Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Carmen Perez-Dickson brought this action claiming that Defendants, the city board of education, the former assistant superintendent of the school district, and the former acting superintendent of the school district, disciplined her for exercising her right to free speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and 17a-101e, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and intentionally caused her severe emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not violate section 31-51q because any relevant speech by Plaintiff had been pursuant to her official job duties and such speech is not protected by the First Amendment; (2) Plaintiff failed to prove her claim of racial discrimination; and (3) Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on her. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendants. View "Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, students or parents of students who attended Iowa public schools, filed a petition contending that Iowa's educational system was inadequate and urging the courts to impose additional public school standards, stating that such action was both constitutionally and statutorily required. Plaintiffs named as defendants the State, Governor, Department of Education, and Director of the Department. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' petition, concluding (1) Plaintiffs had stated claims for relief under the equal protection and due process clauses, but their constitutional claims presented a nonjusticiable political question; and (2) their statutory claim under Iowa Code 256.37 failed because that provision did not afford a private right of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' challenges were properly directed to Plaintiffs' elected representatives, rather than the courts; but (2) Plaintiffs did not state claims for relief under the Iowa Constitution or section 256.37. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of children who were eligible to receive a free and appropriate public education, filed suit to challenge the exclusion of mapping of cochlear implants from the regulatory definition of "related services" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(26)(B). The court concluded that the phrase "audiology services" as used in the IDEA's "related services" definition did not unambiguously encompass mapping of cochlear implants. The court also found that the Mapping Regulations embodied a permissible construction of the IDEA because they were rationally related to the underlying objectives of the IDEA. The court further found that the Mapping Regulations did not substantially lessen the protections afforded by the 1983 regulations. Because the Department's construction of its own regulation was neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, the court owed it deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department. View "Petit, et al. v. US Dept. of Education, et al." on Justia Law

The Pascagoula School District (which contains a Chevron crude oil refinery and a Gulf liquified natural gas terminal) brought suit, seeking a declaration that a new law that mandated that revenue the District collected from ad valorem taxes levied on liquified natural gas terminals and crude oil refineries be distributed to all school districts in the county where the terminals and refineries were located was unconstitutional and requesting injunctive relief. All parties filed for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial judge ruled that the law was constitutional, and the plaintiffs appealed that decision. Because the Supreme Court found the contested statute violated the constitutional mandate that a school district's taxes be used to maintain "its schools," it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pascagoula School District v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Dass, born in India, was first hired as a teacher in 1991. In 2002, Dass was hired at Casals. Donaldson was the principal and rated Dass's overall performance through 2005 as excellent, but never recommended Dass for tenure based on concern that Dass was not a strong disciplinarian. Donaldson retired in 2005 and non-renewed Dass for the 2005-2006 school year. Dass was rehired for the year, but because of an error, was displaced after that school year when Casals lost teaching positions due to budget constraints. Dass won a grievance and was reinstated. Dass received medical leave in December 2006. She did not return the rest of the school year. In 2007, the principal recommended non-renewal. The Board accepted the recommendation. Dass filed suit, alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101.; and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Assignment to teach seventh grade was not an adverse employment action and there was no evidence of discrimination based on national origin. View "Dass v. Chicago Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Appellants, who are current and former certified educators employed by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) in the Palmetto Unified School District (PUSD), collectively appealed the Administrative Law Court's (ALC's) order that affirmed the State Employee Grievance Committee's decision denying their grievances regarding the SCDC's Reduction-in-Force (RIF) implemented in 2003. On appeal, Appellants contended the ALC erred in failing to enforce: (1) the plain language of the RIF policy; (2) the controlling legislation applicable to the PUSD and the RIF policy; (3) Appellants' constitutional rights with respect to employment; and (4) Appellants' rights as "covered employees" with respect to the RIF policy. Based on these alleged errors, Appellants asserted they were entitled to reinstatement to employment as well as back pay and benefits. Because the RIF was deemed "procedurally correct," the Supreme Court concluded the ALC correctly affirmed the Committee's decision regarding the inclusion of the PUSD in the RIF. However the Court concluded that the SCDC violated statutory law in precluding Appellants from exercising their priority right to recall as to the positions vacated by retirees. Because the "Retirement Opportunity" offered by the SCDC required a fifteen-day break in service before rehiring, the Court found that "window" constituted a vacancy for which Appellants should have been offered the opportunity for employment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this case to the Committee to determine the appropriate relief. View "Bell v. SCDC" on Justia Law

Defendant Christian Antonio Alaniz, Jr., appealed an order deferring imposition of sentence entered after he conditionally pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because there was not probable cause to justify the search of his person and the exception to the probable cause requirement for warrantless searches by school officials did not apply. Troy Vanyo was a police officer with the Grand Forks Police Department and was assigned to work as a school resource officer at a high school in Grand Forks. Vanyo had received information about possible drug use involving students in an area approximately a block and a half from the high school. One of the students was later identified as Defendant. The students walked to a town square area and Vanyo followed in his patrol car. Vanyo testified the students were seated when they saw him, stood up, and quickly walked toward a stage area in the town square. Later, Vanyo observed Defendant waiting to talk to the attendance secretary and he informed the school principal that Defendant was the other individual he observed in the town square and suspected was involved in drug activity. The principal took Defendant into a detention room and Vanyo followed them. Vanyo testified the principal questioned Defendant, Vanyo testified he told Defendant something like "if you have anything on you, you need to lay it on the table now." Defendant emptied his pockets, which contained a glass pipe and synthetic marijuana. In moving to suppress the evidence, Defendant argued the police failed to advise him of his rights under "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), there was not probable cause justifying the search of his person, and the exception to the probable cause requirement for searches by school officials did not apply. The district court denied the motion, ruling the reasonableness standard for searches by school officials applied and the search was reasonable. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of Defendant's age, gender, and nature of the suspicion. View "North Dakota v. Alaniz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Thomas Moore appealed a judgment that dismissed his claim for medical expenses incurred by his son, M.M., in their personal injury action against Fargo Public School District No. 1 and Eugenia Hart. In May 2004, M.M., a 15-year-old student at Discovery Middle School in Fargo, was seriously injured while practicing a bike stunt in the school auditorium in preparation for '60s Day, part of the curriculum for Hart's history class. Moore and M.M. brought a personal injury action against the District and Hart. The district court dismissed the action against the District as a matter of law, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred in ruling the recreational use immunity statutes barred the action against the District and erred in excluding certain evidence from the jury in the action against Hart, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. On remand, Hart settled, and the case was tried to the jury only against the District. At the close of the evidence, the district court rejected the District's request to include a line on the special verdict form for apportioning fault to Petitioner, concluding there was no evidence from which a jury could find him was at fault. The jury returned a verdict allocating 30 percent fault to "Eugenia Hart and any other employee of the Fargo Public School District" and 70 percent fault to M.M. The jury awarded Petitioner $285,000 for past economic damages based on M.M.'s medical expenses incurred while he was a minor. Because M.M.'s fault was greater than the fault of the District, the court entered judgment dismissing the action and awarding costs in favor of the District. The court also denied Moore's request to have judgment entered in his favor for $85,500, representing 30 percent of the $285,000 awarded by the jury for M.M.'s past medical expenses. Following the majority rule, the court concluded "a child's negligence should be considered in determining the extent of a parent's recovery against a third party for medical expenses paid." Because Petitioner's claim for past economic damages derived from M.M.'s injuries, and M.M. was denied recovery under North Dakota's modified comparative fault laws, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly dismissed Petitioner's claim for medical expenses. View "M.M. v. Fargo Public School Dist. #1" on Justia Law

UPRLS hired plaintiff as an assistant professor, with possibility of tenure after five years. During her probation, plaintiff, with a male professor, worked in the school's Legal Aid Clinic. Plaintiff's co-teacher had a sexual relationship with a student, who became pregnant as a result. Near the end of her probation, plaintiff requested a one-year extension. The dean questioned plaintiff about her knowledge of the relationship between her co-teacher and the pregnant student and chastised her for failing to report. There was no internal regulation prohibiting student-teacher relationships or mandating reporting. The Dean recommended the extension, but added comments questioning her judgment and maturity. When plaintiff learned of these comments, she wrote to the Chancellor and others, denouncing the comments. The dean reversed his position. A committee was formed and voted to deny the extension. After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff sued UPRLS and individuals, alleging gender-based discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The allegations did support a reasonable inference that plaintiff was engaging in protected conduct when she opposed the dean’s remarks or that defendants’ actions were based on gender. View "Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of PR" on Justia Law

After she was told in advance that her contract for employment would not be renewed, Stacey Carna, the principal of an elementary school, requested a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract. Without meeting with Carna, the board voted not to renew Carna's contract. The common pleas court denied Carna's subsequent request for mandamus relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that after an administrator has been informed that her contract will not be renewed, upon the administrator's request for a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract, Ohio Rev. Code 3319.02(D)(4) requires the board to meet in executive session with the administrator to discuss the reasons for nonrenewal. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law