Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Since 2001 the company has provided professional training, curriculum development, and technical assistance to schools, teachers, and administrators to schools run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The BIA funds its program directly through BIA contracts with a provider and indirectly through distribution of funds under the No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. 6301, to BIA schools, which contract with a provider. The company sought payment from the BIA for specific time periods. The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals dismissed, finding that it did not have jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601, because the company failed to establish that it had a contract with the government for the unpaid services. The Federal Circuit vacated, in part, dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Failure to establish the existence of a contract meant that the company failed to state an element of its claim, not that the court lacked jurisdiction. Questions of fact concerning some of the claimed contracts remain unresolved. View "Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from allegations of improprieties at the Brownsville Independent School District (BISD), including allegations that appellants were manipulating the bidding process for the BISD's Stop Loss Insurance Coverage. Appellants, all members of the BISD Board of Trustees (Board), argued that the district court should have granted their motion for summary judgment because they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found no error in the district court's holding that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to whether appellants violated appellee's First Amendment rights. The court also held that the district court did not err when it denied summary judgment on appellants' qualified immunity defense. View "Juarez v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

Students and former students of the University of Alabama, Auburn University, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham, filed three separate class-action lawsuits in the Jefferson Circuit Court challenging the legality of so-called "dining-dollars" programs implemented by the universities and pursuant to which all undergraduate students were required to pay a mandatory dining fee each semester, which was then credited back to the students in the form of "dining dollars" that could be spent only at on-campus dining outlets controlled exclusively by the food-service vendors for the universities - Aramark Educational Services, Inc., at UA; Compass Group, USA, Inc. (Chartwells) at Auburn; and Sodexo, Inc., at UAB. The trial court dismissed the three actions, and the students appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion and affirmed all three. The students sued the boards of trustees governing the universities and the food-service vendors, alleging that the dining-dollars programs violated: (1) state antitrust laws; (2) the Alabama Constitution inasmuch as it forbids the State from having an interest in a private enterprise; (3) the rule in 16-1-32(d) barring universities from charging excessive transaction fees to merchants that accept university-issued debit cards; and (4) the common-law prohibition on conversion. Because the boards of trustees are entitled to state immunity pursuant to section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, all claims against them were properly dismissed. The university administrators and foodservice vendors were entitled to immunity on the asserted antitrust claims as well, albeit state-action immunity as opposed to state immunity. Moreover, because the students lacked standing to pursue a cause of action for a violation of 16-1-32(d), and because the students did not and could not allege the necessary elements of a conversion claim, the trial court also properly dismissed the students' other claims. View "Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four former elementary-school students, sued the school district because school officials have, at various times and in various ways, prevented them from evangelizing while at school. At issue was whether the school principals violated clearly established law when they restricted plaintiffs from distributing written religious materials while at school. The court held that the principals were entitled to qualified immunity because clearly established law did not put the constitutionality of their actions beyond debate. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with an instruction to dismiss plaintiffs' claims as to the principals in their individual capacities. View "Morgan, et al. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Delaware taxpayer, asserted claims against defendant, the State of Delaware Auditor of Accounts, for claims related to defendant's alleged noncompliance with 29 Del. C. 2906(f), which stated, in part, that the "Auditor of Accounts shall conduct postaudits of local school district tax funds budget and expenditures annually" and for claims related to defendant's alleged violation of Delaware's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 29 Del. C. ch. 100., by failing to provide plaintiff with copies of certain employee time sheets which he duly requested. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the audit claims and the FOIA claims must be dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Korn v. State of Delaware Auditor of Accounts R. Thomas Wagner, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lee Brandvold, Steve Bigelow, Dwight Johnson, Nikki Johansen, and Bruce Peterson (collectively "Brandvold") appealed a district court judgment dismissing their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. In 2009, the school board of the District voted to close the elementary school located in Ryder as part of an overarching reorganization plan. In February 2010, Brandvold filed a petition in district court alleging that the reorganization process had been tainted by fraud because the Berthold Public School District had not disclosed during its reorganization process information about certain outstanding debts it owed on lease-purchase transactions. Brandvold sought a declaration that the reorganization was invalid and that the District be dissolved and the former districts be reinstated. Brandvold also sought an injunction prohibiting the District from closing any school within the District. The District moved for judgment on the pleadings for Brandvold's failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. On appeal, Brandvold challenged only the dismissal of the request for declaratory relief, not the dismissal of the request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the alleged irregularities in the reorganization process were rendered moot by the completion of a District-wide election: "[c]onstruing the petition in the light most favorable to Brandvold and accepting the allegations in the petition as true, we conclude no justiciable controversy was presented and the district court did not err in dismissing the petition ." View "Brandvold v. Lewis &Clark Public Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Parents requested that the Anchorage School District evaluate their child for eligibility for special education services. While awaiting the results of the eligibility assessment, the parents arranged for private tutoring. The school district did not assess the child’s eligibility within the statutorily-required time, and the parents requested a due process hearing. They also arranged for their child to be privately evaluated to determine whether he was eligible for special education services. The school district subsequently completed its evaluation and determined the child to be ineligible for services. At the due process hearing, the parents alleged that the school district committed procedural violations under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including impermissibly delaying the evaluation. They sought reimbursement for the cost of their child’s private evaluation and tutoring. An independent hearing officer presided over the due process hearing and ultimately agreed with the district that the child was ineligible for services. The hearing officer ordered the school district to pay the cost of the private eligibility assessment and to partially pay the cost of the tutoring. The superior court upheld the award of the private eligibility assessment, but reversed the award of the private tutoring cost. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the school district argued that the parents should not be reimbursed for the evaluation or the tutoring; the parents argued they are entitled to full reimbursement for both expenses. The central question the Court addressed was: where a child is ultimately determined to be ineligible for special education services, does the IDEA provide relief for procedural violations that occur during the process of evaluating the child’s eligibility for services? The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, upholding the independent hearing officer’s award of the private assessment cost, but reversing the hearing officer’s award of the private tutoring expenses. View "J.P. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute between plaintiff and her ex-husband over the education and custody of their three minor children. Plaintiff sued City Defendants, alleging that they unlawfully impeded her access to the children. Plaintiff sued the School District Defendants, asserting that they unlawfully denied her access to the children and their education records. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the City Defendants for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment for the School District Defendants. The court held that the fact that plaintiff lived in a different state did not suffice to convert the loss of a single three-hour visit into a deprivation of a fundamental right for purposes of substantive due process and, even if plaintiff could show a deprivation, the City Defendants' alleged conduct would not shock the conscience. The court also held that plaintiff failed to state a procedural due process claim against the City Defendants, given the relatively minimal deprivation alleged in this case, where the post-deprivation procedures were adequate to protect her rights to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The court further held that plaintiff had no fundamental liberty interest in contacting her children at their schools and the court agreed with the district court that an attendance clerk's one-time refusal to tell plaintiff why one of the children had been absent from school, a coach's referral of plaintiff to her ex-husband for information about the children's swimming activities, and the school's refusal to send plaintiff all of the school's projects she requested did not amount to a deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest. Given the limited nature of any infringement of plaintiff's protected liberty interest, the procedures at issue were sufficient to protect plaintiff's right to procedural due process. The court finally held that plaintiff's right, as a non-custodial parent, under state law and her role in the children's lives vary significantly from the rights and role afforded to the ex-husband or to a typical married parent. Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants with respect to her equal protection claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Des Moines Public Schools, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school math teacher, filed suit in federal court alleging that the school district violated his constitutional rights by making him remove banners he displayed in his classroom which referenced "God" and the "Creator." At issue was whether a public school district infringed the First Amendment liberties of plaintiff when it ordered him not to use his public position as a pulpit from which to preach his own views on the role of God in our Nation's history to the captive students in his mathematics classroom. The court agreed with the district court that no genuine issue of material fact remained in the present case. The court held, however, that the district court made a critical error when it determined that the school district had created a limited public forum for teacher speech and evaluated the school district's actions under a traditional forum-based analysis rather than the controlling Pickering-based inquiry. Applying the correct legal principles to the undisputed facts, the court held that the school district was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the claims raised by plaintiff. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the individualized education program (IEP) of C.C., a child with a disability. At issue was whether a school district, after being declared in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1490, in respect to a disabled child's entitlements, by an administrative hearing officer, could bring a civil action in court for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party against the child's parents on the grounds that their IDEA administrative complaint was brought for an "improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," although the parents had voluntarily dismissed their administrative complaint without prejudice. The court held that, under the plain meaning of the IDEA and its implementing regulations, the administrative proceeding through which the school district sought a declaratory ruling was a proceeding under section 1415. The court also held that the declaratory ruling favorably altered the school district's legal relationship with the parents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's legal relationship dismissing the school district's civil action and remanded the case for determination of whether the parents' administrative complaint "was delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," and if so, whether the district court should, within its discretion, award attorneys' fees to the school district. View "Alief Independent Sch. Dist v. C. C." on Justia Law