Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, an unincorporated association, Saline Parents, and six individuals sued the Attorney General of the United States, Merrick Garland, alleging that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was unlawfully attempting to silence them and others who opposed progressive curricula and policies in public schools. This lawsuit was in response to a memorandum issued by the Attorney General, expressing concern over the increase in reported incidents of harassment, intimidation, and threats of violence against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff. The memorandum instructed the DOJ staff to investigate the issue and discuss strategies to address it. The plaintiffs argued that their protest activities, which included constitutionally protected conduct and did not involve threats of criminal violence, had been unfairly targeted by the DOJ.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the dismissal of the case by the District Court on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue this action. The court agreed with the government's argument that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was not ripe for adjudication, indicating that the plaintiffs' claims were based on hypothetical future events that may not occur. The court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the government had in any way threatened imminent enforcement action against them or had labeled them in a way that impugned their reputations. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was based on contingencies and speculation, making the dispute premature for judicial resolution. View "Saline Parents v. Garland" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a group of non-transgender female athletes have legal standing to challenge a policy that allows transgender girls to compete in girls' high school sports. The athletes had sued the Connecticut Association of Schools and several school districts, claiming that the policy violated Title IX by depriving them of equal athletic opportunity. The court held that the athletes had established Article III standing because they had plausibly stated a concrete, particularized, and actual injury in fact - the alleged denial of equal athletic opportunity and concomitant loss of publicly recognized titles and placements during track and field competitions in which they competed against and finished behind transgender athletes. The court also held that the injury was plausibly redressable by monetary damages and an injunction ordering defendants to alter certain athletic records. The court did not rule on the merits of the athletes' Title IX claim, instead remanding the case to the district court for consideration of whether the athletes have plausibly stated a claim under Title IX. View "Soule ex rel. Stanescu v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peter Vlaming, a high school French teacher who was terminated by the West Point School Board for refusing to use a transgender student's preferred pronouns. Vlaming had chosen to use the student's preferred name but avoided using any third-person pronouns to refer to the student as it conflicted with his religious beliefs. The School Board fired Vlaming for not complying with its policy to use government-mandated pronouns.Vlaming sued the School Board, alleging that his termination violated his constitutional, statutory, and breach-of-contract rights. The Circuit Court dismissed Vlaming's claims, holding that they failed to state legally viable causes of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that Vlaming's complaint sufficiently alleged that the School Board substantially burdened his right to free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution and that his claims under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act should not have been dismissed. Moreover, the Court held that Vlaming has alleged a viable compelled speech claim under the free speech provision of the Virginia Constitution. The Court rejected the School Board's argument that it could compel Vlaming's speech as part of his official duties as a teacher. The Court concluded that Vlaming's refusal to use certain pronouns did not interfere with his duties as a French teacher or disrupt the school's operations.The Court's decision reaffirmed the fundamental right to free speech and the free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution, emphasizing that these rights extend to public school teachers in their interactions with students. It clarified that although the government has a legitimate interest in ensuring non-discrimination and respect for all students, this interest must be balanced against individual rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. The Court also clarified that a public school teacher's speech in the classroom is not entirely within the control of the school board and that teachers cannot be compelled to express views that conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs. View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law

Ricardo Campbell, a student of the Career Development Institute, Inc., was dismissed from its vocational nursing program. Following his dismissal, Campbell filed a writ under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the petition, stating that the Institute's policies did not necessitate a hearing. In response, Campbell appealed this decision, with the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Eight, vacating the previous judgment for reconsideration in light of a recent Supreme Court ruling on the doctrine of fair procedure.The Court of Appeal noted that the Institute's student handbook and school catalog outlined student discipline procedures, but did not require a hearing or any other opportunity for students to be heard before being dismissed. Campbell was dismissed following an incident reported by three nurses at his clinical placement, which was followed by a letter from the Institute's director of nursing stating that Campbell had been dismissed. The Institute also claimed that this was not the first problem it had with Campbell, although the dismissal letter only mentioned the said incident.The trial court had previously ruled that because the Institute was not a state actor and Campbell did not argue that a statute required the Institute to provide hearings, the Institute could only be subject to administrative mandamus if its own rules and regulations required hearings. The court concluded that Campbell was not entitled to relief under section 1094.5 as the Institute's procedures did not require it to provide hearings.The Court of Appeal remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether the doctrine of fair procedure applies and, if so, whether Campbell was entitled to more process under this doctrine. The Court of Appeal advised that if the court finds Campbell was entitled to a hearing, it must address the merits of his petition. The Court of Appeal vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Campbell v. Career Development Institute" on Justia Law

This case involves Delta Charter Group, Inc. (Delta), a public charter school operating within Concordia Parish in Louisiana. The case has its roots in a 1965 lawsuit against the Concordia Parish School Board for operating segregated schools in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court approved a desegregation plan, but the Board has yet to achieve unitary status, and Delta, which had intervened in the ongoing desegregation case, was required by a 2013 consent order to comply with the Board's desegregation decree. A second consent order in 2018 outlined a race-based enrollment process for Delta, giving the highest enrollment preference to black students.Four years later, Delta moved to discontinue the race-based enrollment process, arguing that it was unconstitutional. The district court declined to modify the order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which allows courts to modify or dissolve a consent decree if applying it prospectively is no longer equitable. Delta failed to show a significant change in factual conditions or in law that would justify modification. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, stating that Delta had forfeited any argument that the district court had abused its discretion by failing to adequately brief the argument on appeal. The court did not offer any opinion on the underlying constitutional merits, as Delta had forfeited any available argument that the district court should have applied Rule 54(b) and that it had abused its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(5). View "Delta Charter v. Sch Bd Concordia Prsh" on Justia Law

In the State of Montana, a group of parents and the non-profit organization Stand Up Montana sued several school districts in Missoula County over the implementation of mask mandates in schools during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs argued that the mask mandates violated their substantive due process rights. The Fourth Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts, finding the mask mandates did not violate the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court reiterated that the mask mandates did not implicate any fundamental rights under Article II of the Montana Constitution, and therefore, the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review. Under the rational basis test, the court found that the mask mandates were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of stemming the spread of COVID-19, as the school districts had considered information and recommendations from reputable public and private health care providers and agencies, including the CDC, which all recommended universal masking. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to grant a motion in limine to exclude testimony from the plaintiffs' hybrid witnesses, as the proffered testimony was not relevant to whether the mask policies were rationally related to stemming the spread of COVID-19. View "Stand Up Montana v. Msla Co. Schools" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in the case of a student, Brett Goldberg, against Pace University. Goldberg, a graduate student in performing arts, sued Pace for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and violation of New York General Business Law § 349, following the university's decision to move classes online and postpone the performance of his play and a class due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court granted Pace's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Goldberg failed to sufficiently allege a breach given the university's published Emergency Closings provision and failed to identify a sufficiently specific promise under New York law of in-person instruction. The court also found that Goldberg's unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and § 349 claims were either duplicative or failed for similar reasons. On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court, holding that the university's postponement and move to an online format were permitted by the Emergency Closings provision, thus affirming the district court's judgment. View "Goldberg v. Pace University" on Justia Law

In the case, Maple Run Unified School District (the District) appealed a trial court order which granted the Vermont Human Rights Commission (the Commission) a motion to dismiss the District’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The dispute arose from a complaint of sexual harassment filed by a student in the District. The student's mother later filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the District failed to comply with the Vermont Public Accommodations Act (VPAA), the anti-harassment provisions in Title 16, and the school’s own policy. The Commission decided to investigate the matter. The District filed a motion with the Commission to dismiss the investigation, arguing that federal regulations preempted Title 16 and the complaint failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the VPAA. The Commission denied the District’s motion and decided to continue the investigation. The District then filed a Rule 75 petition in the civil division against the Commission, which the Commission moved to dismiss arguing that there was no cognizable avenue for relief under Rule 75 and the superior court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the petition. The court dismissed the District’s complaint. The District appealed claiming that subject-matter jurisdiction had been established under Rule 75 via either mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that the Commission’s determination that the complaint states a prima facie case of discrimination under the VPAA is not reviewable under Rule 75 via either mandamus or prohibition, and therefore, the superior court did not err in dismissing the District’s petition. View "Maple Run Unified School District v. Vermont Human Rights Commission" on Justia Law

In the case brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, two petitioners, Hugh Ady and Reed Scott-Schwalbach, challenged the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 30 (2024) (IP 30). IP 30 proposed to establish a program providing state funding to families incurring "qualified expenses" for educating their children outside of the public school system. The funding would have been provided through a new "Education Savings Account Program" and would have been available to households having an adjusted gross income of $125,000 or less.The petitioners raised several objections to the ballot title, which the court mostly rejected. However, the court agreed with petitioner Scott-Schwalbach that the "yes" result statement and the summary were inaccurate in stating that IP 30 "allows additional virtual charter programs." The court clarified that state law doesn't cap virtual charter programs, but rather enrollment in those programs. IP 30 proposed to increase the enrollment cap, not the number of programs. As such, the court referred the "yes" result statement and the summary back to the Attorney General for correction. View "Ady v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Bradley Peterson, a former professor at Ohio State University, claimed his procedural-due-process rights were violated when the university stripped him of his emeritus status without adequate process. Following a sexual harassment complaint against him, the university conducted an investigation, concluded that Peterson violated the university's Sexual Misconduct Policy, and subsequently revoked his emeritus status. Peterson argued that he had a property interest in his emeritus status and its related benefits. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss Peterson's complaint. The court held that Peterson failed to establish a constitutionally protected property interest in his emeritus status. The court noted that emeritus status was an honorific title, and Peterson did not show that he lost pay or tangible benefits from Ohio State when his emeritus status was revoked. The court also noted that Peterson's claim of harm to his professional reputation was akin to a liberty interest claim, and he did not request a name-clearing hearing, which was a prerequisite for asserting such a claim. View "Peterson v. Johnson" on Justia Law