Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

After serving eighteen months as the superintendent of Bourbon County public schools, Appellant Arnold Carter transferred into the position of consultant to the school district pursuant to an "exit strategy." The details of Carter's resignation and consulting contract were discussed and determined in a closed session during a meeting of the Bourbon County Board of Education. Appellee Jamie Smith, a parent and concerned citizen, challenged the Board's actions as violative of Kentucky's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court found Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.801(1)(f) permitted the Board's closed session discussion of Carter's resignation but not its discussion of Carter's consulting contract and consequently voided the consulting contract. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Board violated the Act when it discussed Carter's resignation and consulting contract in closed session; and (2) Carter's consulting contract was voidable as a matter of law and was properly voided by the circuit court. View "Carter v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Chicago Tribune published articles revealing that the University of Illinois had a special process for reviewing applications from students with well-placed supporters. The President of the University system, the Chancellor of one campus, and seven of the nine members of the Board of Trustees eventually resigned. The Tribune sought additional information through the Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 140/1: the names and addresses of the applicants' parents and the identity of everyone involved in the applications. The University invoked Exemption 1(a), which provides that agencies will withhold information specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law, pointing to 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1), Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, as prohibiting disclosure. It precludes federal funding for any educational institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein) of students without the written consent of their parents. The Tribune asked a federal district court for a declaratory judgment, which was granted on grounds that the 1974 Act does not prohibit disclosure, just funding. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bd. of Trs., Univ of IL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a private college, brought suit against a town and a local zoning authority (defendants), seeking, among other things, a declaration that its proposed development of residential and education facilities for older adults (Regis East) qualified for protection under the Dover Amendment, G.L.c. 40A, section 3, second par. The Dover Amendment exempted from certain local zoning laws or structures that were to be used by nonprofit educational institutions for "educational purposes." Because the court could not conclude that plaintiff "has no reasonable expectation" of demonstrating that Regis East would primarily operate in furtherance of educational purposes, the court vacated and remanded. View "Regis College v. Town of Weston & others." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a putative class action in Texas state court alleging that defendants had violated certain provisions of the Texas Education Code by soliciting students in Texas without the appropriate certifications. Defendants subsequently appealed the district court's confirmation of an arbitral award that required them to submit to class arbitration. They contended that the district court, not the arbitrator, should have decided whether the parties' agreement provided for class arbitration, and that the district court should have vacated the arbitrator's class arbitration award. Because the parties agreed that the arbitrator should decide the class arbitration issue, the court concluded that the district court correctly referred that issue to the arbitrator. The district court erred, however, in confirming the award because the arbitrator exceeded his powers. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reed v. Florida Metro University, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

E.R., now 10 years old, attended kindergarten and first grade at a public school. E.R. has been identified as having numerous learning disabilities, and health-related problems, including severe food and contact allergies. During the summer after first grade, her parents determined that programs offered by the district were inadequate to address E.R.'s unique needs, and decided to enroll her at a private school that specializes in instructing students with learning disabilities. They filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, seeking compensatory education for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and tuition reimbursement, including transportation expenses. A hearing officer awarded compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school year, reimbursement of tuition for the 2008-2009 school year, and reimbursement for transportation. The district court reversed and the Third Circuit affirmed. The district took reasonable steps to accommodate E.R.'s disabilities and include her in all class activities; it was not required to grant the specific accommodations requested by her parents or otherwise make substantial modifications to the programs that were used for all other students. View "Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher at a small Christian school, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school on her pregnancy discrimination claim, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., contending that she had established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. After admitting to the school's administrator and assistant administrator that she conceived the child before getting married, the school fired her, purportedly because she had sinned by engaging in premarital sex, and, as the administrator put it, "there are consequences for disobeying the word of God." Because the school did not raise any issue or make any argument in its brief about the ministerial exception, the court would not decide whether that exception might apply. The court found that plaintiff's testimony contradicted the administrator's testimony that he had never heard her say she was sorry for what she had done and that he would not have fired her if she had. For that and other reasons, plaintiff had established a genuine issue of material fact about the reason that the school fired her. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the pregnancy discrimination claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hamilton v. Southern Christian School, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this qui tam suit alleging that the District of Columbia and its schools violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, by submitting a Medicaid reimbursement claim without maintaining adequate supporting documents. The district court dismissed the case, relying on the court's precedent in United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club. Because the court concluded that the Supreme Court had implicitly overruled Findley in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, the court reversed. View "Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued defendants, including the school district, alleging 20 procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court disposed of almost all of plaintiff's claims and plaintiff and defendants subsequently appealed. The court agreed with the school district that the district court erred by inferring from the IDEA a private right of action for nominal damages. The court also held that Congress has not expressed an intent to create a cause of action for monetary damages based on the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court reviewed plaintiff's other contentions in her cross-appeal and find them either waived or lacking merit. View "Oman, et al. v. Portland Public Schools, et al." on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court considered whether an area education agency (AEA) acted lawfully when it approved for submission to the voters a petition that proposed a consolidation of two community school districts, Preston and East Central. East Central sought to block the measure from being placed before the voters, asserting (1) the AEA approval of the petition for submission to the voters was legally flawed because the AEA failed to comply with a statutory requirement that it develop a plan for the AEA district, and (2) the AEA failed to make a required statutory finding that the consolidation proposed in the petition was in conformity with the plan. The district court rejected the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the AEA acted lawfully in approving submission of the petition to the voters, as (1) the AEA was not required to develop a specific plan of merger between the two school districts prior to approval of submission of a citizen petition to the voters of the districts; and (2) by approving the submission of the issue to the voters, the AEA made an implied finding that all the statutory requisites were met. View "E. Central Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Miss. Bend Area Educ. Agency" on Justia Law

In 2010, appellants unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the implementation of the 2011-2012 student assignment plan by the school board. On appeal, appellants argued that the district court committed legal error by failing to apply, and requiring the school board to rebut, a presumption that racial disparities in the 2011-2012 assignment plan resulted from the school board's prior unconstitutional conduct in operating a racially segregated school district. The court agreed and therefore vacated the district court's order and remanded for reconsideration. View "Everett v. Pitt Cty. Brd. of Educ." on Justia Law