Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In summer 2010, due to budget deficits, the board laid off 1,289 teachers. Laid-off teachers were not given preference for positions available in the district, nor were all vacancies posted on the website. In August, 2010, there was an increase in funding. Approximately 715 tenured teachers were recalled, but many positions were filled with new hires, rather than laid-off tenured teachers. There was no official recall policy. The Seventh Circuit certified, to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the question of whether the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-18(31)), provides that Chicago tenured teachers have a right to be rehired after an economic layoff and whether they have a right to certain procedures during rehiring. The court responded that Chicago public schools are treated differently under the School Code. In all the other districts, laid-off tenured teachers have a right of recall and, subject to certification and seniority, have a right to be rehired into new vacancies in their districts for a specific period. Under 1995 amendments Chicago teachers were not given those rights. The supreme court declined to read into School Code language something which the legislature did not put there. View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ., City of Chicago" on Justia Law

These cases called upon the court to decide whether petitioners were required to exhaust an available internal appeal procedure before challenging the termination of their probationary employment at the City of New York's Department of Education (DOE). The DOE was obligated by its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the United Federation of Teachers and its own bylaws to afford probationary employees the opportunity for reconsideration of a decision to discontinue their employment. The court held that the DOE's decisions were "final and binding" within the meaning of CPLR 217(1) as of the dates when petitioners' probationary services ended. Petitioners awaited the outcome of the internal reviews provided for under the CBA and the DOE's bylaws before commencing suit. But these reviews "stem[] solely from the [CBA]" and constituted "an optional procedure under which a teacher may ask [DOE] to reconsider and reverse [its] initial decision, ... which was final and which, when made, in all respects terminated the employment of a probationer under Education Law 2573(1)(a);" they were not administrative remedies that petitioners were required to exhaust before litigating the termination of their probationary employment. As a result, petitioners' lawsuits brought more than four months after the dates when their probationary service ended, were time-barred. View "Kahn v New York City Dept. of Educ.; In the Matter of Doreen Nash v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. etc." on Justia Law

This case arose when petitioner, a tenured assistance principal in the City's public school system, approached a principal at a middle school in the district to request favorable treatment for petitioner's son, a teacher at the middle school. Petitioner subsequently commenced a CPLR 78 proceeding, seeking to prohibit the Board and the City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) from proceeding with petitioner's scheduled administrative trial. The court held that the Board was authorized to enforce the Conflicts of Interest Law, NY City Charter 2600-2607, against a public servant who was subject to discipline under section 3020 and 3020-a of the Education Law. As a result, the lower courts improperly prohibited the Board and OATH from proceeding with the administrative trial against petitioner. View "Matter of Rosenblum v New York City Conflicts of Interest Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the President of Valdosta State University, claiming that under the Due Process Clause, he was due notice of the charges, and a hearing to answer them, prior to his removal from campus. Plaintiff, a student, was removed on the ground that he presented a "clear and present danger" to the campus. Plaintiff joined the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia as a defendant, claiming against the Board a state-law breach of contract claim for damages. Plaintiff claimed that the student handbook and contracts for student housing established binding agreements between the Board and the university students and the Board breached these agreements by failing to afford plaintiff the due process prior to his removal from campus. The court held that the district court properly denied the President's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where plaintiff had a constitutional right to process before he was removed from the university and plaintiff's constitutional rights were clearly established. The court held, however, that the district court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim against the Board as barred by the Eleventh Amendment where Georgia had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for breach of contract actions. View "Barnes v. Zaccari, et al." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties established a common levy for the general fund budgets of its eleven member school districts. After Sarpy County levied this tax on real property, three taxpayers brought an action in the district court seeking a declaration that the tax was unconstitutional. The Learning Community, each of its member school districts, and the Sarpy County treasurer were named defendants in the action. The district court declared the Learning Community's common levy was unconstitutional as a property tax for state purposes. The Learning Community and two of its member school districts appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-34442(2)(b), which provides that a learning community may establish a levy for general fund budgets of its member school districts, serves a predominantly local purpose, not a state purpose; and (2) because all members of the learning community received benefits from taxes levied and the levy was uniform throughout the community, there was no violation of either the Nebraska Constitution's prohibition of commutation or the uniformity clause. Remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Sarpy County Farm Bureau v. Learning Cmty. of Douglas & Sarpy Counties" on Justia Law

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400, states receive federal funding for education of disabled children if local schools provide a "free appropriate public education" to all resident children with disabilities. Local districts must identify children with disabilities, determine whether they require special-education services, and develop individualized education programs (IEPs) tailored to each student's specific needs. In 2001, students with disabilities sued Milwaukee Public Schools and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, alleging IDEA violations. The case became focused on "child find" requirements. DPI settled by agreeing to order MPS to meet compliance benchmarks. The district court approved the settlement over MPS's objection and ordered MPS to set up a court-monitored system to identify disabled children who were delayed or denied entry into the IEP process, implement hybrid IEP meetings, and craft compensatory-education remedies. The Seventh Circuit vacated the class-certification order and liability and remedial orders. IDEA claims are highly individualized, making the case unsuitable for class-action treatment. The claims lack commonality required by Rule 23(a)(2). DPI's settlement was vacated as requiring more of MPS than DPI had the statutory authority to demand. View "Jamie S., v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

John was a ninth grade special education student. Jane, in eighth grade, believed that she was John's girlfriend. Jane's mother claims that John sexually harassed Jane by shoving her into a locker out of jealousy, requesting oral sex, and making obscene gestures during a basketball game. After confronting John, who became hostile, Jane's stepfather wrote to administration. John's IEP team created a plan requiring constant adult supervision at school for the next 30 days. Seven weeks after the supervision ended, after school, John sexually assaulted Jane on school grounds. John, who had a long disciplinary history, including harassment and assault, and had been arrested twice, was then expelled. A school he previously attended had agreed not to expel John and to purge disciplinary records in exchange for his withdrawal. Jane's mother filed sued the school and officials, alleging violations of Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered judgment for defendants on all counts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff abandoned her 1983 claim, did not establish animus for a 1985 claim, did not establish deliberate indifference, or a special relationship that would create a duty to protect her daughter, or that Jane was deprived of access to educational opportunities. View "Doe v. Merrill Comty Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity. View "Howell v. Sander" on Justia Law

Defendant, a school district, leased portable classrooms from plaintiff under contracts including penalties for early cancellation or default. Under the Downstate School Finance Authority for Elementary Districts Law (105 ILCS 5/1F-1) the state later created the Authority to manage the District's finances. The Authority canceled the leases before expiration, but did not authorize payment of the cancellation fees. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding it was legally impossible for the District to pay the cancellation fees, but also finding that the Authority had to comply with the cancellation terms of the leasing contracts. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the District on the cancellation fees and vacated as moot the declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended the Act to permit the Authority to cancel a school district's contract with a third party, but that cancellation must be consistent with the contractual terms agreed to by the school district and the third party. The Authority can cancel the leasing contracts, but must pay the contractual fees for early cancellation. View "Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest Sch. Dist. 152.5" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by School District for three school years as the activities director and for one school year as interim middle school principal. Subsequently, School District terminated Appellant's employment. Appellant filed a grievance on the ground that he was a continuing-contract employee and entitled to continuing contract rights under Minn. Stat. 122A.40. School District denied the grievance. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Appellant's employment by the school district as an activities director fell within the definition of a "teacher" under section 122A.40, which would determine whether he was entitled to continuing-contract rights under the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not a professional employee required to hold a license from the state department and therefore was not a "teacher" within the meaning of the continuing-contract statute. View "Emerson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 199" on Justia Law