Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendants alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing plaintiff equal access to defendant's "Backpack Flyers for Students" program. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and damages on the merits. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff's First Amendment rights were not violated; that a limited public forum could be limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects and a public entity could impose reasonable and viewpoint neutral restrictions on speech in the forum; that restrictions on plaintiff's access to the program was viewpoint neutral and did not impose a substantial restriction on plaintiff's access to the forum; and that the school official did not exercise unbridled discretion in managing the program.

The regional board of school trustees dissolved a school district, partially located in Montgomery County, and annexed it to a district previously located entirely in Sangamon County. About 99.7 percent of the reconstituted district is in Sangamon County and the voters of that county had approved a referendum under the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL)(35 ILCS 200/18â185); the voters in Montgomery County had not. A taxing district subject to PTELL may not ordinarily extend taxes at a rate that exceeds the previous yearâs extension by more than 5%, or the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index, whichever is less, without referendum approval. The district, wanting to issue bonds to finance improvements, sought a declaration that PTELL did not apply. Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the supreme court held that the entire district remains subject to the PTELL.

A.S., a California minor, filed a request for a special education due process hearing where he was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., as an emotionally disturbed child. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding a special education student's placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court requested the California Supreme Court exercise its discretion and decide the following certified question, "Whether under California law the school district responsible for the costs of a special education student's education while the student is placed at an out-of-state residential treatment facility is the district in which the student's de facto parent, who is authorized to make educational decisions on behalf of the student, resides."

Plaintiffs, former students of Ithaca High School, claimed that defendants violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by prohibiting the publication of a sexually-explicit cartoon in the Ithaca High School student newspaper ("IHS newspaper") and by prohibiting the on-campus distribution of an independent student newspaper containing the same cartoon. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the IHS newspaper was a limited public forum. The court concluded that the IHS newspaper was a limited public form and held that defendants lawfully prohibited the publication of the sexually-explicit cartoon pursuant to the standards for regulation of speech set forth in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. The court also held that defendants lawfully prohibited the on-campus distribution of the sexually-explicit cartoon in an independent student newspaper pursuant to Fraser and that the court need not reach the question of whether defendants' prohibition of the on-campus distribution of the independent student newspaper was lawful under Tinker v. DesMoines Indep. Cmty. Scho. Dist.

Petitioners Daniel and Lisa B. appealed the decision of the New Hampshire State Board of Education (Board) that upheld a thirty-four day suspension imposed on their daughter Keelin B. Keelin opened an email account under another studentâs name, and then sent sexually suggestive, lewd and threatening email messages to the principal of her school and one teacher. When the deception was discovered, the Board âsentencedâ Keelin to a thirty-four day suspension. Keelinâs parents appealed to the School Board, but the Board upheld the suspension. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Keelinâs âsentenceâ exceeded the Boardâs maximum allowable suspension under these kinds of circumstances. The Court reduced Keelinâs suspension to twenty days, but affirmed the Boardâs decision in all other respects.

Plaintiff, a former Nelnet, Inc. ("Nelnet") loan advisor, alleged that certain Nelnet marketing practices were continuing violations of the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP") established under Part B of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1071, that rendered Nelnet liable under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). Plaintiff joined JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc. as defendants alleging they were knowing participants in a conspiracy to submit false claims. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's third amended complaint. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing plaintiff's claims where plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

The United States sued the New York City Board of Education and related parties ("City Defendants") claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact selection measures. The parties entered into a settlement in 1999 despite objections from incumbent employees who were denied leave to intervene in the suit. The incumbent employees' lawsuits raised the issue of whether the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement violated section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In addition to the central holding, the court addressed several other issues. The court held that because the district court in its Title VII analysis reached results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, its judgment must be vacated and remanded with two exceptions. First, the court affirmed the district court's grant of class certification and second, paragraph 4 of the district court's declaratory judgment had not been appealed and therefore must stand.

If funds are available, the Educational Leadership Oklahoma Act (Act) provides for bonuses to eligible teachers who attain national certification. In the past, the State Board of Education provided the full amount of bonuses and any additional amounts necessary to cover the payroll withholding taxes on the bonuses. In 2010, the Board didnât pay the withholding taxes. Teachers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board should have paid the withholding taxes on their bonuses. The trial court found that because the School District was not liable for the bonus payments under the Act, the State Department of Education was, and payment of the bonuses was conditioned on the availability of funds to pay them from State. The court determined that the School District was required to use some of the allocated bonus money from the State to fund the Districtâs tax obligations. Furthermore, the court concluded that the Teachers sued the wrong party by suing the School District, so that it could not enter a judgment in their favor. Accordingly, district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the Teachers were State employees, and State was responsible for paying employer withholding taxes for the bonuses, the School District had to pay them. However, the Court found that the State did not have enough money to pay both the bonuses and the withholding taxâit only had enough to pay the bonuses. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision to dismiss the case.

A continuing education student, suffering cognitive disabilities, obtained an injunction requiring the university to provide him with on-campus housing and an award of $101,676 in attorney fees. While appeal was pending, the student lived in a dormitory and completed the program. He has no intention to return. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the district court order, leaving the fee award undisturbed. The university did not appeal the fee award and the matter is not "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court declined to apply the "public interest" exception.

In September 2002, an accounting firm hired by plaintiff discovered irregularities in plaintiff's financial records. An audit revealed that the assistant superintendent had stolen over $200,000 from plaintiff's accounts. The Roslyn Union Free School District Board ("Board") was notified of the misconduct and decided to allow the assistant superintendent time to repay misappropriated funds and retire. Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in 2005 against former and current members of the Board, including defendant who was on the Board for a year starting in 2000, for the Board's allegedly lax management during the years the funds disappeared and their attempt to keep the illegal activities under wraps. At issue was whether a three or six year statute of limitations applied to causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by a school district against a former member of the school board. The court held that a six year statute of limitations period under CPLR 213(7) was applicable and therefore, the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and declaratory judgment should be reinstated as timely.