Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Brittany and Emily Morrow were subjected to threats and physical assaults by Anderson, a fellow student at Blackhawk High School. After Anderson physically attacked Brittany in the lunch room, the school suspended both girls. Brittany’s mother reported Anderson to the police at the recommendation of administration. Anderson was charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment. Anderson continued to bully Brittany and Emily. A state court placed Anderson on probation and ordered her to have no contact with Brittany. Five months later, Anderson was adjudicated delinquent and was again given a “no contact” order, which was provided to the school. Anderson subsequently boarded Brittany’s school bus and threatened Brittany, even though that bus did not service Anderson’s home. School officials told the Morrows that they could not guarantee their daughters’ safety and advised the Morrows to consider another school. The Morrows filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of their substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the school did not have a “special relationship” with students that would create a constitutional duty to protect them from other students and that the Morrows’ injury was not the result of any affirmative action by the defendants, under the “state-created danger” doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Morrow v. Balaski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as next-friend to her minor daughter, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against high school softball coaches, alleging that the coaches disclosed the daughter's sexual orientation during a disciplinary meeting with plaintiff, primarily claiming the disclosure to plaintiff constituted a Fourteenth Amendment invasion of the daughter's privacy. The court held that there was no clearly established law holding that a student in a public secondary school had a privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment that precluded school officials from discussing with a parent the student's private matters, including matters relating to the sexual activity of the student. The court also held that such students have no clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right that barred a student-coach confrontation in a closed and locked room. Therefore, the court concluded that the coaches were entitled to qualified immunity that barred the federal claims against them. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated in part and remanded for entry of judgment dismissing the federal claims against the coaches. View "Wyatt v. Fletcher, et al." on Justia Law

The Committee sued the NCAA for interfering with the University of North Dakota's use of the Fighting Sioux name, logo, and imagery. The district court treated the NCAA's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the NCAA. The court concluded that the Committee had not shown that the NCAA acted with discriminatory intent; the Committee was not denied due process by the NCAA because, as a nonmember, it was entitled to none from the NCAA; and the NCAA's act neither violated the laws of the land nor plainly violated its own constitution and bylaws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spirit Lake Tribe of Indians, et al v. The NCAA" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2003, Harbaugh worked periodically for Chicago Public Schools as a substitute music teacher. In 2003, she was hired as a “full-time basis substitute,” and tin 2004 she was appointed to a fulltime probationary tenure-track teaching position. In 2008, the principal at Harbaugh’s school recommended against renewing her contract. The Chicago Board of Education accepted that recommendation and terminated her appointment effective at the end of the semester. Harbaugh sued, alleging violation of her due-process rights by terminating her employment without a hearing. The district court entered summary judgment for the Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law Harbaugh had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment only if she had tenure; a teacher becomes tenured at the beginning of her fifth year of full-time employment on the tenure track. Her year as a full-time-basis substitute teacher does not count toward the four-year requirement. View "Harbaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hill, Director of Risk Management for Detroit Public Schools invited Washington to submit a proposal for a wellness program for DPS employees. Washington and others joined Associates for Learning (A4L) and submitted a proposal quoting $150,000 for a pilot study. Contrary to DPS policy, Hill did not open competitive bidding or execute a written contract, and made payments by wire transfer, rather than by check. Hill, who later left DPS testified that he met with Washington to discuss larger amounts. Washington paid Hill five percent of the invoice amount for assistance in getting the invoices paid. Invoices totaling more than a million dollars for “future work” were paid. The partners met in public places to distribute cash. Washington was convicted of conspiracy to commit program fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 666, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956. The district court enhanced Washington’s base offense level by 22 levels, finding that Washington was an “organizer or leader” and that the amount of loss to DPS was more than $2.5 million, and sentenced her to 84 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington was not prejudiced by errors made by counsel and that the evidence was sufficient. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

German law requires all children to attend public or state-approved private schools. The Romeikes, parents of five young children, feared that the public school curriculum would influence their children against Christian values” and chose to home-school. The government imposed fines for each unexcused absence. Once, police went to the Romeikes’ house and escorted the children to school. The next time, four adults and seven children from the Romeikes’ home-schooling support group intervened, and the police, reluctant to use force, left the premises without the children. The family traveled to the U.S. to seek asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), which applies to those who have a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The Board of Immigration Appeals found that German authorities have not singled out the Romeikes in particular or home-schoolers in general for persecution and denied their petition. The district court and Seventh Circuit upheld the decision. The German law does not on its face single out any protected group, and the Romeikes did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the law’s application turns on prohibited classifications or animus based on any prohibited ground. View "Romeike v. Holder" on Justia Law

The parents and the grandmother of two black children sued the Nashville Board of Public Education on behalf of their children and all black students in the District whose school assignments were adversely affected by the elimination of the mandatory noncontiguous transfer zones. They allege that the Rezoning Plan eliminated the desirable practice of being bused to a good, racially diverse school and replaced it with two inferior choices: staying in a bad, racially isolated neighborhood school or being bused to a bad, racially diverse school. They claim that has led to resegregation in violation of the students’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the Board. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the change serves legitimate state interests in school under-utilization. The Plan actually solved the problem that many schools were operating at levels below what their resources and infrastructure would permit, while other schools were overflowing. The court stopped short of endorsing the Plan, noting that certain students in poor neighborhoods had to share textbooks; that the racial achievement gap apparently exists much as before; and that Nashville public-school students as a whole continue to do poorly after the Plan. View "Spurlock v. Fox" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 2012 Public Act 53 provides: “A public school employer’s use of public school resources to assist a labor organization in collecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees is a prohibited contribution to the administration of a labor organization,” so that unions must collect their own membership dues from public-school employees, rather than have the schools collect those dues via payroll deductions. The Act does not bar public employers other than schools from collecting membership dues for unions who represent their employees. Unions and union members challenged the Act under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, quoting the Supreme Court: “The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech’; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” The court further reasoned that there is a legitimate interest in support of the Act’s classification; the legislature could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers. View "Bailey v. Callaghan" on Justia Law

Smiley was a part-time instructor in the college’s Radio Department from 1994 through January 2009. She is of Palestinian and Lebanese descent. Near the end of the fall 2008 semester, one of the nine students in Smiley’s class met with two faculty members and said he felt Smiley had singled him out in class because he is Jewish. At one of the faculty members’ request, the student outlined his complaint in an email. Faculty members and administrators interviewed the student on several occasions and also interviewed Smiley, who asserted that she was “joking.” The school ultimately informed Smiley that it would not ask her to teach further classes. Smiley claimed that the decision was based on her race or national origin in a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the college. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Investigations of other instructors to which Smiley referred do not suggest more favorable treatment. The school’s procedures did not require the school to contact other witnesses to alleged discriminatory conduct, and the school’s investigation of the complaint does not indicate that its reason for terminating her position was pretextual. View "Smiley v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

South Carolina requested a waiver of its maintenance-of-effort condition under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(18), for approximately $67.4 million for its fiscal year 2010. The Secretary granted the waiver in part, but denied it to the extent of the $36.2 million. South Carolina subsequently filed this petition for review, challenging the Secretary's denial of its request for a full waiver and its request for a hearing. The court concluded that the Secretary's action in partially denying the request for a waiver was a determination made with respect to the eligibility of the State for funding and that therefore the court had jurisdiction to consider the State's petition for review. The court also concluded that the Secretary's denial of the State's request for a full waiver was a determination that South Carolina was not eligible to receive a grant in the amount of $36.2 million and that therefore the Secretary was required to provide the State with notice and an opportunity for a hearing before he made a final determination with respect to the waiver request. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "SC Dept. of Educ. v. U.S. Sec. of Educ." on Justia Law