Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The District of Columbia filed this suit to recover its attorneys' fees from a lawyer who brought an administrative complaint against the District on behalf of a student with special educational needs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). At issue was whether the District was a "prevailing party" under the IDEA in this suit. The court held that the facts in this case followed closely in the wake of the court's precedent in District of Columbia v. Straus where that court held that the district was not a "prevailing party" where its own change of position was what had mooted the dispute, causing the case to be dismissed. Therefore, the court held that the District, in this case, was not a "prevailing party" where the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) authorized an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation for the student, which mooted the only issue before the hearing officer. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment ordering the lawyer to pay attorneys' fees was reversed.

Appellee Brooke Nelson brought suit against elementary public school teacher Dianne Turner after allegations that Nelson's five-year-old daughter had been sexually assaulted by another student. The complaint alleged, among other causes of action, that Turner failed to report to enforcement officials the alleged sexual assault. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Turner, concluding that Turner was entitled to qualified official immunity because her action, i.e., determining whether the facts constituted abuse, was discretionary in nature. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions to reconsider the mandatory abuse reporting obligation of Kan. Rev. Stat. 620.030. On remand, the trial court again found qualified official immunity applicable. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the reporting requirement of the statute was mandatory and therefore ministerial, obviating any application for qualified official immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the trial court properly granted Turner's motion for summary judgment because Turner's actions were discretionary in nature rather than ministerial and, therefore, she was entitled to the defense of qualified official immunity under law.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants claiming that she had been demoted in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights by attending a school board meeting and sitting next to her boss, who was fired at the meeting. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that defendants' efficiency interests were greater than plaintiff's interest in free association. The court held that it appeared that the triggering factor in defendants' action was simply plaintiff's decision to sit next to her boss at the public school meeting, without even speaking to him. The court also held that, because defendants produced no evidence that plaintiff's association with her boss actually disrupted the office or her performance, or reasonably threatened to cause future disruption, defendants failed to show that its interests in work-place efficiency outweighed plaintiff's First Amendment interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The German Village Society (GVS) filed an application for exemption of real property. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27(C), the school board became a party to the proceedings before the tax commission and to any appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). After the tax commissioner denied GVS's application, GVS appealed to the BTA but did not serve the school board with its notice of appeal. BTA reversed the decision of the tax commissioner and granted the exemption but did not transmit its decision to the school board. The tax commissioner then issued a determination giving effect to the BTA's decision. The school board filed a notice of appeal from the tax commissioner's order, asserting that the BTA's decision was void ab initio because the school board was not named or notified as to the existence of the appeal. The BTA held that because the period for appeal from its decision had expired, it did not have jurisdiction to address the validity of its earlier decision. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA's holding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief to the school board, vacated the BTA's decision along with the tax commissioner's related order, and remanded.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathleen Godon appealed the district court's judgment dismissing her complaint for breach of contract against the Defendant-Appellee Kindred Public School District. Plaintiff entered into a teaching contract with the School District for the 2008-2009 school year. In addition to the teaching contract, Plaintiff’s employment was subject to a professional negotiation agreement between the Kindred School Board and the Kindred Education Association. This more extensive agreement provides other terms of employment, including the base salary for a teacher in the District and the types and amounts of leave a teacher receives. The agreement did not provide for unpaid leave, but before the start of the school year, Plaintiff asked the District administration to allow her to take a week off work for travel. The District approved her request but required that she take unpaid leave for the days she could not apply personal leave. Plaintiff agreed to these terms. When school was not scheduled to be in session because of spring break, the District held school to make up for a storm day cancellation. Plaintiff did not work that day. While Plaintiff was away, the District cancelled school to allow employees and students to respond to imminent flooding in the Red River and Sheyenne River valleys. The District paid all teachers who did not request leave for this period as if school had been in session. Of four teachers who had previously requested and were granted leave during the flood cancellation period, only Plaintiff challenged the District's decision and filed a grievance. She claimed she should have been paid like all other teachers in the District who did not teach during the flood period. The District denied her grievance. Plaintiff brought suit in district court, alleging the District breached her teaching contract and violated her equal protection rights under the North Dakota Constitution. The district court ruled in favor of the District, finding that Plaintiff’s teaching contract was amended when the District granted her request for leave to travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held Plaintiff's arguments as without merit. The Court affirmed the District and the district court's decisions.

LTTS Charter School ("LTTS") was an open-enrollment school that retained C2 Construction, Inc. ("C2") to build school facilities at a site Universal Academy had leased. C2 filed a breach of contract suit and Universal Academy filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming immunity from suit. The trial court denied the plea and Universal Academy brought an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In the court of appeals, C2 moved to dismiss the interlocutory appeal, arguing that Universal Academy was note entitled to one because it was not a governmental unit under the Torts Claims Act ("Act"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001(3)(D). At issue was whether an open-enrollment charter school was a governmental unit as defined by Section 101.001(3)(D) and thus, able to take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. The court held that open-enrollment charter schools were governmental units for the Act purposes because the Act defined government unit broadly to include any other institution, agency, or organ of government derived from state law; the Education Code defined open-enrollment charters schools as part of the public school system, which were created in accordance with the laws of the state, subject to state laws and rules governing public schools and, together with governmental traditional public schools, have the primary responsibility for implementing the state's system of public education; and the Legislature considered open-enrollment charter schools to be governmental entities under a host of other laws outside the Education Code. Accordingly, because Universal Academy was a governmental unit under the Act, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear its interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).

Appellants, on behalf of their disabled daughter, appealed the district court's finding that the Fort Osage R-1 School District ("school district") offered the daughter a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400, et seq., for the 2006-2007 school year. Appellants sought reimbursement for their costs of placing their daughter at a private facility during the school year. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the school district offered the daughter a FAPE and that the Individualized Education Plan put forward by the school district did not suffer from any procedural error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioners, 23 transportation vendors, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to prevent the Department of Education ("DOE") from implementing allegedly illegal bid solicitations related to a school transportation contract. At issue was whether certain specifications in the bid solicitations of the DOE comported with the public bidding laws. The court held that the "Employee Protection Provisions" ("EPPs") contained in the solicitation were subject to heightened scrutiny and held that the DOE had not proven that the EPPs were designed to save the public money, encourage robust competition, or prevent favoritism. The court, however, applied the rational basis review to the remaining disputed bid specifications and held that the DOE's actions regarding pricing of school transportation and discounted payment arrangements were rational business judgments that lie within the DOE's discretion.

The student was suspended for using a home computer to create an internet profile of her middle school principal, including sexual content and vulgar language. The site did not include the principal's name, but did include his picture from the school website. Other students were not able to view the site from school computers and the student made an effort to limit viewers to a few of her friends. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school on First Amendment claims (42. U.S.C. 1983). The Third Circuit reversed in part. The school violated the student's rights in suspending her for for off-campus speech that caused no substantial disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption in school. There was no disruption beyond "general rumblings" and a few minutes of talk in class; the profile was outrageous and there was no evidence that anyone took it seriously. The court rejected the parent's Fourteenth Amendment claim of interference with their "liberty" interest in raising their child. The court affirmed that the school handbook and computer use policy were not overbroad and vague.

A student created a fake profile of his high school principal on a social networking internet web site, using his grandmother's computer. Some students saw the profile from school computers before the school disabled them. The student was suspended for 10 days, required to finish the school year at an alternative school, and banned from extra-curricullar activities and the graduation ceremony. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the student on his First Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983) claim. The Third Circuit affirmed, but vacated for rehearing en banc, following which it again affirmed. The school district response to the conduct transcended the protection of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. Student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school. The school district could not establish a sufficient nexus between the speech and disruption of the school environment. The student's attempt to use a picture from the district website did not establish such a connection, nor did the use of school computers, by other students, to access the site.