Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In Georgia, the Fair Dismissal Act (FDA) offers certain protections to public school teachers after they have fulfilled a contract for the fourth consecutive school year with the same local board of education. This case considered whether the Charter Schools Act's waiver provision, which relieves public charter schools from complying with Title 20 (including the FDA), impairs the vested rights of teachers who had earned FDA protections before their school converted to a charter system. The Supreme Court of Georgia decided that the teachers' constitutional claims failed as a matter of law. The justices reasoned that the 1993 Charter Schools Act had already clarified that the FDA did not afford teachers any rights enforceable against charter schools. Therefore, the Charter Systems Act's retention of an FDA exemption for charter schools did not impair any rights for teachers who earned FDA rights after the 1993 Charter Schools Act was enacted. View "WOODS v. BARNES" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas evaluated a case in which a land development company, Bellpas, Inc., sought to detach property from one school district and annex it to another. According to the Texas Education Code, if the school boards of the affected districts disagree on the petition, the Commissioner of Education can resolve the issue in an administrative appeal. However, the Lampasas Independent School District (LISD) board neglected to approve or disapprove the petition, leading to a disagreement over whether the Commissioner of Education had jurisdiction over the administrative appeal.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Commissioner of Education did have jurisdiction over the administrative appeal. The court reasoned that a school board "disapproves" a petition if it does not approve it within a reasonable time after a hearing, as per the plain reading of the Education Code. The court also concluded that the Commissioner did not lose jurisdiction by failing to issue a ruling within 180 days, as the statute's deadline is not jurisdictional.The case was returned to the Court of Appeals to resolve the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court of Texas stressed that the delay in the administrative appeal process should not deprive the appellant of a decision on the merits of their petition and criticized the school board for refusing to make a decision, thus avoiding any ruling on the merits. View "MORATH v. LAMPASAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by a group of students and Children’s Health Defense, Inc. against Rutgers University. The plaintiffs challenged the university's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required in-person students to be vaccinated or else enroll in online programs or seek exemptions for medical or religious reasons. The court found that the university's policy did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights.The court held that there is no fundamental right to refuse vaccination. It applied the rational basis review and concluded that Rutgers University had a rational basis for its policy given the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the policy was ultra vires under New Jersey law, determining that Rutgers was authorized to require COVID-19 vaccinations under state law. Furthermore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, concluding that Rutgers had a rational basis for its differential treatment of students and staff, as well as vaccinated and unvaccinated students. View "Children's Health Defense Inc. v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

This case was brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by the parents of A.O., a child with severe hearing loss who uses cochlear implants. The parents had rejected the Los Angeles Unified School District's proposed individualized education program (IEP) for their daughter, which they felt didn't specify the frequency and duration of proposed speech therapy and audiology services, offer a meaningful educational benefit, or place A.O. in the least restrictive environment appropriate for her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision largely supporting the parents' objections. The court found that the school district's proposed IEP violated the IDEA by not clearly specifying the frequency and duration of proposed speech therapy and audiology services. The court also concluded that the proposed IEP wouldn't offer A.O. a meaningful educational benefit and failed to place her in the least restrictive environment appropriate for her. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the school district's proposed IEP did not need to provide individual speech therapy. The court remanded the case to the district court to modify its judgment. View "LAUSD V. A. O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey examined whether N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 limits an arbitrator’s authority to penalize conduct under the Tenure Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1. The defendant, the Board of Education for the Town of West New York Public Schools, brought tenure charges against the plaintiff, Amada Sanjuan, for conduct unbecoming. The charges were based on alleged false claims made by Sanjuan about an accident at the school. An arbitrator concluded that Sanjuan's conduct warranted a penalty, but not dismissal. The arbitrator demoted Sanjuan from her tenured administrative position to a tenured teaching role, without backpay. Sanjuan sought to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by demoting her. The Appellate Division agreed, interpreting N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 to allow sustained tenure charges to result only in termination or loss of salary, but not demotion. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed, holding that N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 provides the basis to refer a case to arbitration but does not limit an arbitrator’s authority to impose penalties. Therefore, the Supreme Court reinstated the arbitrator's award demoting Sanjuan. View "Sanjuan v. School District of West New York" on Justia Law

In this case, a doctor, Dr. Gabriel Fine, sued the University of Utah School of Medicine, alleging that the University deprived him of his clinical privileges without following the procedures required by its bylaws. The University moved for summary judgment, pointing to a provision in its bylaws where Dr. Fine had agreed not to sue "for any matter relating to appointment, reappointment, clinical privileges, or the individual’s qualifications for the same." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University, agreeing that Dr. Fine had released his claims against the University.Dr. Fine appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the release to apply to his case. He asserted that the release only applied to actions taken during a formal review process and his claims arose from actions taken during an informal process.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah disagreed with Dr. Fine's argument. The court interpreted the release using its traditional tools of contract interpretation and found no textual justification for limiting the release's application only to actions taken during the formal review process. The court held that Dr. Fine’s claims against the University fell within the scope of the release and therefore affirmed the district court's decision. View "Fine v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

This case is about a dispute between Richard Roe and St. John’s University (SJU) and Jane Doe. Roe, a male student at SJU, was accused of sexually assaulting two female students, Doe and Mary Smith, on separate occasions. SJU's disciplinary board found Roe guilty of non-consensual sexual contact with both Doe and Smith and imposed sanctions, including a suspension and eventual expulsion. Roe then sued SJU, alleging that his rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and state contract law had been violated. He also sued Doe for allegedly defaming him in an anonymous tweet accusing him of sexual assault. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Roe's Title IX and state law claims, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over his defamation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Roe's complaint failed to state a plausible claim of sex discrimination under Title IX. The court found that, while Roe had identified some procedural irregularities in SJU's disciplinary proceedings, these were not sufficient to support a minimal plausible inference of sex discrimination. Furthermore, the court ruled that Roe's hostile environment claim was fatally deficient, as the single anonymous tweet at the center of his claim was not, standing alone, sufficiently severe to support a claim of a hostile educational environment under Title IX. View "Roe v. St. John's University" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court, State of Wyoming, the Petitioners, Kenneth Carson and Anna Leigh Anderson, parents of two children living in a remote family ranch in Wyoming, sought to compel the Albany County School District Board of Trustees, the Superintendent of Schools for Albany County, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Wyoming (collectively, Respondents) to establish a rural school, named "The Buckle School," on their ranch. The proposal for this school was initially approved by the Albany County School District Board of Trustees and the Director of the State Construction Department. However, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction later denied the approval, citing the cost-effectiveness of the proposed school and the availability of virtual education options for the children.The Petitioners then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, which was dismissed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court, State of Wyoming, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondents had a ministerial duty to form the school. A ministerial duty is a duty that is absolute, clear, and indisputable, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts. The court found that the relevant statutes provided the Respondents with discretionary judgment, not a ministerial duty to approve or deny the formation of a rural school. The court further noted that the Petitioners had not shown that they had requested or were denied any transportation or maintenance payments, which the relevant statutes provide for in lieu of establishing a school. Therefore, the court concluded that the Petitioners had failed to state a claim upon which mandamus relief could be granted. View "Carson v. Albany County School District #1 Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

In a dispute arising from a contract for refurbishing an elementary school, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that no unfair trade practices claim could be stated against the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (the “State”). The plaintiff, Advanced Environmental Consulting, Inc. (“AEC”), had subcontracted to perform asbestos abatement services for Law Industries, LLC, the general contractor. When the State terminated the contract due to unsatisfactory asbestos remediation progress, AEC amended its answer to Law Industries' breach of contract suit to include a claim of unfair trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”). The State had objected to this claim, arguing that AEC had no cause of action and that the claim was perempted (time-barred). The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that AEC had failed to state a valid LUTPA cause of action against the State. It concluded that the State's actions were in furtherance of its governmental function of providing safe educational facilities for schoolchildren. The State, in this case, was a consumer of construction services, not a participant in "trade or commerce" as defined in the LUTPA, and was therefore not subject to a LUTPA claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. View "LAW INDUSTRIES, LLC VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled in favor of the University of Maine System (UMS) in a case involving Robert Bocko, who claimed that UMS failed to pay him wages on time as mandated by Maine law. Bocko, who was employed by UMS to teach law courses, argued that UMS violated the state's wage payment laws by not paying him at intervals not exceeding 16 days. UMS countered that Bocko was exempt from these requirements as he was a salaried employee. The court agreed with UMS, ruling that Bocko was indeed exempt from the wage payment requirements as he was compensated on a fee basis for teaching each course, rather than on a regular salary basis. The court found that the payment Bocko received for teaching each course met the salary-basis requirement when converted to an annual rate. Therefore, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in favor of UMS. View "Bocko v. University of Maine System" on Justia Law