Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Park hoped to become a dental surgeon when she enrolled at the Indiana University School of Dentistry (IUSD) in 2006. After one year at the school, Park began to experience a series of serious setbacks, including several failing grades and allegations of professional misconduct. Eventually, the school dismissed her. Park appealed without success to school committees and administrators. The district court dismissed her suit, alleging Equal Protection and Due Process violations, as well as claims for state law breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Park did not allege bad faith in the dismissal and had no contract claim. Park’s interest in becoming a dentist is not one that the due process clause protects. Park did not allege intentional discrimination. View "Park v. IN Univ. Sch. of Dentistry" on Justia Law

CEF, a local chapter of an international non-profit organization that conducted weekly "good news clubs" (GNC) for children, appealed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction against the district. Due to concerns about the "prayer and proselytizing," which occurred at GNC meetings, CEF was informed that it would be removed from the district's after-school enrichment program effective in the 2009-2010 school year. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. CEF had a high likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment claim. The likely First Amendment violation further meant that the public interest and the balance of harms (including irreparable harm to CEF) favored granting the injunction. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Child Evangelism Fellowship v. Minneapolis Special Sch. Dist. 1" on Justia Law

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim. View "Capeheart v. Terrell" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the use of a particular desk in special education classrooms was permissible under the United States Constitution. The desks in question wrap around the student on the front and the sides and have a securing bar that runs behind the student’s chair. A student can only remove herself by sliding under or crawling over the desk’s surface when the bar is in place. Ebonie S., a young girl with multiple disabilities, was often required to sit in this type of desk. Ebonie’s mother, Mary S., filed suit on her behalf under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the use of the desk violated the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the constitutional claims, but denied summary judgment on the statutory claims. Plaintiff appealed the grants of summary judgment. "Plaintiff devote[ed] much effort to arguing that the use of the desk was prohibited under Colorado law and was contrary to well-established educational standards. But it is not our office to decide the lawfulness of the desk under state law or the wisdom of using the desk as a matter of pedagogical policy. . . . We hold only that use of the desk under the circumstances presented did not violate the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendments." View "Ebonie S. v. Pueblo School District 60, et al" on Justia Law

Defendants, an elementary school principal and two teachers, appealed from a denial of summary judgment by the district court on defendants' claims that qualified immunity shielded them from suit for alleged deliberate indifference to kindergarten and first-grade students' racial harassment of a classmate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to claims that the kindergarten teacher and the principal were deliberately indifferent to racial name-calling by kindergarten students because there were questions of disputed fact for which the district court identified sufficient record evidence to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The court reversed the denial, however, as to claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to all other allegedly racially motivated physical misbehavior by kindergarten and first-grade students because no clearly established law permitted a finding that defendants had actual knowledge that commonplace physical misbehavior by children of this age was racially motivated in the absence of some objective evidence connecting the physical misbehavior to the earlier racial name-calling. Further, the first-grade teacher was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because her transmittal of parental complaints of physical misbehavior to the principal for investigation could not be deemed "clearly unreasonable" as a matter of law. View "DiStiso v. Wolcott" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their suit for failure to state a claim and denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs, parents and/or legal guardians of seven children with disabilities, sought equitable relief preventing defendants from enforcing a prohibition on the use of aversive interventions. The court concluded that the State's prohibition of one possible method of reducing the consequences of a child's behavioral disability did not undermine the child's right to a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) or prevent administrators from enacting an individualized plan for the child's education. The court also concluded that New York's law represented a considered judgment by the State of New York regarding the education and safety of its children that was consistent with federal education policy and the United States Constitution. View "Bryant v. New York State Education Dept." on Justia Law

Watkins, an African-American, worked for the school district, overseeing security systems. Fultz supervised Watkins and, relying on Watkins’s advice, Fultz awarded Vision a $182,000 annual contract for service of security cameras. Vision’s president, Newsome, testified that Watkins called her and talked about a “finder’s fee.. Newsome went to Cleveland for a customer visit. She e-mailed Watkins and he replied: “Absolutely$.” Newsome believed that Watkins expected her to pay him at their meeting. Newsome notified Fultz. At the meeting, Watkins requested “an envelope.” After Fultz contacted police, the FBI recorded meetings at which Newsome gave Watkins $5,000 and $2,000. A white jury convicted on two counts of attempted extortion “under color of official right” (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and one count of bribery in a federally funded program, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court determined a total offense level of 22, applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, another two-level enhancement for bribes exceeding $5,000, and a four-level enhancement for high level of authority, plus an upward variance of 21 months under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and sentenced Watkins to six years’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the jury’s racial composition, and the reasonableness of the sentence.View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

ITT is a for-profit corporation that runs “ITT Technical Institutes” throughout the country, including Lathrop, California. Halasa was the Lathrop Campus’s College Director for six months in 2009. ITT says that Halasa was fired for poor management skills and delivering inadequate results; Halasa alleges that he was fired in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), after identifying and reporting several irregularities in the way ITT was handling its federally subsidized loans and grants for students. The district court granted ITT summary judgment and costs. Even if Halasa did engage in protected conduct under the Act, he did not establish that he was fired because of this conduct. There was no evidence that decision-makers were made aware of his reporting. View "Halasa v. ITT Educational Servs., Inc" on Justia Law

In 1999, Bucalo, then 42 years old, applied for a position as a school librarian and was not hired; the position went to a 35-year-old man. Bucalo filed a charge of age and sex discrimination with the EEOC, which granted a right-to-sue letter, but she did not file. In 2003, the position re-opened and Bucalo, then 46, reapplied. Lanier, a new superintendent, selected interviewees; Bucalo was not among them. A committee hired a 32-year-old woman. Bucalo sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and retaliation for her 1999 EEOC complaint, violating the ADEA and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Lanier, then suffering from a debilitating disease, executed an affidavit asserting that he had not selected Bucalo because she had worked in numerous short-term positions, evidencing “instability,” and denying that he had considered Bucalo’s age or 1999 EEOC charge. Lanier died before trial. The district court ruled in favor of the District. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that because of the death of the sole District employee with direct knowledge of the reasons she was not hired, Bucalo was entitled to judgment under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. View "Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The District hired Donnelly as a teacher under a three-year probationary contract. During his first year he received the highest rating and had perfect attendance. The District transferred him. His performance included episodes that required admonition. He told a student she was “acting retarded” and wrote the word “retard” on the board and told another to “go back to Mexico.” In the final year of his probation, Donnelly required gallbladder surgery, which occurred on November 27. He took leave through December 5. Under the collective bargaining agreement, Donnelly worked at least 1,247 hours (7.25 per day for 172 days) during the 12-month period prior to his leave: three hours short of Family Medical Leave Act eligibility, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A)(ii). When he returned, he received unsatisfactory evaluations and was denied tenure. The district court held that he was not eligible for FMLA leave and that he had not shown that he was qualified for tenure. The Second Circuit reversed. Donnelly presented a genuine issue of material fact on whether he qualifies for FMLA leave; the standard applied by the court does not apply outside of the college tenure context; and Donnelly presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find unlawful retaliation. View "Donnelly v. Greenburgh Central Sch. Dist." on Justia Law