Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A disabled child, born in 1996, was a student in the Sutton public school system from 1999 until 2005, when his parent were dissatisfied with the individualized education program developed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400-1491, and the services he was receiving. They removed him from the school and enrolled him in a private learning center. The Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals determined that the 2005 IEP complied with the IDEA. The district court upheld the decision on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court could not determine compliance without first determining the child's potential for learning and self-sufficiency. The district court properly concluded that the child's potential was unknowable and that the IEP was reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits. The parents did not raise triable claims under the First Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Titles II and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act, or 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985; plaintiffs “cannot disguise an IDEA claim in other garb.” View "D.B., a minor v. Esposito" on Justia Law

This case arose when the superintendent of the school district preferred eight charges of misconduct and/or incompetence against petitioner, then the business manager for the school district. At issue was whether persons who have testified in a Civil Service 75 disciplinary hearing were required to disqualify themselves from subsequently acting upon any of the charges related to that hearing. The court held that, because the testimony of the testifying witnesses, concerning the charges levied pursuant to section 75, rendered them personally involved in the disciplinary process, disqualification was necessary. View "Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment, dismissing their complaint, which alleged that an elementary school student's First Amendment rights were violated when he was suspended for six days after expressing a wish for violence to the school and teachers. The litigation arose out of a crayon drawing by B.C., a ten-year-old fifth-grader, in response to an in-class assignment. The drawing depicted an astronaut and expressed a desire to "[b]low up the school with the teachers in it." The court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the astronaut drawing could create a substantial disruption at the school and defendants' resulting decision to suspend B.C. was constitutional. The court also held that there was no merit to plaintiffs' argument that B.C.'s punishment was excessive in light of the court's deference to school authorities. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cuff v. Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a licensed Iowa educator, filed suit in Iowa state court against his employer, school officials, and private citizens following his termination. Plaintiff alleged various state-law claims as well as violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the denial of his motion to remand and the dismissal of his section 1983 claims. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to remand where, based upon the facts of the case, the unanimity requirement was satisfied. The court also held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claims as unexhausted where he failed to appeal his termination to an adjudicator under Iowa Code 279.17 and in dismissing plaintiff's substantive due process claim where he failed to plausibly plead a substantive due process claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Christiansen v. West Branch Community School, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a superior court judge's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging violations of her state civil rights. Plaintiff contended that she had a right, secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to attend a lecture that was open to the public, held on the campus of Tufts and that defendants violated the act when they excluded her from the lecture. Tufts, through its office of continuing education, presented a publicly advertised lecture on its campus entitled, "Dangers of Feeding Your Pet a Raw Diet." Plaintiff, who was an advocate of raw food diets for animals, sought to attend the lecture. At the time, she had not paid her bill for services rendered to her horse and defendants informed plaintiff that she was ineligible for continuing education services at Tufts. The court concluded that the circumstances of plaintiff's exclusion from the lecture did not amount to an interference with any claimed free speech right, and thus that the allowance of summary judgment on this claim was proper. The court also concluded that the allowance of summary judgment for defendants' on plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence was correct. View "Roman v. Trustees of Turfts College & others." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the University of Oregon, alleging that it prevented her from completing a Ph.D. program in retaliation for having complained of gender-based institutional bias in the University's Ph.D. program, and gender discrimination by her faculty dissertation committee chair. The court held that the facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX. Because a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence presented at summary judgment that the faculty chair's resignation was gender-based retaliation, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The court also reversed the district court's award of costs because the University was no longer the prevailing party under Rule 54(d). View "Emeldi v. University of Oregon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Maria Rosales filed this wrongful death action against LaPorte Community School Corporation after her son choked to death on food while eating lunch at his elementary school. The jury returned a $5 million verdict for Plaintiff, and judgment was entered in the sum of $500,000, the maximum amount then permitted under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The School Corporation appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in giving certain jury instructions. The Supreme Court granted transfer and agreed that the giving of the instruction, which could have reasonably been interpreted and applied by the jury in a way that substantially misstated Plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to establishing negligence on the part of the School Corporation, required reversal, but the error created by the instruction related only to the issue of liability and did not affect the jury's assessment of damages. Remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability only. View " LaPorte Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Rosales " on Justia Law

Dwight Trumble owned property in Sarpy County and paid two levies for the support of school districts in the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties (Learning Community). Trumble subsequently brought suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1735 against the school districts in the Learning Community, claiming the levies were unconstitutional. The district court determined it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a suit to recover unconstitutional taxes cannot be brought under section 77-1735; (2) Trumble filed suit outside the tax year in which the challenged taxes were levied or assessed, so the district court did not have jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,149; and (3) since the district court lacked jurisdiction, it properly dismissed the action. View "Trumble v. Sarpy County Board" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, Carol Perdue, individually and as next friend and guardian of her daughter, Anna; William D. Motlow, Jr.; and Shane Sears (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the objectors"), all of whom were objecting class members in class-action litigation related to the Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition ("PACT") Trust Fund a/k/a The Wallace-Folsom Prepaid College Tuition Trust Fund, appealed the trial court's judgment that approved a class-action settlement concluding the litigation. The objectors largely complained that as contributors or beneficiaries of the PACT fund, it was being mismanaged and underfunded to their detriment. While the case was pending, the Alabama Legislature changed the laws directly impacting the management and funding of the PACT program. The PACT Board responded to the change in the law by moving to dismiss the objectors' suit as moot. The issues on appeal before the Supreme Court involved terms of the settlement agreement: the objectors contended that the trial court permitted language in the agreement that ran afoul of the changed laws and disregarded objections of the complaining members of the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case: "[t]he scope of the objections in the trial court was not the narrow question whether the order should bind only the objectors, but, on the contrary, the issue presented [was] the broader question whether the trial court's judgment approving the settlement agreement [was] due to be affirmed. . . . the objectors are allowed to appeal that aspect of the trial court's order that affects them - 'the [circuit court's] decision to disregard [their] objections.' If the judgment [was] affirmed, the settlement agreement affects them in that it binds them, as members of the class, to terms of a settlement agreement inconsistent with 16-33C-19." View "Perdue v. Green" on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiff, then in ninth grade, was reported as having a knife. The school board held a hearing and entered an expulsion order. Plaintiff was conditionally reinstated for the next school year. In 2007 an administrator learned that the statement, "Only one bullet left, no one to kill but myself," appeared on plaintiff's backpack. Three more incidents involving threats or physical violence followed. Following meetings, he was permanently expelled and enrolled in private school. The state superintendent reversed the expulsion, but plaintiff remained in private school. Seen using the public school gym facilities, plaintiff was asked to leave; he became agitated and confrontational. The school barred him from the premises and he was subsequently cited for trespass. The district court entered summary judgment for the district with respect to his many claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He appealed with respect to the ban on entering school grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As a member of the public, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in accessing school grounds; defendants had no obligation to provide him with process in connection with the ban.View "Hannemann v. S. Door Cty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law