Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his mandamus petition, where he sought to compel the DOE to issue him a Stafford Loan. While plaintiff's immigration status was still pending, he obtained valid employment authorization, graduated from college, and was accepted to law school. Plaintiff then filed a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and requested a Stafford Loan to pay his tuition. The law school declined to find him eligible for any form of federal student aid and plaintiff was unable to obtain a Stafford Loan. The court held that, in these circumstances, the jurisdictional question merged with the merits question. Plaintiff's mandamus petition fell within the scope of the sue-and-be-sued clause of 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(2). Notwithstanding that clause, however, section 1082(a)(2)'s ani-injunction clause barred the suit for declaratory relief. The Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff's petition under 28 U.S.C. 1361. When plaintiff's Stafford Loan eligibility was reviewed, he did not provide any evidence from the INS or USCIS that he was in the United States for other than a temporary purpose. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's petition on the merits. View "Mashiri v. Dept. of Education, et al" on Justia Law

Covington, a basketball official in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for more than 10 years, filed suit, alleging gender employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. 10:5-1, because she has been excluded from officiating at boys’ high school varsity basketball games. The district court dismissed all claims against all defendants: the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Board 193 (Board 193), which assigns officials to officiate at regular season high school basketball games; the New Jersey State Interscholastic Athletic Association (NJSIAA), which controls and supervises post-season tournament games and assigns officials to referee those games; the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials (IAABO), the Colonial Valley Conference (CVC), the Hamilton Township School District (“Hamilton”), a school at which Covington has officiated, and Dumont, the President of Board 193. The Third Circuit remanded to give Covington an opportunity to provide more facts as to her claim against Hamilton, Board 193, and NJSIAA, but affirmed dismissal of claims against the CVC and IAABO. View "Covington v. Int'l Assoc. of Approved Basketball Officials" on Justia Law

K.A., a fifth-grade student, attempted to distribute, before the start of class, an invitation to a children’s Christmas party at her church. Students were normally allowed to distribute invitations to birthday parties, Halloween parties, and similar events during non-instructional time. The teacher told K.A. that the principal would have to approve the flyer. The principal later notified K.A.’s father that the superintendent had not approved the flyer, based on a policy concerning events not related to the school. Her father filed suit, alleging that the school district had violated K.A.’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court, applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and finding no evidence that distribution of the invitations would threaten a “substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere with the rights of others,” granted preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the original policy and subsequent revisions were broader than allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into a narrow exception. View "K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Between 1982 and 1997, Alfes took out student loans funded by FFELP. Alfes consolidated his student-loan debt; SunTrust was the lender and obligee on the consolidated note and the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency was the guarantor. Alfes sought relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court entered a general discharge in 2005. Subsequently, Alfes sought a declaration that the debt under the consolidated note had been discharged, arguing that the consolidated note no longer constituted an “educational loan” under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(A) and had been discharged with his ordinary debt. The bankruptcy court initially entered a default judgment against the defendants. Following a series of transfers, reopening, and various motions, the bankruptcy court ultimately held that a holder of consolidated student loans is an educational lender and that the consolidated loan was, therefore, not dischargeable absent a showing of undue hardship. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Alfes v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of their son, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Missouri Constitution, alleging that the district, the superintendent, the principal, and the sheriff violated the son's constitutional rights by briefly separating him from his backpack during a drug dog exercise in his high school. The district court granted summary judgment to the district, its officials, and the sheriff. The court concluded that the brief separation of the son and his belongings was reasonable and did not deprive him of a constitutionally protected right and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the district and its officials. The court also held that the sheriff was not liable under section 1983 in his individual or official capacity where he did not participate in the drug procedure at the school, there was no evidence that the sheriff failed to train or supervise the deputies who conducted the drug dog surveys, and there was no evidence that the sheriff's office should have believed that its procedures or actions were likely to result in a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burlison, et al v. Springfield Public Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher since 1976, was diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes. By 1999, she required insulin injections. Until 2008, plaintiff was never disciplined. In 2008, plaintiff was summoned to address allegations that she had been sleeping during class. Plaintiff claimed that she was not sleeping but rather exhibiting symptoms of diabetes. She was formally reprimanded and requested accommodations: training in recognizing symptoms of diabetes; assistance if she appeared asleep; and breaks for insulin injections. The superintendent allowed her to keep snacks in her classroom, to use the nurse’s office if she first obtained classroom coverage, and to disseminate diabetes information to students and staff. Plaintiff was subsequently suspended for missing classes, sleeping in class, and referring to Playgirl Magazine in class discussion. The Board decided to terminate her contract. Plaintiff was 71 years old. A referee upheld the termination. Instead of appealing, plaintiff filed suit, alleging age discrimination under Ohio law; failure to make reasonable accommodations (ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and state law); retaliation for engaging in protected activity (ADA and state law); and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to age discrimination, but reversed on other claims. View "Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed an order and judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Hofstra and dismissing her suit claiming harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681-88; and corresponding provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law 290-301. Plaintiff claimed that she experienced harassment and retaliation while employed by Hofstra as a team manager for the university's football program. Because defendants took the needed remedial action in this case, the harassment carried out by some players on the football team could not be imputed to the university or its personnel. The district court erred, however, in its analysis of the McDonnell Douglas factors by holding that plaintiff could not prevail on any of her three retaliation claims based on her supposed failure to demonstrate that she had engaged in protected activity and the requisite causation. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to withstand a grant of summary judgment with respect to her retaliation claims, but not as to her sexual harassment claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Summa v. Hofstra University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the University alleging that the University, as her former employer, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, 12203, by refusing to accommodate her mental and physical disabilities and by responding to her requests for accommodation with hostile actions that caused her constructive discharge. The court agreed with the district court that the University lacked the capacity to be sued under state law and Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment without reaching the merits of plaintiff's ADA claims. View "Lundquist v. University of SD Sanford" on Justia Law

McArdle was hired as principal of Lindbergh School in 2008 with a two-year contract that allowed termination after one year with payment of severance. Lindbergh’s prior principal, Davis, was McArdle’s superior. McArdle claims that she discovered irregularities, including Davis’ use of school funds for personal purposes; improper payment to a student teacher; and circumvention of rules regarding admission of nonresidents. McArdle alleges that she received evasive responses from Davis. Davis put McArdle on a performance improvement plan in 2009, asserting parental complaints, but refusing to identify complainants. McArdle was told that the board would consider termination of her contract. McArdle consulted an attorney and filed a police report, accusing Davis of theft of school funds. She sent letters to the board, listing improprieties. Davis was excused from the meeting; the board discussed McArdle’s allegations, then voted to terminate McArdle’s contract at the end of the school year. Davis was prosecuted for theft of school funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on claims under the First Amendment and of breach and interference with contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McArdle’s reporting of misconduct was speech as a public employee, not shielded from her employer’s response; defendants’ motives are immaterial. View "McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. 150" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, defendants appealed from the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, which halted a mandatory drug-testing policy implemented by Linn State. In evaluating the probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred in ignoring the substantial obstacles this facial challenge presented for plaintiffs and therefore abused its discretion in issuing such a broad injunction. Because plaintiffs have failed to show a fair chance of prevailing on their facial challenge, the court vacated the preliminary injunction. View "Barrett, IV, et al v. Claycomb, et al" on Justia Law