affirmed the state review officer's determination that the hearing record did not support the impartial hearing officer's determination that the lack of a functional behavior assessment (FBA) rose to the level of denying the child a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) where the individualized education program (IEP) addressed behavioral needs. Further, the IEP's failure to include parental counseling did not deny the child a FAPE; the SRO did not rely upon impermissible retrospection and the court deferred to her analysis; and the court found plaintiffs' remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "M.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Munir sent his son, O.M., to a private residential facility and a private boarding school after multiple suicide attempts, and sought reimbursement for the cost of the placements from the school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which requires that states receiving federal education funding ensure that disabled children receive a free appropriate public education, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1) or pay for their education elsewhere if a child require specialized services that the public institution cannot provide. The district court denied the request, reasoning that O.M. had emotional problems, but that those problems were not affecting his ability to learn. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that O.M.’s placement was to meet his mental health needs; any educational benefit he received from the placement was incidental. O.M. was an above-average student, without serious attendance problems, and socialized well in the district school. An individualized education plan offered by the district satisfied its IDEA obligations. View "Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs ("Parents") filed suit against Educators seeking a declaratory judgment that the Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 1989, Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-206(f)(1), violated the Equal Protection Clause and an injunction transferring their children to another school district. The court concluded that Parents' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because the Arkansas General Assembly enacted the Public School Choice Act of 2013, Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-1901 et seq., which repealed the 1989 Act in its entirety. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Teague, et al. v. Arkansas Board of Education, et al." on Justia Law