Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal as moot and vacated the judgment of the court of appeals in this case arising from the Covid-19 pandemic, holding that the public interest was best served by vacatur of the court of appeals' opinion and that the State was prevented from challenging on the merits due to mootness.When the San Antonio Independent School District (ISD) required that its employees take a Covid-19 vaccine by October 15 2021, the State sued, seeking a temporary injunction arguing that the vaccine requirement violated a gubernatorial executive order. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied the ensuing appeal as moot, holding that neither the enforceability of the ISD's vaccine mandate, which was barred by Senate Bill 29, nor the enforceability of executive order GA-39, which had expired, left a live controversy between the parties. View "State v. San Antonio Independent School District" on Justia Law

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Jackson Federation of Teachers (JFT) filed a complaint against the Jackson Public School District (JPS), alleging alleged that certain JPS policies violated the free speech rights of its employees. The trial court: (1) denied JPS’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing; (2) denied JPS’s motion to dismiss for mootness; (3) found that JPS’s three policies were in violation of article 3, section 11, and article 3, section 13, of the Mississippi Constitution; and (4) issued a permanent injunction enjoining JPS from enforcing the policies. JPS timely appealed. Because JFT failed to establish standing, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of JPS. View "Jackson Public School District v. Jackson Federation of Teachers, et al." on Justia Law

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UC Davis students Doe and Roe were having consensual sex in Doe’s room, when Doe made a one-second video recording of his own face. Roe asked Doe to delete it, which he did. Months later, she made a formal complaint. Doe initially lied to the investigator but ultimately admitted to taking the recording. UC Davis imposed a one-year suspension for violations of its Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment Policy and a policy that generally bars nonconsensual recordings that violate another person’s privacy. The trial court found UC Davis’s Title IX procedure “consistent with due process standards” but found the suspension “objectively excessive and punitive,” stating that the college must do more to explain its Title IX discipline. UC Davis then imposed a shorter suspension.Doe unsuccessfully sought $142,387.48 attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5 and $7,500 under Government Code 800. The court of appeal held that Doe was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5 because the litigation did not confer a significant benefit “on the general public or a large class of persons.” However, section 800 authorizes an award of up to $7,500 if the challenged administrative determination “was the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct.” All aspects of an administrative proceeding need not be arbitrary or capricious to justify section 800 fees. The court remanded for consideration of whether UC Davis engaged in sufficient arbitrary or capricious conduct to warrant an award. View "Doe v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Appellants on their claim brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, holding that the district court should not have dismissed the Title IX claim.MG, a minor child, alleged that he was harassed by fellow students while he was attending Brooke Charter School East Boston. Appellants - MG's mother, on behalf of herself, MG, and his four minor siblings - brought suit against the school asserting claims under Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Massachusetts state law. The federal district court granted summary judgment for the school on all claims. The First Circuit reversed the summary judgment on Appellants' Title IX claim and remanded the case, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the Title IX claim. View "Grace v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

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In this action arising out of the curtailment of classes and services at the University of Rhode Island (URI) during the COVID-19 pandemic, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing some of Plaintiffs' claims early in the litigation and granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the remaining claims, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs, students who remained enrolled at URI during the pandemic, filed separate putative class actions against URI alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that URI had breached its contract when it stopped providing in-person, on-campus instruction. The district court dismissed certain claims and then, following the completion of discovery, granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to make out a genuine issue of material fact as to whether URI had either an express or implied contract to provide in-person services and activities. View "Burt v. Bd. of Trustees of University of R.I." on Justia Law

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Evers pled guilty to assault on a police officer with a firearm after being arrested in connection with a string of residential burglaries. At sentencing, the trial court ordered Evers to pay restitution to two victims and assessed a 15 percent administrative fee on the restitution amounts. The court also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine and imposed but suspended a $10,000 parole restitution fine. The court declined Evers’ request to reduce the two restitution fines by applying a statutory formula and concluded that, under the circumstances, the maximum fines were warranted.The court of appeal reversed the imposition of the 15 percent administrative fee, which was invalid because the statute pursuant to which it was imposed was repealed before the date of Evers’s sentencing. The court otherwise affirmed. Evers forfeited his argument that the restitution fines were unconstitutional under People v. Dueñas (2019) and similar cases requiring sentencing courts to take into account a defendant’s ability to pay. The forfeiture was not cured by Evers submitting two informal post-judgment motions to the trial court under Penal Code section 1237.2. View "People v. Evers" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal of the circuit court's orders, the latter of which denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment, in this action alleging that Petitioners acted negligently in their handling of an incident where S.D. was inappropriately touched by a fellow student in the hallway of a high school, holding that the orders appealed from did not present an appealable ruling.In their notice of appeal, Petitioners asserted that the individual defendants were entitled to dismissal pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-12A-5(b)(2) because the order at issue found that the individual defendants did not act maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Petitioners further contend that the board of education was immune from liability pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-12A-5(a)(4). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the orders presented in this appeal were interlocutory, did not fall within the collateral order doctrine, and did not otherwise present an appealable ruling. View "Kanawha County Board of Education v. S.D." on Justia Law

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Parents Defending Education, an association of parents, brought this action to challenge a policy adopted by the Linn Mar Community School District in Iowa. The disputed policy is entitled “Administrative Regulations Regarding Transgender and Students Nonconforming to Gender Role Stereotypes.” The policy sets forth regulations for the District that “address the needs of transgender students, gender-expansive students, nonbinary, gender nonconforming students, and students questioning their gender to ensure a safe, affirming, and healthy school environment where every student can learn effectively.” The parents who seek to participate in this case are anonymous; the pleadings identify them by a letter of the alphabet. The district court determined that Parents Defending failed to establish Article III standing because the organization did not show injury, causation, or redressability on its claims.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part as moot and reversed on one claim. The court concluded that at least Parent G has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Parent G asserts that her son wants to “state his belief that biological sex is immutable.” Because of the policy, however, Parent G states that her son remains silent in school “when gender identity topics arise” to avoid violating the policy. This student’s proposed activity “concerns political speech” and is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.” Thus, Parent G has standing to bring a claim challenging the policy based on the First Amendment. Therefore, Parents Defending has standing as an association to pursue the claim on behalf of a member. View "Parents Defending Education v. LinnMar Community School Dist., et al" on Justia Law

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=O.B. who was attending the University on a football scholarship, repeatedly and violently assaulted Plaintiff, his fellow student, in an off-campus house where O.B. was living with other university football players. At the time of the assault, university officials knew that O.B. had repeatedly and violently assaulted two other female undergraduates the previous year. Plaintiff sued the University under Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment to the University.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The en banc court held that to obtain damages under Title IX for student-on-student harassment, a plaintiff must show (1) that the educational institution had substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs; (2) that the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denied its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect; (3) that a school official with authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures has actual knowledge of the discrimination; (4) that the school acted with deliberate indifference to the harassment; and (5) that the school’s deliberate indifference must cause students to undergo harassment. The en banc court held that evidence in the record would support a conclusion by a reasonable factfinder that University officials had actual knowledge or notice of O.B.’s violent assaults and that Erika Barnes, the University’s Title IX liaison within the Athletics Department, was an official who had authority to address O.B.’s assaults and to institute corrective measures. View "MACKENZIE BROWN, ET AL V. STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL" on Justia Law

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UCSF's 107-acre Parnassus Heights campus currently accommodates two hospitals, various medical clinics, four professional schools, a graduate program, and space for research, student housing, parking, and other support uses. In 2014, UCSF prepared a long-range development plan for its multiple sites around San Francisco, to accommodate most of UCSF’s growth at the Mission Bay campus. There were concerns that the Parnassus campus was overwhelming its neighborhood. In 2020, UCSF undertook a new plan for the Parnassus campus with multiple new buildings and infrastructure resulting in a 50 percent net increase in building space over 30 years.An environmental impact report (EIR) was prepared for the Plan's initial phase (California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Resources Code 21000, identifying as significant, unavoidable adverse impacts: wind hazards, increased air pollutants, the demolition of historically significant structures, and increased ambient noise levels during construction.The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of challenges to the EIR. The EIR considers a reasonable range of alternatives and need not consider in detail an alternative that placed some anticipated development off campus. The EIR improperly declines to analyze the impact on public transit, but the error is not prejudicial. The aesthetic effects of an “employment center project on an infill site within a transit priority area” are deemed not significant. The EIR is not required to adopt a mitigation measure preserving certain historically significant buildings and its mitigation measure for wind impacts is adequate. View "Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law