Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity. View "Howell v. Sander" on Justia Law

Defendant, a school district, leased portable classrooms from plaintiff under contracts including penalties for early cancellation or default. Under the Downstate School Finance Authority for Elementary Districts Law (105 ILCS 5/1F-1) the state later created the Authority to manage the District's finances. The Authority canceled the leases before expiration, but did not authorize payment of the cancellation fees. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding it was legally impossible for the District to pay the cancellation fees, but also finding that the Authority had to comply with the cancellation terms of the leasing contracts. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the District on the cancellation fees and vacated as moot the declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended the Act to permit the Authority to cancel a school district's contract with a third party, but that cancellation must be consistent with the contractual terms agreed to by the school district and the third party. The Authority can cancel the leasing contracts, but must pay the contractual fees for early cancellation. View "Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest Sch. Dist. 152.5" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by School District for three school years as the activities director and for one school year as interim middle school principal. Subsequently, School District terminated Appellant's employment. Appellant filed a grievance on the ground that he was a continuing-contract employee and entitled to continuing contract rights under Minn. Stat. 122A.40. School District denied the grievance. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Appellant's employment by the school district as an activities director fell within the definition of a "teacher" under section 122A.40, which would determine whether he was entitled to continuing-contract rights under the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not a professional employee required to hold a license from the state department and therefore was not a "teacher" within the meaning of the continuing-contract statute. View "Emerson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 199" on Justia Law

Governor Linda Lingle filed an executive order unilaterally imposing three-day-per-month furloughs for all state employees and reducing the Department of Education's and University of Hawaii's spending accordingly. The Hawaii State Teachers Association and United Public Workers (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this action, asserting several causes of action and moving for a temporary restraining order. The circuit court granted in part Plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction and held for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the dispute in this case ultimately related to a prohibited practice pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 89; and (2) the circuit court erred by deciding statutory issues over which the Hawaii Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction. View "State Teachers Ass'n v. Abercrombie" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the school district practice of giving preference to the boys' Friday and Saturday night basketball games, asserting that non-primetime games result in a loss of audience, conflict with homework, and foster feelings of inferiority. The district court dismissed the claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) and an equal protection claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983 on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Plaintiffs presented a genuine question of fact that such practices violate the statute. Defendants are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, subject to suit under that statute.View "Parker v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants are the parents of G.J., a child with autism and brain injuries. At issue was whether the ALJ and the district court properly evaluated appellants' claims that the MCSD did not comply with certain provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., with respect to services it was to provide to G.J. The court held that the district court did not err in setting forth reasonable conditions for G.J.'s reevaluation and in determining that appellants were not entitled to either a private or publicly funded independent educational evaluation. The court also held that there was no basis for making a determination that any procedural failures with regard to the August 2008 and 2009 IEP meetings impacted the education received by G.J. to any substantive degree. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "G. J., et al. v. Muscogee Co. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education (the Board), several of its members, and a teacher in the school system petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacated its order that denied their motion for summary judgment. Third-grade student "S.K." went to the restroom with two friends. Her teacher did not accompany them. S.K. claims that when she attempted to leave the restroom stall, the door jammed. She tried to climb over the door to get out of the stall but slipped and fell, cutting her face on a metal hanger on the back of the door. S.K. (by and through her mother Tetrina Capehart) sued the Board, its members individually and in their official capacities, and the teacher asserting negligence and wantonness claims, and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The Board and teacher argued that there were no genuine issues of fact, and that S.K. was contributorily negligent from "playing" in the restroom. The circuit court denied the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated that under the state constitution, it had absolute immunity from suit for claims asserted against it. The Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to rule in the Board's favor. View "In re: S.K." on Justia Law

This case concerned the way by which the costs of financing the school district were apportioned among the city of New Bedford, the town of Dartmouth, and the town of Fairhaven, which were municipalities comprising the school district. Dartmouth commenced an action in the superior court against defendants challenging the funding obligations imposed on the member municipalities by the Education Reform Act of 1993, G.L.c. 70, section 6. Fairhaven filed a cross claim asserting that the funding obligations imposed by the Act were a disproportionate tax on property and income in violation of the state constitution. The court held that the complaint filed by Dartmouth and cross claim filed by Fairhaven were properly dismissed because Dartmouth and Fairhaven failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. View "Town of Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist. & others" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher, filed this action against defendants, a superintendent and principal, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. At issue was whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and whether plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims were barred by res judicata. The court held that plaintiff failed to present any precedent, and the court was aware of none, to suggest that a reasonable principal and superintendent armed with the knowledge they possessed, to include the unsatisfactory performance reviews, would know they could not recommend and/or adopt a recommendation to terminate plaintiff. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and the court need not address the res judicata issue. View "Sherrod v. Johnson; Sherrod v. Crutchfield" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff Helen Barton was injured while watching a high school football game in Barrow when a player ran out of bounds during a play and collided with her, breaking her leg. Plaintiff sued the North Slope Borough School District, alleging in part that the football field had not been designed or built with a proper "run-off" area along the sidelines and that spectators had improperly been allowed to stand in the run-off area during the game. Plaintiff retained expert landscape architect Juliet Vong who proposed to testify that she used a particular manual in designing sports fields "to help ensure the appropriate dimensions and design criteria are met for a given sport and level of play." The School District filed a motion in limine to exclude Vong's testimony because it did not provide an admissible expert opinion. The superior court agreed with the District and excluded Vong's report and testimony. At a jury trial in August 2010, the District was found not negligent. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court should not have excluded Vong's testimony and that doing so was prejudicial to Plaintiff's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that although it was error to exclude Vong’s testimony, the error was harmless. View "Barton v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law