Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A plaintiff alleged that, between 1965 and 1969, while he was a young child attending an elementary school in a California school district, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by the school’s principal. The complaint stated that school staff and faculty were aware or suspected the abuse, and that similar abuse occurred to other students. The plaintiff claimed ongoing psychological and emotional harm as a result. He brought four negligence-based causes of action against the school district, asserting that he was not required to present a government tort claim before filing suit due to statutory changes exempting such claims.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the school district’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement was fatal to his case, and concluded that legislative changes extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 violated the California Constitution’s gift clause. The appellate court held that the retroactive waiver did not create a new liability or cause of action, but merely removed a procedural barrier to suit. The court further found that the legislative purpose of aiding victims of childhood sexual assault served a valid public purpose and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District" on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child with significant disabilities, including autism and other disorders, attended a public elementary school where staff were aware of his special needs and history of leaving school grounds when unsupervised. Despite this knowledge, the child was left alone multiple times, and on May 17, 2021, he walked out of the school unattended and was never seen again. His mother, acting as his legal guardian, alleged that the school district and staff negligently supervised her son, leading to his disappearance and likely death or serious harm. She also claimed severe emotional distress resulting from the incident.The mother filed suit in the District Court for Sarpy County under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), naming the school district and three staff members as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by sovereign immunity under the PSTCA’s due care and discretionary function exemptions, and that the complaint failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the motion, finding both exemptions applied and that the emotional distress claim was either barred or insufficiently pled. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, based solely on the complaint’s allegations and reasonable inferences, it could not determine whether the PSTCA exemptions applied, as a more developed factual record was needed. The court also found the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims for negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larsen v. Sarpy Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 77-0027" on Justia Law

A public elementary school district arranged for its students to attend a four-day overnight outdoor science camp operated by the county office of education. The county office provided direct overnight supervision, while district teachers were present but only on call. A student alleged that, during her attendance at the camp as a fifth grader, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a county office employee who served as a night monitor. The student claimed that both the district and the county office knew or should have known of the employee’s prior misconduct and failed to protect her.The student filed a negligence claim against the district, the county office, and the employee. The district moved for summary judgment in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, arguing that it was immune from liability under Education Code sections 35330 and 44808. The district contended that the camp was a “field trip or excursion” subject to a statutory waiver of claims and that, alternatively, it could not be liable because its employees were not providing immediate and direct supervision at the time of the alleged assaults. The trial court granted summary judgment for the district based solely on section 35330, finding the statutory waiver applied.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. It held that the district failed to establish as a matter of law that the camp was a “field trip or excursion” under section 35330, as the program was part of the required science curriculum rather than a recreational or observational departure. The court also found the district did not meet its burden under section 44808 to show that no district employee should have been providing immediate and direct supervision, especially in light of allegations that the district knew of risks posed by the county employee. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the district. View "Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School District" on Justia Law

Two students at a private college in Michigan alleged that they were sexually assaulted by fellow students—one incident occurring in an on-campus dormitory and the other in an off-campus apartment. Both students reported the assaults to college officials, who initiated investigations led by outside lawyers. The students claimed that the college’s response was inadequate: one student’s assailant received no additional punishment due to a prior infraction, and the other’s assailant was disciplined but later allowed to rejoin the baseball team. Both students experienced emotional distress and academic or personal setbacks following the incidents.The students filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, asserting state-law claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sex discrimination under Michigan’s civil rights statute, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class. The district court granted the college’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to support any of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that Michigan law does not impose a general duty on colleges to protect students from criminal acts by third parties, absent a special relationship or foreseeability of imminent harm to identifiable individuals, neither of which was present here. The court also found that the alleged conduct by the college did not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing either disparate treatment or disparate impact based on sex under Michigan’s civil rights law. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. View "Chen v. Hillsdale College" on Justia Law

A teacher at a public charter school in Utah was terminated after a series of events involving a student and the student's parent. The teacher, a former Air Force veteran, reprimanded the student for disruptive behavior, leading the student to quit the team and report the incident to his father. The parent, dissatisfied with the teacher's conduct, began raising concerns about the teacher's alleged inappropriate behavior, including claims of physical and verbal abuse, to school administrators and at a school board meeting. The parent also communicated these concerns to the school superintendent and, according to the teacher, made a report to local police. Investigations by both the police and the Division of Child and Family Services found no evidence of abuse, and the teacher was ultimately terminated without a stated reason.The teacher filed suit in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), abuse of process, and tortious interference with economic relations. The parent moved for early dismissal under Utah’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), arguing the statute protected his speech and actions. The district court denied the motion, finding UPEPA inapplicable and concluding that the teacher had stated prima facie cases for all claims.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred in finding UPEPA did not apply, as the parent’s statements concerned a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court also found that the teacher failed to state prima facie cases for IIED and abuse of process, requiring dismissal of those claims. The court vacated the denial of the special motion as to defamation and tortious interference, remanding for further consideration of whether the teacher could establish a prima facie case, particularly regarding privilege. The court ordered costs and fees related to the motion be awarded as provided by UPEPA. View "Mackey v. Krause" on Justia Law

In 2021, a plaintiff filed a complaint against a public school district, alleging that she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a teacher while attending middle and high school. The complaint asserted that the teacher’s abusive conduct was widely known within the school and that the district either knew or should have known about the abuse but failed to act, allowing the teacher to remain employed. The plaintiff brought claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, relying on statutory provisions that exempt certain childhood sexual assault claims from the usual requirement to present a claim to the public entity before filing suit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after the school district moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district argued that the plaintiff’s claims were only possible due to Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218), which retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual assault claims against public entities. The district contended that AB 218 violated the gift clause of the California Constitution by imposing liability for past acts where no enforceable claim previously existed. The trial court agreed, finding that AB 218 retroactively created liability and constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that AB 218 does not violate the gift clause because it did not create new substantive liability; rather, it removed a procedural barrier to enforcing pre-existing liability for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with directions to deny the school district’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "O.B. v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A university revoked a student’s bachelor’s degree in social work after being informed by a state agency that, during her internship, she accessed confidential information in a state database without authorization. The university retroactively changed her grade for the internship course to failing, notified her that her degree and diploma were invalid, and initiated disciplinary proceedings. The student, who had already graduated and obtained a social work license, challenged the university’s actions, arguing that her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the student’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that she did not have a protected property interest in her degree, grade, or the disciplinary process, and that, even if such an interest existed, the university provided adequate process. The court also concluded that she failed to plausibly allege that she was unable to pursue a career in social work, and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because any rights at issue were not clearly established.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the student’s university degree is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the university failed to provide adequate process before revoking it. Specifically, the court found that the student plausibly alleged she was denied sufficient time to present her defense and was not allowed to cross-examine university-affiliated witnesses at her conduct hearing. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the procedural due process claim on these grounds and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the dismissal of the substantive due process claim and the grant of qualified immunity to the defendants for monetary relief. The appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

A high school social studies teacher with a history of disciplinary issues was terminated after posting inflammatory messages on her Facebook account, which was followed primarily by former students. The posts, made during nationwide protests following the killing of George Floyd, included comments and memes that were perceived as racially insensitive and vulgar. Although the teacher had set her account to private and did not accept friend requests from current students, the posts quickly circulated within the school community, prompting complaints from students, parents, staff, and widespread media attention. The school district cited her prior suspensions for similar conduct, the disruption caused by her posts, and her failure to appreciate the impact of her comments as reasons for her dismissal.After her termination, the teacher requested a review hearing before the Illinois State Board of Education, where she argued that her Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment. The hearing officer applied the Pickering balancing test and found that her dismissal did not violate her constitutional rights. Subsequently, the teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against the school district and associated individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a First Amendment violation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that she was collaterally estopped from bringing her claim and, alternatively, that her claim failed on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the teacher failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find in her favor on her First Amendment claim. Applying the Pickering balancing test, the court concluded that the school district’s interest in addressing actual and potential disruption outweighed the teacher’s interest in free expression, and her posts were not entitled to First Amendment protection. View "Hedgepeth v Britton" on Justia Law

A student, C.M., experienced repeated racial harassment by peers while attending public school in Michigan, including being subjected to racial slurs, threats, and physical assault. The harassment occurred during her sixth, seventh, and ninth grades, prompting her to transfer to another school district in her freshman year. C.M. and her parents alleged that the school district and its officials failed to adequately respond to her complaints, asserting violations of federal law (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause) and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and its officials. The district court found that, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to C.M., the school’s responses to the reported incidents did not amount to deliberate indifference under the applicable legal standards. C.M. appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court assumed, without deciding, that deliberate indifference claims are cognizable under Title VI for student-on-student racial harassment. Applying the deliberate indifference standard, the court held that the school’s responses to each reported incident were not clearly unreasonable and reflected good faith efforts, including investigations, disciplinary actions, and proactive measures. The court concluded that C.M. failed to establish deliberate indifference, and therefore her claims under Title VI, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act could not succeed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Malick v. Croswell-Lexington Dist. Schs." on Justia Law

A high school student in the District of Columbia was sexually assaulted by a classmate in a school bathroom. The student’s mother reported the incident to school officials, prompting an investigation by the District. The District ultimately found the assault claim credible and took steps to support the student, including offering counseling and a school transfer. However, the school principal, before any investigation, expressed disbelief in the student’s claim, made derogatory remarks about her, and attempted to undermine the investigation, even after video evidence corroborated the student’s account. The principal’s conduct included misleading superiors and withholding information. The student and her mother later learned of these actions, which caused them significant distress.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the student’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) for failure to state a claim, finding that the school-student relationship alone did not create a special duty under D.C. law. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and Title IX claims, holding that the District’s response was not deliberately indifferent and that the principal’s conduct did not meet the standard for IIED because the remarks were made outside the student’s presence.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the NIED claim and the grant of summary judgment to the District on the Title IX claims, finding the District’s overall response was not clearly unreasonable and that the principal’s actions could not be attributed to the District for Title IX retaliation. However, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the IIED claim against the principal, holding that a reasonable jury could find her conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended or recklessly caused severe emotional distress, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Doe v. DC" on Justia Law