Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs alleged that the school district practice of holding high school graduation ceremonies and related events at a Christian church rented for the occasion violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, a declaratory judgment and damages. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the court reversed in part. The public school graduation ceremonies in the sanctuary of a Christian church, violated the Constitution. The court noted that it was not making a broad statement about the propriety of governmental use of church-owned facilities, nor was it criticizing cases permitting governmental use, in the proper context, of certain church-owned facilities. When confronted with an Establishment Clause challenge of this nature, the Supreme Court requires examination of the context in which government interacts with a religious organization. Here, the involvement of minors, the significance of the graduation ceremony, and the conditions of extensive proselytization prove too much for the district’s actions to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause. View "Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

M.P., a student with disabilities, appealed the district court's ruling that the Anchorage School District (ASD) did not deny him a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) because the failure to develop an updated Individualized Education Program (IEP) was mostly attributable to his "parents' litigious approach." The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) mandates that public educational agencies review and revise annually an eligible child's IEP. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the district court relied on an improper basis when it declined to consider whether the ASD complied with the IDEA's substantive requirements; (2) the ASD deprived M.P. of a substantively adequate FAPE by relying on an outdated IEP to measure M.P.'s academic and functional performance and provide educational benefits to M.P.; and (3) M.P.'s parents were entitled to reimbursement for private tutoring expenses incurred in 2008 and review of the propriety of private tutoring expenses incurred in 2009. Remanded. View "Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired in 2003 by Northwestern University, was denied tenure in 2007 and fired in 2008. The district court dismissed her sex discrimination suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding that only the denial of tenure occurred within the 300-day window for filing a charge of discrimination, and finding that no reasonable jury could infer that plaintiff was denied tenure because she is a woman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff’s history with respect to publication and obtaining grants. View "Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400-1491, requires that students with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment possible. Sebastian, born in 1986, has mental retardation and began receiving special education services when he was three years old. Every year the school district developed an individualized education plan for him; he has received vocational and personal care education in addition to basic academic education and has had a variety of work experiences. Although he had visual-motor and visual-spatial deficits, as well as deficits in receptive language skills, he made steady progress. When he was 20 years old, his parents became dissatisfied with his public education and placed him in a private residential facility. An administrative hearing officer determined that Sebastian's parents were not entitled to recover the costs of Sebastian's private education, and the district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the services offered by the district adequate. View "M.v. King Philip Reg'l Sch." on Justia Law

In 2007, two University of Iowa football players were accused of sexually assaulting another student in a campus dorm room. The incident led to criminal charges, internal actions by the University, an external criticism of the University. The incident also led to the present lawsuit, which concerned Open Records Act requests that the Iowa City Press-Citizen served on the University. Dissatisfied with the University's initial response to those requests, the Press-Citizen filed suit. The lawsuit resulted in more documents being produced and others being submitted for in camera review by the district court. The court then ordered additional documents produced, in some instances with redactions. The University appealed that order in part. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment in part, holding that the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act prohibited the disclosure of the remaining documents, including even redacted versions of "education records" where the identity of the student was known to the recipient. View "Press-Citizen Co. v. Univ. of Iowa" on Justia Law

Samuel Milligan, then a freshman at Southern Illinois University, had uncomfortable encounters with a professor emeritus at, and substantial donor to, SIU, during which Meyers touched Milligan inappropriately and complimented him on what Meyers believed to be his feminine features. SIU banned Meyers from campus pending completion of an investigation and warned that he would be subject to arrest for trespass. Milligan saw Meyers on campus more than times after the ban was imposed. SIU public safety personnel escorted Meyers off campus each time they became aware of his presence but, on instructions from the Director of Public Safety, he was not arrested. Although Milligan lost his campus job, he was able to get another and to gain admission to graduate school. Milligan sued SIU under Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and Title IX for creating a hostile work and educational environment and also for retaliating against him for complaining about Meyers’ harassment. The district court granted summary judgment to SIU. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutes do not set a higher standard for “more vulnerable” student workers and that SIU responded appropriately to the situation. View "Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. IL Univ." on Justia Law

During its 2010 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 749 (Act), comprising La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041 through 17:4049, known as the "Red Tape Reduction and Local Empowerment Waiver Program." The Act authorized the Board of Secondary and Elementary Education ("BESE") to grant waivers exempting school districts and individual schools from complying with a number of statutes provided for in Title 17, the Education Code. Under the Act, a waiver could not be presented to BESE "unless a majority of the classroom teachers employed in the school, voting by secret ballot, vote in favor of inclusion of such school in the waiver request." At this point, no waiver had been granted under the Act, or even requested. The Louisiana Federation of Teachers and others (collectively "LFT") filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the State of Louisiana and BESE, seeking a judgment declaring Act 749 unconstitutional. In particular, LFT sought to enjoin Defendants from applying and enforcing La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041(7). Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court concluded that the constitutional challenge presented in this case was premature and presented no justiciable controversy. Therefore the Court reversed the ruling of the trial court which held Act 749 unconstitutional. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in consolidated cases are the parents of disabled children, challenging the procedural and substantive adequacy of Individualized Education Plans that the New York City Department of Education, developed for their children pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education 8 Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. They also sought reimbursement of funds spent on private-school tuition for their children. In one case, the Second Circuit held that the district court properly agreed with the determinations of the hearing officer who initially considered the matter and properly rejected the subsequent determinations of the state review officer. In the other case, the Second Circuit found that the magistrate judge, who recommended granting the Department's motion for summary judgment, overstated the extent to which federal courts must defer to the findings of state administrative officers, but that the Department's motion was properly granted. View "M.H. v. NY City Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Medlock was a student at Indiana University, living in a single room in a dormitory. As part of a routine “health and safety inspection,” two University resident assistants searched Medlock’s dormitory room for safety hazards. Medlock was not present at the time. When the resident assistants entered the room, they discovered marijuana in plain sight, and notified University police, who later entered Medlock’s room and seized the drugs. The Dean summarily suspended Medlock for one year. After exhausting internal appeals, Medlock sought a preliminary injunction, citing violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the suspension had expired. View "Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

South Carolina’s Spartanburg County School District Seven adopted a policy allowing public school students to receive two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private educators. The parents of two students at Spartanburg High School filed suit against the School District, alleging that the policy impermissibly endorses religion and entangles church and State in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1) that plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by the policy, and (2) that the policy was constitutional in that it was neutrally stated and administered and that it had the secular purpose of accommodating students’ desire to receive religious instruction. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that that the purpose and primary effect of the School District’s policy was to promote Christianity. The district court rejected the school district’s standing argument but agreed with it on the merits and, accordingly, granted summary judgment to the School District. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: "[the Court saw] no evidence that the program has had the effect of establishing religion or that it has entangled the School District in religion. As was the General Assembly and School District’s purpose, the program properly accommodates religion without establishing it, in accordance with the First Amendment." View "Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7" on Justia Law