Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Nearly a decade ago, petitioners, a state child protective services worker and a county deputy sheriff, interviewed then 9-year-old S.G. at her Oregon elementary school about allegations that her father had sexually abused her. Her father stood trial for that abuse but the jury failed to reach a verdict and the charges were later dismissed. S.G.'s mother subsequently sued petitioners on S.G.'s behalf for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the in-school interview breached the Fourth Amendment's proscription on unreasonable seizures. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioners' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment but that they were entitled to qualified immunity from damages liability because no clearly established law had warned them of the illegality of the conduct. Although judgment was entered in petitioners' favor, they petitioned the Court to review the Ninth Circuit's ruling that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. At issue was whether government officials who prevailed on grounds of qualified immunity could obtain the Court's review of a court of appeals' decision that their conduct violated the Constitution. Also at issue was, if the Court could consider cases in this procedural posture, did the Ninth Circuit correctly determine that this interview breached the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that it could generally review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity but could not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case had become moot because the child had grown up and moved across the country and so would never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality was at issue. Therefore, the Court did not reach the Fourth Amendment question in this case and vacated the part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion that decided the Fourth Amendment issue.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the board of education of the town of Watertown ("board"), the town of Watertown ("town"), and two teachers employed by the board, claiming that, as a result of defendants' negligence, one plaintiff severely injured her foot at a school dance sponsored by the board. At issue was whether the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to strike the claims on the grounds that negligence claims against the town and board were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity and did not come within the scope of the statutory waiver of government immunity set forth in General Statutes 52-557n; that the claims against the two teachers were barred because section 52-557n did not create a cause of action against individual municipal employees; and that, in the absence of a common law negligence claim against the teachers, there was no basis for an indemnification claim pursuant to General Statutes 7-465. The court held that the trial court properly granted defendants' motion to strike count one as to the town and the board because they were immune from suit pursuant to 52-557n(a)(2)(B) and properly determined that section 52-557n did not authorize suit against individual government employees. The court also held that the trial court improperly granted the motion to strike the first count of the complaint as to the two teachers and the entire second count seeking payment from the town and the board pursuant to section 7-465 on the ground that plaintiffs had not alleged common law negligence against the teachers. The court further held that the trial court's ruling could be affirmed on the alternate ground that the teachers were immune from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs sued defendant in state court alleging that defendant violated a number of its statutory and common-law duties while managing plaintiffs' assets. Defendant filed a notice of removal with the district court, arguing that the diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1), gave the district court original jurisdiction over the action. At issue was whether the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' motions to remand to state court. The court held that, after considering plaintiffs' relative lack of Independence from the State of Missouri as well as the potential impact that a money judgment in plaintiffs' favor could have on the state's treasury, the court found that plaintiffs were merely an arm of the state and not "citizens" for purposes of section 1332(a)(1). Therefore, defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the district court had original jurisdiction over the case and the district court's orders to remand the case to state court were affirmed.

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendants alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing plaintiff equal access to defendant's "Backpack Flyers for Students" program. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and damages on the merits. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff's First Amendment rights were not violated; that a limited public forum could be limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects and a public entity could impose reasonable and viewpoint neutral restrictions on speech in the forum; that restrictions on plaintiff's access to the program was viewpoint neutral and did not impose a substantial restriction on plaintiff's access to the forum; and that the school official did not exercise unbridled discretion in managing the program.

The regional board of school trustees dissolved a school district, partially located in Montgomery County, and annexed it to a district previously located entirely in Sangamon County. About 99.7 percent of the reconstituted district is in Sangamon County and the voters of that county had approved a referendum under the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL)(35 ILCS 200/18â185); the voters in Montgomery County had not. A taxing district subject to PTELL may not ordinarily extend taxes at a rate that exceeds the previous yearâs extension by more than 5%, or the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index, whichever is less, without referendum approval. The district, wanting to issue bonds to finance improvements, sought a declaration that PTELL did not apply. Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the supreme court held that the entire district remains subject to the PTELL.

A.S., a California minor, filed a request for a special education due process hearing where he was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., as an emotionally disturbed child. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding a special education student's placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court requested the California Supreme Court exercise its discretion and decide the following certified question, "Whether under California law the school district responsible for the costs of a special education student's education while the student is placed at an out-of-state residential treatment facility is the district in which the student's de facto parent, who is authorized to make educational decisions on behalf of the student, resides."

Plaintiffs, former students of Ithaca High School, claimed that defendants violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by prohibiting the publication of a sexually-explicit cartoon in the Ithaca High School student newspaper ("IHS newspaper") and by prohibiting the on-campus distribution of an independent student newspaper containing the same cartoon. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the IHS newspaper was a limited public forum. The court concluded that the IHS newspaper was a limited public form and held that defendants lawfully prohibited the publication of the sexually-explicit cartoon pursuant to the standards for regulation of speech set forth in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. The court also held that defendants lawfully prohibited the on-campus distribution of the sexually-explicit cartoon in an independent student newspaper pursuant to Fraser and that the court need not reach the question of whether defendants' prohibition of the on-campus distribution of the independent student newspaper was lawful under Tinker v. DesMoines Indep. Cmty. Scho. Dist.

Petitioners Daniel and Lisa B. appealed the decision of the New Hampshire State Board of Education (Board) that upheld a thirty-four day suspension imposed on their daughter Keelin B. Keelin opened an email account under another studentâs name, and then sent sexually suggestive, lewd and threatening email messages to the principal of her school and one teacher. When the deception was discovered, the Board âsentencedâ Keelin to a thirty-four day suspension. Keelinâs parents appealed to the School Board, but the Board upheld the suspension. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Keelinâs âsentenceâ exceeded the Boardâs maximum allowable suspension under these kinds of circumstances. The Court reduced Keelinâs suspension to twenty days, but affirmed the Boardâs decision in all other respects.

Plaintiff, a former Nelnet, Inc. ("Nelnet") loan advisor, alleged that certain Nelnet marketing practices were continuing violations of the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP") established under Part B of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1071, that rendered Nelnet liable under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). Plaintiff joined JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc. as defendants alleging they were knowing participants in a conspiracy to submit false claims. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's third amended complaint. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing plaintiff's claims where plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

The United States sued the New York City Board of Education and related parties ("City Defendants") claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact selection measures. The parties entered into a settlement in 1999 despite objections from incumbent employees who were denied leave to intervene in the suit. The incumbent employees' lawsuits raised the issue of whether the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement violated section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In addition to the central holding, the court addressed several other issues. The court held that because the district court in its Title VII analysis reached results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, its judgment must be vacated and remanded with two exceptions. First, the court affirmed the district court's grant of class certification and second, paragraph 4 of the district court's declaratory judgment had not been appealed and therefore must stand.