Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Michigan adopted race-conscious admissions policies for public colleges and universities in the 1960s and 1970s, In 2003, the Supreme Court held that universities cannot establish racial quotas but could continue considering race or ethnicity as a ‘plus’ factor along with other relevant factors, On a 2006 statewide ballot, Proposal 2, to amend the Michigan Constitution “to prohibit all sex- and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting” passed by a margin of 58 to 42 percent and eliminated consideration of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in admissions decisions. No other admissions criterion (grades, athletic ability, geographic diversity, or family alumni connections) was eliminated. Opponents filed suit, alleging that provisions affecting public colleges and universities violated the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. The district court issued postponed application of Proposal 2. In 2008, the district court entered summary judgment, rejecting the suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the “existence of such a comparative structural burden” (making the policy constitutional in nature) undermines the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee that all citizens ought to have equal access to the tools of political change. View "Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of MI" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a fifth grade student and his mother, commenced this action against the St. Louis Board of Education and two nurses, asserting Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law claims for negligence and negligent supervision. The student was administered an H1-N1 shot by a school nurse despite telling the nurse, and presenting a signed parental form confirming, that his mother did not consent to the vaccination. The court held that the district court correctly noted that a local government entity, such as the Board, could not be sued under section 1983 respondeat superior theory of liability; plaintiffs' failure to train claims against the Board were properly dismissed for either failure to plead a plausible claim or failure to state a claim; and claims against Nurse Clark were dismissed because the nurse was acting within her official capacity and had immunity from suit. View "B.A.B., et al v. The Board of Education, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Superintendent of the Connecticut Technical High School System, renewed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in which defendant was alleged to have deprived plaintiff of her right to procedural due process. The district court denied the motion after concluding that there existed a dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff received sufficient notice before the elimination of her position as a guidance counselor at a Connecticut high school. The court held that defendant's conduct in this case, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did not violate plaintiff's clearly established rights. Therefore, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed and remanded. View "Coollick v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In this litigation, Appellants (plaintiffs below) brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the statutory scheme by which the state of Kansas funds its public schools. The district court dismissed their suit for lack of standing. Upon review of the matter and the applicable statutory authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Appellants had standing because their alleged injury, unequal treatment by the state, would be redressed by a favorable decision. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Petrella, et al v. DeBacker, et al" on Justia Law

The school district issued 180-day suspensions to twin brothers, the Wilsons, for disruption caused by a website the Wilsons created. The Wilsons filed suit against the school district alleging, among other things, that the school district violated their rights to free speech. At issue was the order granting the Wilsons' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court did not find that the district court made inadequate factual findings; rather, the court concluded that the district court's findings did not support the relief granted. The court held that the Wilsons were unlikely to succeed on the merits under the relevant caselaw. The court also concluded that the district court's findings did not establish sufficient irreparable harm to the Wilsons to justify a preliminary injunction. View "S.J.W., et al v. Lee's Summit R-7 School Dist., et al" on Justia Law

In 2003, D.K. began kindergarten; he struggled in school and had behavioral issues. In 2007, at the urging of a private therapist, his parents requested a second evaluation. Two months later, the district determined that D.K. was eligible for special education services as a student with “other health impairment,” and he was offered an Individualized Education Program. In 2008, while finalizing D.K.’s IEP, his parents requested a due process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1419, and requested an award of compensatory education for September 2004 through March 12, 2008. The district court affirmed the denial, holding that the IDEA’s statute of limitations, passed in 2004, barred relief for conduct prior to January 8, 2006, and that plaintiffs were ineligible for two statutory exceptions to the IDEA statute of limitations. The school district did not violate its obligation to identify students in need of special education and did not fail to provide D.K. a free appropriate public education before November 2007. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the district consistently monitored, documented, and responded to D.K.’s individual educational needs, developed behavioral improvement systems with his parents’ cooperation, and offered him special attention and testing accommodations. View "D. K. v. Abington Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Department appealed summary judgment to R.E. and M.E. on their claim for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq, and summary judgment to R.K. on her claim for tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. Plaintiff E.Z.-L. also appealed. The court held that courts must evaluate the adequacy of an individualized educational program (IEP) prospectively as of the time of the parents' placement decision and could not consider "retrospective" testimony regarding services not listed in the IEP. However, the court rejected a rigid "four-corners rule" that would prevent a court from considering evidence explicating the written term of the IEP. In R.E., the court found that the Department offered the student a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and reversed the decision of the district court. In R.K., the court found that the Department failed to offer the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. In E.Z.-L., the court found that the Department offered the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. View "R.E. v. New York City Dept of Education; R.K. v. New York City Dept of Education; E.Z.-L v. New York City Dept of Education " on Justia Law

D.F. was a five-year-old African-American male kindergartener during the 2008-2009 school year, his first in Collingswood. He had previously been educated in the Camden school system, which had identified him as a special needs student and developed an Individualized Education Plan for him. Collingswood adopted the Camden IEP in substantial part, with the consent of D.F.’s mother, A.C. In January 2009, A.C. filed a due process petition alleging violation of D.F’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act; later, she filed a second petition expanding the claims. D.F. and A.C. subsequently moved out of state and the New Jersey Administrative Law Judge dismissed the pending petitions as moot. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the move did not render all claims moot. The ALJ did not make any factual findings that related to the claim for compensatory education for violations of the right to a free and appropriate public education beyond the absence of a one-to-one aide during the September 2008-January 2009 period, nor any related to the summer 2009 compensatory education claim. View "D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

McCormick was pursuing a graduate degree in psychology at Miami University in Ohio when she was diagnosed with several illnesses that slowed her progress in her graduate studies. After the faculty voted against promoting McCormick to doctoral status, she filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and disability in violation of state and federal laws. To circumvent the expired two-year statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, which provides an express cause of action against state actors, McCormick asserted federal claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed, concluding that McCormick’s discrimination claim under section 1981 was barred because section 1983 provided the exclusive means to bring a damages suit against state actors in either their official or individual capacities for violations of section 1981. The court also dismissed Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "McCormick v. Miami Univ." on Justia Law

A suit on behalf of a 14-year-old, eighth grade boy alleged that the failure of the public school district to prevent sexual abuse by a female teacher violated the student’s rights under Title IX of the federal Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress under Wisconsin law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district; claims against the teacher remain pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a private suit under Title IX, a school district cannot be held liable on the ground of respondeat superior for an employee’s violation absent proof of actual notice and deliberate indifference. That other teachers suspected improper conduct and administrators investigated and accepted the teacher’s denials does not establish knowledge or deliberate indifference. . View "N. R. Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist." on Justia Law