Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A teacher in Indiana, who was preparing to begin teaching grades 1–3, filed a lawsuit challenging a new state statute that prohibits public schools and teachers from providing “instruction” on “human sexuality” to students in prekindergarten through third grade. While the law allows teachers to answer students’ questions and to teach academic subjects and child abuse prevention, it does not define the key terms “instruction” or “human sexuality.” The teacher argued that the statute would chill or restrict her protected speech, such as including certain books in her classroom library, displaying pro-LGBTQ+ stickers, and addressing students’ use of pejorative language related to sexual identity. She also claimed the law is unconstitutionally vague, fearing she might inadvertently violate it and risk losing her teaching license.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied her request for a preliminary injunction. The district court concluded that the teacher had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court reasoned that most of the speech affected by the statute—classroom instruction and related communications—was official speech not protected by the First Amendment, and that any protected speech affected was not substantial enough to make the law overbroad. It also found that the terms “instruction” and “human sexuality” had a discernible core of meaning, so the law was not unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the teacher had not demonstrated that the statute prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech or is impermissibly vague. The court concluded that any ambiguity at the margins does not render the statute facially invalid and emphasized that challenges to specific applications of the law could be brought in the future if necessary. View "Smiley v. Jenner" on Justia Law

A substitute teacher sexually assaulted a thirteen-year-old student on multiple occasions in a classroom, recorded at least two of the assaults, and shared one of the videos with adults in an online chatroom. The Federal Bureau of Investigation found child pornography on his phone and evidence of further distribution. The student confirmed multiple instances of abuse, which significantly impacted his mental health. The teacher was subsequently federally prosecuted and sentenced to seventeen and a half years for production of child pornography. In parallel state proceedings, he was indicted on several charges, pled guilty to three, and was sentenced to an aggregate thirty years in prison, with some terms ordered to run consecutively and concurrently.In the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, the court granted the State’s oral motion for consecutive sentences at sentencing but provided only a brief, generalized rationale focused on the teacher-student relationship and harm to the victim. It did not address the distinct nature of the offenses or provide a detailed explanation for departing from the presumptive concurrent sentencing. After the defendant appealed, the court issued a written order—drafted by the prosecution and adopted verbatim—offering a more comprehensive justification for the consecutive sentences. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the sentence, relying heavily on this post-sentencing written order.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s judgment and the portion of the circuit court’s sentence imposing consecutive terms. The court held that a sentencing court must state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences on the record at the time of sentencing, not in a later written order, and must not simply adopt the prosecutor’s arguments. The case was remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. View "State v. Bunag" on Justia Law

A group of teachers working in schools with persistent teacher vacancies filed administrative complaints asserting that their school district was unlawfully using long-term and rotating substitute teachers to cover these vacancies instead of pursuing all available legal avenues to staff classrooms with permanent, credentialed teachers. The affected schools served high-poverty communities and had challenges recruiting and retaining qualified teachers. The teachers alleged that the district failed to implement sufficient processes for recruiting, hiring, and supporting permanent teachers, and did not fully utilize statutory options or support programs to address the shortages.After the district responded to the complaints by acknowledging its noncompliance but attributing it to an inability to hire enough qualified teachers, the teachers sought judicial relief in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County. They requested a writ of mandate to compel the district to alter its staffing practices and comply with all legal requirements. The district argued that it was impossible to comply due to persistent teacher shortages, and the trial court denied the petition, finding the district was making good-faith efforts to fill vacancies.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, determined that the trial court erred by accepting the district’s impossibility defense without first requiring the district to demonstrate that it had exhausted all statutory alternatives, including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teacher Credentialing and the State Board of Education. The appellate court held that the doctrine of impossibility was not available unless the district showed it had pursued all available options without success. The court ordered issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its prior order and reconsider the petition consistent with this ruling. View "Cleare v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A high school student, who is a transgender girl but was assigned male at birth, played on a varsity girls’ softball team in Minnesota under a 2016 state athletic bylaw permitting students to participate in sporting activities consistent with their gender identity. Female Athletes United (FAU), an organization advocating for women’s sports, sued Minnesota officials and local school boards, alleging that permitting the student’s participation violated the rights of its members under Title IX by denying them effective accommodation and equal treatment. FAU claimed its members suffered various harms, such as lost athletic opportunities and emotional distress, and sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit “male athletes” from competing against its members in girls’ sports involving contact or competitive skill.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found that FAU had standing because one member’s team was scheduled to play against the transgender athlete’s team. However, the district court denied the preliminary injunction on two grounds: first, that FAU lacked a private right of action for its Title IX claims, because they were based on a disparate impact (rather than intentional discrimination) theory, and second, that FAU failed to satisfy the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that, under Title IX and controlling Supreme Court precedents, there is only a private right of action for claims of intentional discrimination, not for disparate impact. It found FAU’s claims were based on allegations of negative effects rather than intentional disparate treatment or deliberate indifference. The court concluded that FAU’s allegations did not support a claim of intentional discrimination. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that FAU lacked a private right of action for its Title IX claims. View "Female Athletes United v. Keith Ellison" on Justia Law

A nursing student was required to complete clinical rotations at local hospitals as part of her coursework in 2017. She alleged that her supervisor, the director of the nursing program, subjected her to severe sexual harassment and retaliated against her when she rejected his advances by giving her a failing grade and refusing to discuss it. After the student reported these incidents, the district placed the supervisor on administrative leave and initiated an independent investigation. The investigation confirmed inappropriate conduct by the supervisor, who did not return to his position. The student later withdrew from the program and completed her degree out of state. Through counsel, she notified the district of her intent to pursue claims and sought damages.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment for the community college district, holding that the student lacked standing under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), failed to comply with the Government Claims Act for her non-FEHA claims, and that the district was not deliberately indifferent under the Education Code. The court also excluded the student’s attorney’s declaration due to a technical omission, and entered judgment for the district on all claims.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the judgment. The court found the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the attorney’s declaration to be corrected, which was a curable procedural defect. The appellate court held that a postsecondary student serving in a clinical capacity qualifies as an “unpaid intern” under FEHA, conferring standing. The court further found the student’s notice to the district satisfied the Government Claims Act requirements, and concluded that triable issues existed regarding whether the district acted with deliberate indifference. The court affirmed summary adjudication for the district only on the Civil Code cause of action, but otherwise denied summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District" on Justia Law

A former student at the University of Southern Indiana was accused of sexual assault during the 2020–21 academic year. After a hearing, a university panel found the alleged victim’s account more credible than the student’s, noting her consistency over time, and concluded that the student committed rape and forcible fondling. The student was suspended for three semesters and did not return to the university. He subsequently filed a lawsuit against the university and other defendants, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, deprivation of due process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During discovery, the student learned of undisclosed records that suggested his account may have been consistent over time, contrary to the panel’s finding.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. In the course of the litigation, a magistrate judge ordered the student to proceed using his real name, not a pseudonym. The student objected, but the district judge overruled the objection, though the district court stayed its order pending this appeal. The student filed multiple appeals, which were consolidated for argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the student’s use of a pseudonym. The court reaffirmed the strong presumption that adult parties litigate under their real names in federal court and found that the student did not present sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of physical harm or retaliation to justify use of a pseudonym. The court declined to broaden the standard to include mental health risks or to consider the merits of the underlying claims in deciding the pseudonym issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. View "Doe v University of Southern Indiana" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old male student at a Virginia Beach middle school received a sexually explicit photo from a female classmate and, several months later, showed the image to other students during the school day. After teachers reported the incident, the assistant principal removed the student from class, questioned him, and searched his phone’s photo gallery. The school resource police officer was notified and began a criminal investigation. The student ultimately showed the explicit photo to the officer, was read his Miranda rights, arrested, and charged in juvenile court with possession of child pornography. The juvenile court found sufficient evidence for guilt but deferred disposition; the charge was dismissed after the student completed court-imposed conditions.The student, through his mother and later counsel, sued the assistant principal, the school resource officer, the Virginia Beach School Board, and the City of Virginia Beach in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. He alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as conspiracy and Monell claims. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the phone search reasonable under New Jersey v. T.L.O., the confession voluntary, no evidence of unlawful conspiracy, and no underlying constitutional violations to support Monell liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the assistant principal’s search of the student’s phone was justified at its inception and reasonable in scope under T.L.O., and that Riley v. California did not displace this standard in the school context. The court also held the student’s confession was voluntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, found no evidence of a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and determined Monell liability could not attach absent an underlying constitutional violation. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. View "O.W. v. Carr" on Justia Law

A married couple, acting on behalf of their minor child, challenged West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law after their daughter was disenrolled from a public virtual school because she was not fully vaccinated. The parents sought a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement, but were informed that only medical exemptions—based on specific medical contraindications or precautions certified by a physician—are permitted under state law. After being denied a religious exemption, the parents filed suit, claiming that the absence of a religious exemption violated their First Amendment right to freely exercise their Christian faith. They requested a preliminary injunction to allow their daughter’s re-enrollment in the virtual academy during the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the parents were likely to succeed on their free exercise claim. The district court applied the test from Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, concluding that the vaccination law was not generally applicable, and thus subject to strict scrutiny, which it found the law did not survive.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of preliminary relief. The Fourth Circuit held that West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law is a neutral and generally applicable measure enacted under the state’s police power to protect public health, as recognized in longstanding Supreme Court precedent including Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Prince v. Massachusetts. The court found that the medical exemption process does not constitute a “mechanism for individualized exemptions” that would undermine general applicability under cases such as Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the law is subject to rational basis review, which it easily satisfies, and that the Free Exercise Clause does not require religious exemptions simply because medical exemptions exist. The court reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "Perry v. Marteney" on Justia Law

Several educators, parents, students, and a nonprofit organization challenged two provisions of an Iowa law affecting public schools. The law restricts classroom instruction on gender identity and sexual orientation for students in kindergarten through sixth grade and requires school officials to notify parents if a student requests accommodations affirming their gender identity, such as using a different pronoun. The plaintiffs, asserting facial constitutional challenges, argued the provisions were overbroad and vague, infringing on First Amendment and due process rights.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted a preliminary injunction against these provisions. The district court found that the terms “program” and “promotion” in the instruction restriction were overly broad and infringed on protected speech, and determined that the parental notification law was impermissibly vague due to the undefined use of “accommodation.” The district court severed what it considered unconstitutional portions of the statutes and enjoined their enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that the statutes, when read with the canon of constitutional avoidance, could reasonably be interpreted in a way that avoided constitutional problems and that the statutory language was sufficiently clear. The appellate court found the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that unconstitutional applications of the laws substantially outweighed constitutional ones in their facial challenge. It further determined that the term “accommodation” was not unconstitutionally vague. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and vacated that injunction as to all challenged provisions, remanding the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Iowa Safe Schools v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including publishers, authors, educators, and a parent of a student, challenged provisions of an Iowa law (Senate File 496) requiring public school libraries to remove books containing “descriptions or visual depictions of a sex act.” The law also imposed penalties on educators who failed to comply. The plaintiffs argued that these provisions violated their First Amendment rights, both as to students’ access to information and as to the right of authors and publishers to communicate with their intended audience.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa initially granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the challenged provisions. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail, holding that the unconstitutional applications of the law substantially outweighed constitutional ones. It declined to apply the standard set out in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, instead relying on the obscenity standard from Ginsberg v. State of New York and the “substantial and reasonable government interest” test from the plurality in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the Hazelwood standard—whether the restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”—applies to school library curation. The court determined that the Iowa law’s book restrictions addressed legitimate pedagogical concerns and were neither amorphous nor unreasonable. Because the plaintiffs could not show a likelihood of success on the merits under the correct standard, the Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Penguin Random House, LLC v. Robbins" on Justia Law