Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

After an administrative hearing by a Fayette County Public Schools tribunal, Appellee, an elementary school teacher of twenty-two years, was found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" and was suspended without pay from her employment for a period of time. The circuit court reversed. Appellants, the superintendent of the Fayette County Public Schools and the County Board of Education, appealed, arguing that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority by substituting its own judgment of the facts for the tribunal's findings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charge of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" lodged against Appellee was not sustained by the evidence and was not supported by the tribunal's findings; and (2) remand to the tribunal for further adjudication was not appropriate where the Court accepted in full the facts found by the tribunal.View "Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. Hurley-Richards" on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant Virginia College's motion to compel arbitration. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Virginia College, LLC v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several Indiana taxpayers, brought an action challenging Indiana's statutory program for providing vouchers to eligible parents for their use in sending their children to private schools. Plaintiffs contended that the school voucher program violated three provisions of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court granted Defendant-intervenors' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the enacted program (1) was within the legislature's power under Ind. Const. art. VIII, 1 to provide for a general and uniform system of common schools; (2) did not violate Ind. Const. art. I, 6 by impermissibly providing direct benefits to religious institutions; and (3) did not contravene Ind. Const. art. I, 4 by requiring persons to support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against Plaintiffs' consent.View "Meredith v. Pence" on Justia Law

D.S., who had several disabilities and disorders, was admitted to the Spurwink School for the provision of "necessary emotional, psychological and other therapeutic services and education." In 2004, D.S., then sixteen years old, arrived at school. An educational technician came outside when D.S. arrived, but D.S. shortly thereafter left the property on foot. D.S. was not located, and D.S. later alleged that, after leaving the school property, she was sexually assaulted by two strangers. In 2010, D.S.'s mother, on behalf of D.S., filed a five-count complaint against Spurwink Services. Spurwink Services moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the case was governed by the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) and D.S. failed to comply with the requirements of the MHSA. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Spurwink Services, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over D.S.'s claims pursuant to the MHSA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the provisions of MHSA did not apply in this case, as D.S.'s action did not constitute an "action for professional negligence" as defined by the MHSA.View "D.S. v. Spurwink Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Frank George, a student at the University of Oklahoma, was charged by the University with violating five provisions of the University's student code. The Campus Disciplinary Board (CDB) found that he was guilty of violating three provisions of the Code: 16.4 (Failing to Comply with Directions of Institutional Officials), 16.65 (Public Drunkenness), and 16.25 (Violating Applicable Local, State, or Federal Laws). He appealed to the University's Campus Disciplinary Council (CDC) and alleged that the evidence was insufficient for the administrative decisions that the student code had been violated. The CDC reviewed the statements of the witnesses and the student, and in its written decision concluded that the student had failed to meet his burden to show that the evidence against him was insufficient. The decision of the CDB was sustained by the CDC. George "appealed" the decision to the district court. The University filed a motion to dismiss the petition and argued that the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act did not authorize appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stayed proceedings, and certified the court's order for interlocutory certiorari review on the issue of the appellate jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) 75 O.S. 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; (2) the remedy of an independent District Court civil action is an adequate remedy for an alleged violation by the University of a student's rights to due process in a University disciplinary proceeding; (3) the possibility of a subsequent institutional offense that is subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act having an enhanced punishment because of former offenses does not require the former offenses to be also subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) absent unusual circumstances not present here, the Court declined in a supervisory writ proceeding to adjudicate constitutional arguments that were not adjudicated in the District Court. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Lucas" on Justia Law

A “paraprofessional” who, for 11 years, had worked in the elementary school library, helped at recess, and taught keyboarding classes, was a member of the union, which had a collective-bargaining agreement with the district. The CBA provided that when “a member of the bargaining unit is required to appear before the Board of Education concerning any disciplinary matter, the staff member shall be given reasonable prior written notice of the reasons for such meeting and shall be entitled to have a personal representative at said meeting.” In 2008, the school principal recommended the employee’s discharge. The employee spoke at the regular meeting of the board, although the concerns at issue had not been specified to her She was discharged. The matter then went to arbitration, as provided in the CBA. The arbitrator ordered a reinstatement. The school district did not comply. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board confirmed the award. The appellate court held that the arbitrator’s award was “clearly erroneous.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. Judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is extremely limited; the question is whether the decision draws its essence from the CBA. The arbitrator had interpreted a quoted provision of the CBA as calling for a dismissal procedure that was not arbitrary, and he found arbitrariness in the lack of information given to the employee prior to her dismissal. View "Griggsville-Perry Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. IL Educ. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010, voters in the Fayetteville School District approved a 2.75 new-debt-service mills that would be a continuing debt service tax until the retirement of proposed bonds to be issued for the purpose of erecting and maintaining new and existing school facilities. The surplus revenues produced by debt service millage would be used for other school purposes. In 2011, certificates issued by the Washington County tax collector resulted in 1.45 mills of that 2.75-mill ad valorem increase being applied to the retirement of redevelopment-district bonds issued in 2005. The School District sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The circuit court found that the assessor's certification was incorrect and that the tax collector improperly applied the 1.45 mills. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the present cause of action was not barred by res judicata; (2) Ark. Code Ann. 14-168-301(18)(B)(i) did not impair the bond-purchase contract and financing of the redevelopment bonds; and (3) the 2.75 expressly pledged the new millage to a bond in accordance with section 14-168-301(18)(B)(i).View "City of Fayetteville v. Fayetteville Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Legislature passed several statutes and included a provision in the 2007-2008 General Appropriations Act that exerted control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees for the Florida university system. Petitioners challenged these statutes as unconstitutional, contending that the 2002 constitutional amendment creating the Board of Governors transferred the authority over tuition and fees to the Board, thus divesting the Legislature of any power over these funds. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Legislature, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature exercised control over the funds was facially constitutional, as (1) the constitutional source of the Legislature's control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees derives from its power under Fla. Const. art. VII, 1(c) and (d) to raise revenue and appropriate for the expenditure of state funds; and (2) the language of the 2002 amendment is devoid of any indication of an intent to transfer this power to the Board.View "Graham v. Haridopolos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a tenured teacher who worked for Defendant, the Memphis City Schools Board of Education. After Plaintiff requested and was granted a substantial amount of sick leave but failed to return from that sick leave, Defendant dismissed Plaintiff without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that her dismissal violated the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and awarded Plaintiff's reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages for the actual harm she suffered, and attorney's fees. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) although a tenured teacher's failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure; and (2) accordingly, Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. View "Thompson v. Memphis City Schs. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case included fifteen minor children and their parents who participated in the family court's truancy court diversion calendar program. The diversion program allowed family court magistrates to conduct court sessions at public schools where truancy had become an issue. Plaintiffs brought an action against the judicial officials who were sitting in the truancy court, family court administrators, and five municipalities. Plaintiffs requested that the superior court declare the previous procedures in the truancy court to be unconstitutional and enjoin the family court from enforcing the prior procedures. The superior court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Supreme Court quashed the superior court's order denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were moot, as (1) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges were obviated by an administrative order that reformed the truancy program and by existing law; and (2) there were no ongoing truancy petitions that continued to be affected by the earlier court procedures.View "Boyer v. Bedrosian" on Justia Law