Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

This case was a public-records action in which relator, ESPN, Inc., sought certain records from respondent, Ohio State University. Ohio State rejected ESPN's requests because the university deemed them to be "overly broad per Ohio's public record laws." EPSN then filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio State to provide access to the requested records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ for limited records that should have been disclosed because they were not exempt from disclosure based on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); but (2) denied the writ for the rest of the records because Ohio State established that FERPA and the attorney-client privilege prohibited the disclosure of the requested records. View "State ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

Relator brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that appellees defrauded the United States Department of Education by knowingly making fraudulent claims by engaging in various non-economic transactions to inflate their loan portfolios eligible for Special Allowance Payments (SAP), a federal student loan interest subsidy. The district court granted appellees' motions to dismiss on the ground that they were "state agencies" and therefore not subject to suit under the FCA as interpreted in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens. Because the district court did not employ the arm-of-the-state analysis in determining whether each of the appellees was a state agency subject to suit under the FCA, the court vacated its judgment and remanded the case for the court to apply this analysis in the first instance. View "US ex rel. Jon H. Oberg v. Kentucky Higher Ed., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were high school football players that earned scholarships to play for National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I football programs. Both suffered career-ending football injuries at college. Their athletic scholarships were good for one year. When injuries prevented them from playing football, their scholarships were not renewed. Plaintiffs challenge two NCAA regulations as having an anticompetitive effect, in violation of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. 1: the cap on the number of scholarships given per team and the prohibition of multi-year scholarships. The district court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to allege a relevant commercial market on which NCAA Bylaws had an anticompetitive effect. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It was not clear whether plaintiffs believed that the Bylaws affect an overall market for degrees, which would impact scholarship athletes and non-athletes alike, or some market that only concerns athletes attempting to obtain education in exchange for athletic services. Plaintiffs claimed that they alleged that there was no practical alternative for students wishing to pursue an education in exchange for playing ability, but the complaint explained the lack of practical alternatives for colleges wanting to field teams outside of the NCAA framework, not the lack of alternatives for student-athletes. View "Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n" on Justia Law

Public school students filed complaints with the SDHR, claiming that their respective school districts engaged in an "unlawful discriminatory practice" under Article 15 of the Executive Law, Executive Law 290, et seq. At issue on these appeals was whether a public school district was an "education corporation or association" as contemplated by Executive Law 296(4). The court concluded that it was not, and therefore, SDHR lacked jurisdiction to investigate complaints made against public school districts under that provision. View "Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights" on Justia Law

This case began as a dispute over the results of CM's special education evaluation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue on appeal was: (1) the ALJ's dismissal of several of CM's claims against Lafayette prior to holding a due process hearing; and (2) the district court's dismissal of MM's, CM's parents, separate claims against the California Department of Education (CDE). The court held that the district court correctly dismissed MM's claims against Lafayette challenging the ALJ's statute of limitations ruling as being premature. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the fourth claim as duplicative and correctly held that the CDE had no authority to oversee the individual decisions of OAH's hearing officers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "M. M., et al. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

The Association filed suit, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and the Constitution, challenging the State Authorization, Compensation, and Misrepresentation Regulations the Department of Education initiated under the Higher Education Act (HEA), Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that the Compensation Regulations did not exceed the HEA's limits; the court mostly rejected the Association's claim that these regulations were not based on reasoned decisionmaking; the court remanded two aspects of the Compensation Regulations, however, that were lacking for want of adequate explanations. The court also held that the Misrepresentation Regulations exceeded the HEA's limits in three respects: by allowing the Secretary to take enforcement actions against schools sans procedural protections; by proscribing misrepresentations with respect to subjects that were not covered by the HEA, and by proscribing statements that were merely confusing. The court rejected the Association's other challenges to the Misrepresentation Regulations. Finally, with respect to the State Authorization Regulations, the court concluded that the Association had standing to challenge the school authorization regulation, but held that the regulation was valid. However, the court upheld the Association's challenge in the distance education regulation, because that regulation was not a logical outgrowth of the Department's proposed rules. View "Assoc. of Private Sector Colleges and Universities v. Duncan, et al." on Justia Law

The daughter of Mark Fails and Laura Fails transferred from Jefferson Davis County School District to Lamar County School District, after obtaining consent from the school boards of both districts. Four years later, the School Board passed a resolution that Jefferson Davis County residents would no longer be permitted to transfer to other school districts. The following year, the Superintendent of Education for the School District published an announcement in the local newspaper informing parents of Jefferson Davis County School District students that all transfers had been revoked. Although three of the School Board members represented to Mark Fails that this did not affect his daughter's transfer status, an interim conservator, appointed by the governor to oversee Jefferson Davis County Schools, represented to Mark Fails that it was the intent of the School Board to revoke all previously granted transfer petitions. Mark Fails attended a School Board meeting to appeal the revocation of his daughter's petition for transfer. However, the conservator prohibited the School Board from voting on the child's petition for transfer. Prior to the School Board meeting, the Failses had obtained Lamar County residency, and the student had continued to attend Lamar County Schools legally, and without interruption. Despite this fact, the Failses appealed the School Board's decision to the Circuit Court of Jefferson Davis County. The circuit court and the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the School Board's decision. Given that the Failses have represented to the circuit court and the Supreme Court that they have since moved into the Lamar County School District, and that fact was not disputed the issue of revocation was considered moot. View "Fails v. Jefferson Davis County Public School Board" on Justia Law

Circle Y filed a complaint alleging, among other things, breach of contract when the school district terminated a construction management services contract with Circle Y. The trial court denied the school district's motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that, in light of the determination by the court of appeals that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss because Circle Y's complaint alleged facts that, when taken as true, established that the contract was not void as a matter of law due to voter approval of the educational local option sales tax, it was not necessary for the court of appeals to construe OCGA 20-2-506(h) in order to resolve the appeal. Accordingly, the court remanded to the court of appeals with direction that it vacate that portion of the Division order that addressed OCGA 20-2-506. View "Greene Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Circle Y Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a lawsuit in federal district court over the death of fifteen-year-old Tucker Thayer. In that suit, Tucker's parents alleged that Washington County School District officials were negligent when they allowed a gun loaded with blank cartridges to be used in a school musical production, resulting in their son's death. The school district asserted governmental immunity from the claims. The Utah Supreme Court accepted certification to address a novel issue of state law and held that the Licensing Exception of the Governmental Immunity Act did not apply to the conduct of the school district officials and those acting on the district's behalf, as any authorization of the presence of the firearm on campus was not a formal, official authorization by a governmental body or employee endowed with regulatory power to issue such an authorization. In addition, a governmental entity such as the school district may not insulate itself from suit by routinely authorizing and approving the negligent conduct of its employees. View "Thayer v. Thayer" on Justia Law

The East Butler and Prague public school districts filed a petition for dissolution and merger with the Committee for the Reorganization of School Districts. Afterwards, Appellees, property owners, filed freeholder petitions with the Saunders County Freeholder Board to remove property owned by them from the Prague District into the Wahoo District. The Committee then approved the dissolution of merger. Before it became effective, the Board granted Appellees' petitions to move their property. East Butler subsequently appealed, alleging that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter or that the Committee had prior jurisdiction to act. The district court dismissed the appeal, concluding that under Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-458(5) the appeal was untimely and that East Butler lacked standing to challenge the Board's order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because East Butler had a valid merger petition that involved the same property pending at the time of Appellees' freeholder petitions, it had sufficient interest in the matter to invoke the court's jurisdiction; and (2) the appeal was timely. Remanded. View "Butler County Sch. Dist. v. Freeholder Petitioners" on Justia Law