Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former Nelnet, Inc. ("Nelnet") loan advisor, alleged that certain Nelnet marketing practices were continuing violations of the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP") established under Part B of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1071, that rendered Nelnet liable under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). Plaintiff joined JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc. as defendants alleging they were knowing participants in a conspiracy to submit false claims. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's third amended complaint. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing plaintiff's claims where plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

The United States sued the New York City Board of Education and related parties ("City Defendants") claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact selection measures. The parties entered into a settlement in 1999 despite objections from incumbent employees who were denied leave to intervene in the suit. The incumbent employees' lawsuits raised the issue of whether the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement violated section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In addition to the central holding, the court addressed several other issues. The court held that because the district court in its Title VII analysis reached results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, its judgment must be vacated and remanded with two exceptions. First, the court affirmed the district court's grant of class certification and second, paragraph 4 of the district court's declaratory judgment had not been appealed and therefore must stand.

If funds are available, the Educational Leadership Oklahoma Act (Act) provides for bonuses to eligible teachers who attain national certification. In the past, the State Board of Education provided the full amount of bonuses and any additional amounts necessary to cover the payroll withholding taxes on the bonuses. In 2010, the Board didnât pay the withholding taxes. Teachers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board should have paid the withholding taxes on their bonuses. The trial court found that because the School District was not liable for the bonus payments under the Act, the State Department of Education was, and payment of the bonuses was conditioned on the availability of funds to pay them from State. The court determined that the School District was required to use some of the allocated bonus money from the State to fund the Districtâs tax obligations. Furthermore, the court concluded that the Teachers sued the wrong party by suing the School District, so that it could not enter a judgment in their favor. Accordingly, district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the Teachers were State employees, and State was responsible for paying employer withholding taxes for the bonuses, the School District had to pay them. However, the Court found that the State did not have enough money to pay both the bonuses and the withholding taxâit only had enough to pay the bonuses. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision to dismiss the case.

A continuing education student, suffering cognitive disabilities, obtained an injunction requiring the university to provide him with on-campus housing and an award of $101,676 in attorney fees. While appeal was pending, the student lived in a dormitory and completed the program. He has no intention to return. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the district court order, leaving the fee award undisturbed. The university did not appeal the fee award and the matter is not "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court declined to apply the "public interest" exception.

In September 2002, an accounting firm hired by plaintiff discovered irregularities in plaintiff's financial records. An audit revealed that the assistant superintendent had stolen over $200,000 from plaintiff's accounts. The Roslyn Union Free School District Board ("Board") was notified of the misconduct and decided to allow the assistant superintendent time to repay misappropriated funds and retire. Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in 2005 against former and current members of the Board, including defendant who was on the Board for a year starting in 2000, for the Board's allegedly lax management during the years the funds disappeared and their attempt to keep the illegal activities under wraps. At issue was whether a three or six year statute of limitations applied to causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by a school district against a former member of the school board. The court held that a six year statute of limitations period under CPLR 213(7) was applicable and therefore, the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and declaratory judgment should be reinstated as timely.

Plaintiff served as an elementary school nurse during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years but did not acquire professional teacher status under G.L. c. 71, sections 41 and 42. Defendant sent plaintiff a notice that she would not be employed for the following 2009-2010 school year because she did not have the proper professional standards. Plaintiff sued defendant asserting that she was entitled to reemployment where defendant failed to comply with the requirements under G.L. c. 71, section 42. At issue was whether the nonrenewal of plaintiff's employment should be treated as a "dismissal" within the meaning of section 42 and subject to the protections therein. The court held that the decision not to rehire a teacher on the experience of his or her term of employment cannot be equated to dismissal of a teacher during his or her term of employment. Therefore, plaintiff was not dismissed from her position and was not entitled to safeguards under section 42.

The government sought an injunction under the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201-219, based on the boarding school's use of uncompensated minors in its kitchen and housekeeping departments, agricultural operations, auto repair shop, Sanitarium, and other operations. The district court concluded that the students are not employees and, therefore, not subject to the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected the school's claim that students in a vocational program can never be considered employees and the government's argument that the test of whether "trainees" are employees should apply, and applied a "primary benefit" test. The school staff is sufficient to perform the work even if the students did not work and the school is not at competitive advantage with respect to the work; the students benefit from hands-on training in an accredited program that is run consistently with their parents' religious beliefs.

Appellees, the parents of a child with moderate-to-severe autism, filed due process proceedings against the Sumter County School District #17 ("District") seeking a determination that the District did not provide a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") to the child as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). At issue was whether the district court erred by concluding that the District failed to provide the child with a FAPE and that the program established by the child's parents to educate him at home was appropriate. The court held that that the district court did not err in concluding that the District failed to provide the child with FAPE for the 2005-2006 school year where the district court considered the evidence of the child's small improvements in a few tested areas against the District's conceded failure to provide the hours of therapy required for the child, the evidence that the lead teacher and aides did not understand or use proper techniques, and the evidence that it took one teacher months of working with the child to correct the problems caused by the improper techniques. The court also held that the district court did not err by finding that the District was not capable of providing FAPE to the child where the District's evidence was not compelling enough to establish it's improved capabilities at the time of the due process hearing. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's findings that the home placement was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.

Appellant, a former student in the Forest Grove School District ("Forest Grove"), appealed the district court's determination that he was not entitled to an award of reimbursement for his private school tuition under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(C). At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in holding that equitable considerations did not support any award of private-school tuition at Mount Bachelor Academy as a result of Forest Grove's failure to provide appellant with a Free and Appropriate Education ("FAPE") under the IDEA. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's factual determination where appellant's parents enrolled him at Mount Bachelor solely because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems.

Plaintiff sued defendants, public school officials in Burlington, Connecticut, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, among other things, violations under the First Amendment when they prohibited her from running for Senior Class Secretary in response to her off-campus internet speech and prohibited her from wearing a homemade printed t-shirt at a subsequent school assembly. At issue was whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims that they violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights, whether plaintiff was entitled to money damages based on a "final policymaker" theory of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, and whether plaintiff was entitled to Equal Protection pursuant to a "selective enforcement" argument under LeClair v. Saunders. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the asserted First Amendment rights at issue were not clearly established. The court also held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claims under Monell where she failed to properly assert the claim against defendants. The court further held that plaintiff was not entitled to Equal Protection where she failed to show that any other Student Council member went unpunished after engaging in similarly offensive speech in light of the circumstances. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to identify a single Connecticut decision that suggested that free speech protections for public students were broader under the Connecticut Constitution than under the United States Constitution.