Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the District alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 706 and 794a. Plaintiffs' claims involved disputes with the District over the manner in which the District implemented individualized education programs. The court concluded that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1491, before filing their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the district court. Further, the futility, inadequate remedy, and contrary to law exceptions were not applicable in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant summary judgment in favor of the District. View "J.B., et al. v. Avilla R-XIII School District" on Justia Law

The pro se plaintiff filed a qui tam suit against the university and nine chemistry professors, charging that they defrauded the United States in violation of several federal statutes by obtaining federal grant money on the basis of plagiarized research papers. He does not allege that the fraud harmed him, but apparently sought a “bounty,” 37 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1-2). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that to maintain a suit on behalf of the government, a qui tam plaintiff has to be either a licensed lawyer or represented by a lawyer. Georgakis is neither and cannot maintain the suit in his individual capacity because he does not claim to have been injured. View "Georgakis v. IL State Univ." on Justia Law

Sroga filed a 54-page complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against employees of Chicago Public Schools and the Board of Education, alleging that they got him fired from his job as an instructor. The district court dismissed for violation of FRCP 8(a)(2), stating that “the morass of irrelevant and tangential allegations” made it “impossible” to evaluate the complaint, but allowed submission of an amended complaint. Sroga timely filed an amended complaint asserting various constitutional and tort-law claims. After five months with no indication of whether Sroga would be permitted to proceed, the district court dismissed most of the claims, leaving claims for retaliatory discharge against an individual and for indemnification against the Board. The court scheduled a status hearing two months later and warned that if Sroga failed to appear, “the Court may dismiss the case for want of prosecution.” The U.S. Marshal’s Office mailed Sroga a letter requesting information about how to serve summonses. Sroga did not respond, and the summonses were returned unexecuted. When Sroga did not appear for his status hearing, the court dismissed. Sroga unsuccessfully moved to vacate, asserting that he was working out of town and did not receive any notification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting Sroga’s history of compliance and that one missed date is not generally a basis for dismissal. View "Sroga v. Huberman" on Justia Law

ITT is a for-profit institution with more than 140 locations and offers post-secondary education. Leveski, who worked at the ITT campus, alleged, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(b) that ITT knowingly submitted false claims to the Department of Education to receive funds from federal student financial assistance programs under the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1001. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the allegations had already been publicly disclosed and that Leveski was not the original source of the allegations. The court granted sanctions of $394,998.33 against Leveski's lawyers. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the allegations that ITT paid illegal incentive compensation throughout Leveski’s employment as a recruiter and financial aid assistant, sufficiently distinct from prior public disclosures to give the court jurisdiction. The court noted the lack of temporal overlap with allegations by other ITT employees and Leveski’s more detailed allegations. View "Timothy J. Matusheski v. ITT Educational Services, Inc" on Justia Law

Since the Court’s 2003 decision, Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Texas at Austin has considered race as a factor in undergraduate admissions. A Caucasian, rejected for admission, sued, alleging that consideration of race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to the University. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, reasoning that the Fifth Circuit did not hold the University to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Supreme Court precedent. A university must clearly demonstrate that its purpose or interest is constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose, and “that the reasons for any [racial] classification [are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.” A court may give some deference to a university’s judgment that diversity is essential to its educational mission, if diversity is not defined as mere racial balancing and there is a reasoned, principled explanation for the academic decision. The University must prove that the means it chose to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to its goal and that admissions processes “ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.” A reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternative would produce the educational benefits of diversity. The Fifth Circuit simply presumed that the school acted in good faith and gave the plaintiff the burden of rebutting that presumption. Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without closely examining how the process works in practice. On remand, the Fifth Circuit must assess whether the University has offered sufficient evidence to prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity. View "Fisher v. Univ. of TX at Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of his son, filed suit against the Hawaii Department of Education, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d). The district court found that the Department did not deny the son a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by holding an annual individualized education program (IEP) meeting without the participation of the parent. Plaintiff did not attend the meeting even though he actively sought to reschedule it in order to participate. The court concluded, however, that the Department denied the son a FAPE by denying plaintiff the opportunity to participate and plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement if he could establish that the private school placement was proper under the Act. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Doug C., et al. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Brittany and Emily Morrow were subjected to threats and physical assaults by Anderson, a fellow student at Blackhawk High School. After Anderson physically attacked Brittany in the lunch room, the school suspended both girls. Brittany’s mother reported Anderson to the police at the recommendation of administration. Anderson was charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment. Anderson continued to bully Brittany and Emily. A state court placed Anderson on probation and ordered her to have no contact with Brittany. Five months later, Anderson was adjudicated delinquent and was again given a “no contact” order, which was provided to the school. Anderson subsequently boarded Brittany’s school bus and threatened Brittany, even though that bus did not service Anderson’s home. School officials told the Morrows that they could not guarantee their daughters’ safety and advised the Morrows to consider another school. The Morrows filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of their substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the school did not have a “special relationship” with students that would create a constitutional duty to protect them from other students and that the Morrows’ injury was not the result of any affirmative action by the defendants, under the “state-created danger” doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Morrow v. Balaski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as next-friend to her minor daughter, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against high school softball coaches, alleging that the coaches disclosed the daughter's sexual orientation during a disciplinary meeting with plaintiff, primarily claiming the disclosure to plaintiff constituted a Fourteenth Amendment invasion of the daughter's privacy. The court held that there was no clearly established law holding that a student in a public secondary school had a privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment that precluded school officials from discussing with a parent the student's private matters, including matters relating to the sexual activity of the student. The court also held that such students have no clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right that barred a student-coach confrontation in a closed and locked room. Therefore, the court concluded that the coaches were entitled to qualified immunity that barred the federal claims against them. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated in part and remanded for entry of judgment dismissing the federal claims against the coaches. View "Wyatt v. Fletcher, et al." on Justia Law

The Committee sued the NCAA for interfering with the University of North Dakota's use of the Fighting Sioux name, logo, and imagery. The district court treated the NCAA's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the NCAA. The court concluded that the Committee had not shown that the NCAA acted with discriminatory intent; the Committee was not denied due process by the NCAA because, as a nonmember, it was entitled to none from the NCAA; and the NCAA's act neither violated the laws of the land nor plainly violated its own constitution and bylaws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spirit Lake Tribe of Indians, et al v. The NCAA" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2003, Harbaugh worked periodically for Chicago Public Schools as a substitute music teacher. In 2003, she was hired as a “full-time basis substitute,” and tin 2004 she was appointed to a fulltime probationary tenure-track teaching position. In 2008, the principal at Harbaugh’s school recommended against renewing her contract. The Chicago Board of Education accepted that recommendation and terminated her appointment effective at the end of the semester. Harbaugh sued, alleging violation of her due-process rights by terminating her employment without a hearing. The district court entered summary judgment for the Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law Harbaugh had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment only if she had tenure; a teacher becomes tenured at the beginning of her fifth year of full-time employment on the tenure track. Her year as a full-time-basis substitute teacher does not count toward the four-year requirement. View "Harbaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law