Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A student, E.A., resided in the Pittsfield School District, which operates its own middle and high school. E.A. applied to and was accepted by Prospect Mountain School, an open enrollment public school located outside the district. When Prospect Mountain requested tuition payment from the Pittsfield School District for E.A.’s attendance, the district refused, asserting that because it had not adopted the provisions of RSA chapter 194-D, it was not obligated to pay tuition for students attending open enrollment schools outside its district.E.A.’s parents appealed the superintendent’s decision to the Pittsfield School Board, which denied their request. They then appealed to the New Hampshire State Board of Education. After a hearing, a hearing officer recommended upholding the school board’s decision, reasoning that the district was not required to pay tuition unless it had formally adopted an open enrollment program. However, after oral argument, the State Board rejected this recommendation. The State Board interpreted the statute to require a resident district to pay tuition for students attending an open enrollment school in another district, regardless of whether the sending district had adopted the statute. The Pittsfield School District’s motion for rehearing was denied, and it appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and recent legislative amendments. The court held that under RSA chapter 194-D, a sending school district must pay tuition to an open enrollment receiving school in another district, even if the sending district has not adopted an open enrollment program. The court found that the statutory scheme and recent clarifying amendments support this interpretation. The court affirmed the State Board’s decision. View "Appeal of Pittsfield Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After their property in DeKalb County was annexed by the City of Atlanta, two parents sought to enroll their children in Atlanta Public Schools (APS). APS, however, denied enrollment, citing a 2021 Georgia law (SB 209) that prevents the expansion of APS boundaries to include newly annexed areas unless specifically authorized. The City of Atlanta had approved the annexation and expressed its intent for the APS boundaries to expand accordingly, but APS maintained that SB 209 prohibited such an extension.The parents and the City of Atlanta filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of Georgia, arguing that SB 209 was unconstitutional under the Georgia Constitution’s Single Subject Rule. The case was initially filed in Fulton County, transferred to DeKalb County, and then refiled in Fulton County against the State after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the DeKalb action. The DeKalb County School District (DCSD) was allowed to intervene as a plaintiff. The trial court denied motions to dismiss, found that the plaintiffs had standing, determined there was a justiciable controversy, and ruled that SB 209 violated the Single Subject Rule, granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant relief. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the plaintiffs failed to establish an actual or justiciable controversy with the State, as the alleged harm stemmed from APS’s actions, not from any enforcement by the State. Because the dispute did not involve the parties before the court, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "PILATO v. STATE OF GEORGIA" on Justia Law

Two elementary school students with intellectual disabilities, through their legal guardians, and a disability advocacy organization challenged the educational placement practices of a public school district. The plaintiffs alleged that the district automatically assigned students with intellectual disabilities to self-contained special education classes in a limited number of designated schools, based solely on IQ-based categories, without conducting individualized assessments to determine whether a general education classroom with supplementary services might be more appropriate for each student. The plaintiffs claimed this practice violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA).After the students’ parents pursued administrative due process hearings under the IDEA, hearing officers dismissed their ADA claims for lack of jurisdiction and, in one case, denied a hearing on the IDEA claim due to lack of parental consent for services. The other student’s hearing officer found that the district had made an appropriate individualized placement. The plaintiffs, joined by the advocacy organization, then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and similarly situated students. The district court dismissed all claims, construing the complaint as seeking only placement in neighborhood schools—a form of relief previously held unavailable under Tenth Circuit precedent—and dismissed the RA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the district failed to make individualized educational placement determinations stated plausible claims under the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504. The court also found that exhaustion of administrative remedies for the RA claim would have been futile. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jacobs v. Salt Lake City School District" on Justia Law

A sixth-grade student with behavioral disabilities, X.M., attended Mount Pleasant Public Schools under an Individualized Education Plan that allowed him to use a breakroom to manage stress. In the fall of 2021, after a student reported that X.M. had brought a gun to school, school officials, including special-education teacher Jason Russell, searched X.M.’s locker and questioned him, but found nothing. The next day, after X.M. made a comment about not having his gun at school, officials again searched his belongings. According to X.M., Russell then ordered him to pull down his trousers and lift his shirt in a search for a gun. Days later, after X.M. was suspended for violence, he claimed Russell locked him in the breakroom for over 20 minutes.Cheyenne Johnson, X.M.’s mother, sued Russell, the school district, and other officials, alleging violations of X.M.’s constitutional rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to all defendants except Russell, denying him qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. The district court found that disputed facts—specifically, whether Russell conducted a strip search and locked X.M. in the breakroom—required a jury’s determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that, even accepting X.M.’s version of events, Russell did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that Russell’s search was justified at its inception and not clearly excessive in scope given the suspicion of a gun. It also concluded that it was not clearly established that locking a student in a breakroom for 20 minutes under these circumstances constituted an unreasonable seizure. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims against Russell. View "Johnson v. Mount Pleasant Public Schools" on Justia Law

A tenured English professor at a public university in Ohio, who identifies as transgender, became involved in discussions about leading the university’s Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality during a period of departmental restructuring. Although the professor expressed interest in directing the Center and was considered a strong candidate, the position was not open as the Center had gone dormant. The professor was offered a partial teaching load reallocation to help develop a new gender-studies major, but after a series of profanity-laden and disparaging social media posts targeting colleagues and administrators, the offer was rescinded. The professor also sought a tenure transfer to the main campus, which was denied by faculty committees after considering collegiality and departmental needs, with no discussion of gender identity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the university and individual defendants on all claims. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and concluded that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, including the professor’s unprofessional conduct and the department’s academic requirements. The professor appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings on claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and perceived-disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation, that the professor’s social media posts did not constitute protected speech on matters of public concern under the First Amendment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a perceived-disability claim. The court clarified that adverse employment actions under Title VII need only cause some harm, but found the university’s reasons for its decisions were not pretextual. View "GPat Patterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Parents and guardians of students enrolled in independent study programs at two California charter schools requested that the schools purchase and allow the use of sectarian curricular materials for instruction. The schools denied these requests, citing California laws that prohibit the teaching of sectarian or denominational doctrine in public schools, including charter schools. The plaintiffs argued that the independent study programs were essentially homeschooling and that the denial of their requests violated their rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that charter schools are part of California’s public school system and are permitted to provide strictly secular education. It concluded that the plaintiffs were not being excluded from a generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise, as the case involved state-funded public schools rather than private schools. The court also held that a public school’s curriculum constitutes government speech, which is not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the funding and materials provided in independent study programs are a generally available public benefit, the programs are sufficiently public to allow California to require the use of secular curricula. The court further held that the curriculum decisions of public schools are government speech and thus not subject to the Free Speech Clause. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "WOOLARD V. THURMOND" on Justia Law

A private Christian school in Vermont forfeited a girls’ basketball playoff game because it objected, on religious grounds, to playing against a team with a transgender athlete. The school believes that requiring its female athletes to compete against biological males would violate its religious convictions about the immutability of sex. Following the forfeit, the Vermont Principals’ Association (VPA), which oversees extracurricular activities for Vermont schools, expelled the school from all state-sponsored extracurricular activities, including both athletic and non-athletic events.After the expulsion, the school and several students and parents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, seeking a preliminary injunction to reinstate the school’s VPA membership and alleging a violation of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the VPA’s policies regarding transgender athletes were neutral and generally applicable, and thus subject only to rational-basis review. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that the VPA’s expulsion was not neutral, as it was accompanied by official expressions of hostility toward the school’s religious beliefs. The court found that the plaintiffs also satisfied the requirements of irreparable harm and public interest. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to grant a preliminary injunction reinstating the school’s VPA membership pending further proceedings. View "Mid Vermont Christian School v. Saunders" on Justia Law

A plaintiff alleged that, between 1965 and 1969, while he was a young child attending an elementary school in a California school district, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by the school’s principal. The complaint stated that school staff and faculty were aware or suspected the abuse, and that similar abuse occurred to other students. The plaintiff claimed ongoing psychological and emotional harm as a result. He brought four negligence-based causes of action against the school district, asserting that he was not required to present a government tort claim before filing suit due to statutory changes exempting such claims.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the school district’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement was fatal to his case, and concluded that legislative changes extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 violated the California Constitution’s gift clause. The appellate court held that the retroactive waiver did not create a new liability or cause of action, but merely removed a procedural barrier to suit. The court further found that the legislative purpose of aiding victims of childhood sexual assault served a valid public purpose and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District" on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child with significant disabilities, including autism and other disorders, attended a public elementary school where staff were aware of his special needs and history of leaving school grounds when unsupervised. Despite this knowledge, the child was left alone multiple times, and on May 17, 2021, he walked out of the school unattended and was never seen again. His mother, acting as his legal guardian, alleged that the school district and staff negligently supervised her son, leading to his disappearance and likely death or serious harm. She also claimed severe emotional distress resulting from the incident.The mother filed suit in the District Court for Sarpy County under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), naming the school district and three staff members as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by sovereign immunity under the PSTCA’s due care and discretionary function exemptions, and that the complaint failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the motion, finding both exemptions applied and that the emotional distress claim was either barred or insufficiently pled. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, based solely on the complaint’s allegations and reasonable inferences, it could not determine whether the PSTCA exemptions applied, as a more developed factual record was needed. The court also found the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims for negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larsen v. Sarpy Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 77-0027" on Justia Law

A public elementary school district arranged for its students to attend a four-day overnight outdoor science camp operated by the county office of education. The county office provided direct overnight supervision, while district teachers were present but only on call. A student alleged that, during her attendance at the camp as a fifth grader, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a county office employee who served as a night monitor. The student claimed that both the district and the county office knew or should have known of the employee’s prior misconduct and failed to protect her.The student filed a negligence claim against the district, the county office, and the employee. The district moved for summary judgment in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, arguing that it was immune from liability under Education Code sections 35330 and 44808. The district contended that the camp was a “field trip or excursion” subject to a statutory waiver of claims and that, alternatively, it could not be liable because its employees were not providing immediate and direct supervision at the time of the alleged assaults. The trial court granted summary judgment for the district based solely on section 35330, finding the statutory waiver applied.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. It held that the district failed to establish as a matter of law that the camp was a “field trip or excursion” under section 35330, as the program was part of the required science curriculum rather than a recreational or observational departure. The court also found the district did not meet its burden under section 44808 to show that no district employee should have been providing immediate and direct supervision, especially in light of allegations that the district knew of risks posed by the county employee. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the district. View "Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School District" on Justia Law