Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a private college, brought suit against a town and a local zoning authority (defendants), seeking, among other things, a declaration that its proposed development of residential and education facilities for older adults (Regis East) qualified for protection under the Dover Amendment, G.L.c. 40A, section 3, second par. The Dover Amendment exempted from certain local zoning laws or structures that were to be used by nonprofit educational institutions for "educational purposes." Because the court could not conclude that plaintiff "has no reasonable expectation" of demonstrating that Regis East would primarily operate in furtherance of educational purposes, the court vacated and remanded. View "Regis College v. Town of Weston & others." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a putative class action in Texas state court alleging that defendants had violated certain provisions of the Texas Education Code by soliciting students in Texas without the appropriate certifications. Defendants subsequently appealed the district court's confirmation of an arbitral award that required them to submit to class arbitration. They contended that the district court, not the arbitrator, should have decided whether the parties' agreement provided for class arbitration, and that the district court should have vacated the arbitrator's class arbitration award. Because the parties agreed that the arbitrator should decide the class arbitration issue, the court concluded that the district court correctly referred that issue to the arbitrator. The district court erred, however, in confirming the award because the arbitrator exceeded his powers. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reed v. Florida Metro University, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

E.R., now 10 years old, attended kindergarten and first grade at a public school. E.R. has been identified as having numerous learning disabilities, and health-related problems, including severe food and contact allergies. During the summer after first grade, her parents determined that programs offered by the district were inadequate to address E.R.'s unique needs, and decided to enroll her at a private school that specializes in instructing students with learning disabilities. They filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, seeking compensatory education for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and tuition reimbursement, including transportation expenses. A hearing officer awarded compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school year, reimbursement of tuition for the 2008-2009 school year, and reimbursement for transportation. The district court reversed and the Third Circuit affirmed. The district took reasonable steps to accommodate E.R.'s disabilities and include her in all class activities; it was not required to grant the specific accommodations requested by her parents or otherwise make substantial modifications to the programs that were used for all other students. View "Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher at a small Christian school, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school on her pregnancy discrimination claim, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., contending that she had established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. After admitting to the school's administrator and assistant administrator that she conceived the child before getting married, the school fired her, purportedly because she had sinned by engaging in premarital sex, and, as the administrator put it, "there are consequences for disobeying the word of God." Because the school did not raise any issue or make any argument in its brief about the ministerial exception, the court would not decide whether that exception might apply. The court found that plaintiff's testimony contradicted the administrator's testimony that he had never heard her say she was sorry for what she had done and that he would not have fired her if she had. For that and other reasons, plaintiff had established a genuine issue of material fact about the reason that the school fired her. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the pregnancy discrimination claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hamilton v. Southern Christian School, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this qui tam suit alleging that the District of Columbia and its schools violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, by submitting a Medicaid reimbursement claim without maintaining adequate supporting documents. The district court dismissed the case, relying on the court's precedent in United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club. Because the court concluded that the Supreme Court had implicitly overruled Findley in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, the court reversed. View "Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued defendants, including the school district, alleging 20 procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court disposed of almost all of plaintiff's claims and plaintiff and defendants subsequently appealed. The court agreed with the school district that the district court erred by inferring from the IDEA a private right of action for nominal damages. The court also held that Congress has not expressed an intent to create a cause of action for monetary damages based on the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court reviewed plaintiff's other contentions in her cross-appeal and find them either waived or lacking merit. View "Oman, et al. v. Portland Public Schools, et al." on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court considered whether an area education agency (AEA) acted lawfully when it approved for submission to the voters a petition that proposed a consolidation of two community school districts, Preston and East Central. East Central sought to block the measure from being placed before the voters, asserting (1) the AEA approval of the petition for submission to the voters was legally flawed because the AEA failed to comply with a statutory requirement that it develop a plan for the AEA district, and (2) the AEA failed to make a required statutory finding that the consolidation proposed in the petition was in conformity with the plan. The district court rejected the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the AEA acted lawfully in approving submission of the petition to the voters, as (1) the AEA was not required to develop a specific plan of merger between the two school districts prior to approval of submission of a citizen petition to the voters of the districts; and (2) by approving the submission of the issue to the voters, the AEA made an implied finding that all the statutory requisites were met. View "E. Central Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Miss. Bend Area Educ. Agency" on Justia Law

In 2010, appellants unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the implementation of the 2011-2012 student assignment plan by the school board. On appeal, appellants argued that the district court committed legal error by failing to apply, and requiring the school board to rebut, a presumption that racial disparities in the 2011-2012 assignment plan resulted from the school board's prior unconstitutional conduct in operating a racially segregated school district. The court agreed and therefore vacated the district court's order and remanded for reconsideration. View "Everett v. Pitt Cty. Brd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellant, inmate Sidney Souffrance, petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the records custodian for the Life Skills Center of Cincinnati, a community school, to provide access to the attendance records, addresses, and telephone numbers of all students who were in a certain classroom during two specific months and to records indicating which computer terminal a specific student had used during one of those months. The court of appeals held that the disclosure of the requested records was barred by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the record request related to persons who were no longer students, because the persons were students when the records were created and originally maintained, the records were subject to the nondisclosure provisions of FERPA. View "State ex rel. Souffrance v. Doe" on Justia Law

The Arkansas School for the Deaf's Board of Trustees terminated Appellant Darleen Tripcony from her employment with the School as part of a reduction in force (RIF). The Arkansas State Employee Grievance Appeal Panel (SEGAP) upheld the Board's RIF of Tripcony's position. Tripcony subsequently filed a complaint in circuit court requesting judicial review of the decision by SEGAP upholding the denial of her appeal and further sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the School. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the basis that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Tripcony's claim against the School's Board of Trustees was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court also dismissed Tripcony's claims against several members of the Board in their individual capacities based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of the termination of a state employee; and (2) it necessarily followed that the Court also lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal issues relating to the immunity issues. View "Tripcony v. Ark. Sch. for the Deaf" on Justia Law