Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

A child, through his parents, brought a due process challenge under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), claiming that the School District failed to provide him a free appropriate public education (FAPE). An administrative law judge agreed and ordered compensatory education. The district court affirmed but reduced the compensatory education award based on the statute of limitations. The parties cross-appealed. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the school provided the child with a FAPE and reversed the district court's order. View "Minnetonka Public Schools v. M.L.K." on Justia Law

Two Mississippi school districts disputed whether the disbursement of past revenues generated from sixteenth section land located in townships shared by the two school districts and received by one, should have been shared by the other. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the applicable governing statutes placed the burden on the noncustodial school district to provide student lists to the custodial school district, and made it unlawful for the custodial school district to pay over “until the lists . . . have been made.” Because the one-year period delineated in Section 29-3-119(4) did not place a time limit on litigation but rather a time limit on when a noncustodial district could make a claim with a custodial district, it was not a statute of limitations. Commensurate with its duty to presume the validity of legislative enactments, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and render judgment in favor of the custodial district, Wayne County School District, because Quitman School District’s claims were outside the prescribed time limit in the statute. View "Wayne County School District v. Quitman School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Lowell provided piano tuning services to defendant Medford School District and assisted in producing concerts performed in defendant’s facilities. While providing production assistance for a particular concert, plain- tiff noticed an echo near the stage. He complained to the school theater technician, Stephanie Malone, and, later, feeling that Malone had not adequately responded, he followed up with her. Malone reported to her supervisor that plaintiff appeared to be intoxicated, that he “smelled of alcohol,” and that “this was not the first time.” The supervisor repeated Malone’s statements to a district support services assistant. The assistant sent emails summarizing Malone’s statements to three other district employees, including the supervisor of purchasing. The assistant expressed concerns that appearing on district property under the influence of alcohol violated district policy and the terms of plaintiff’s piano tuning contract. Plaintiff brought this defamation action against Malone, the supervisor and assistant, later substituting the School district for the individual defendants. Defendant answered, asserting multiple affirmative defenses, including the one at issue here: that public employees are entitled to an absolute privilege for defamatory statements made in the course and scope of their employment. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on that basis. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant as a public employer, did not have an affirmative defense of absolute privilege that entitled it to summary judgment. View "Lowell v. Medford School Dist. 549C" on Justia Law

The parties to this matter—Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, and the Belton School District—disagree about the appropriate school placement for Plaintiff’s son pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq. Plaintiff appealed the decision of the district court granting judgment on the administrative record to the District.   On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that transferring her son to Trails West would violate his right under the IDEA to be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE). Alternatively, Plaintiff argued, if her son needs additional services, the District should provide them in her son’s current placement. Thus, the question is whether Kentucky Trail or Trails West is the LRE in which Plaintiff’s son can receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding no clear error in the district court’s factual findings and agreed that a preponderance of the evidence supports the AHC’s conclusion that placement at Trails West respects Plaintiff’s son's rights under the IDEA. Second, although Plaintiff emphasizes the social benefit her son receives from his more integrated placement at Kentucky Trail, the evidence shows that her son receives all of his instruction in the special education classroom and eats lunch there as well, and he has contact with nondisabled peers only when passing in the hallways or at recess. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that placement at Trails West offers substantial benefits for Plaintiff’s son. View "J.P. v. Belton School District No. 124" on Justia Law

Patrick G. was a seventeen-year-old boy with autism who qualified for special educational services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and who, since 2013, has been attending the Alpine Autism Center for school. In 2016, Harrison School District No. 2 (the “School District” or the “District”) proposed transferring Patrick from Alpine to a special program at Mountain Vista Community School allegedly tailored to Patrick’s needs. Plaintiffs-Appellants Patrick’s parents challenged this decision on Patrick’s behalf, first in administrative proceedings and then in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that the School District committed a host of violations in crafting an “individualized educational plan” (“IEP”) for Patrick in 2015 and 2016. After several years of litigation, the district court determined that the expiration of Patrick’s 2016 IEP rendered the Parents’ lawsuit moot. Significantly, the district court held several related issues - including the Parents’ request for attorney’s fees from the administrative proceedings, their argument that the School District had incorrectly reimbursed the Parents’ insurance provider instead of the Parents themselves, and their motion for a “stay put” injunction to keep Patrick in his current educational placement during the proceedings - were also moot. The Parents contended on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred by failing to find their substantive IDEA claims fell into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. And, even if their substantive IDEA claims did not fall within this exception, they argued their requests for attorney’s fees, reimbursement, and a “stay put” injunction continued to present live claims. To the latter, the Tenth Circuit agreed and remanded to the district court to rule on the merits of these claims in the first instance. To all other issues, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Patrick G., et al. v. Harrison School District No. 2" on Justia Law

In this COVID-19 pandemic-related case, the Seventh Circuit vacated in part the judgment of the district court granting Loyola University of Chicago's motion to dismiss this complaint brought by Plaintiffs, three undergraduate students, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, holding that Plaintiffs pled enough to withstand dismissal for failure to state a claim and that Plaintiffs were entitled to leave to amend to save their alternative claim for unjust enrichment.As a result of the pandemic, Loyola suspended all in-person instruction during the Spring 2020 semester, curtailed access to campus facilities, and moved all instruction online. Plaintiffs brought a putative class action lawsuit against Loyola, arguing that the decision to shut down Loyola's campus deprived them of promised services, such as in-person instruction and access to on-campus facilities, in exchange for tuition and fees. The district court granted Loyola's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs sufficiently pled a claim for breach of an implied contract under Illinois law; and (2) Plaintiffs adequately pled an unjust enrichment claim in the alternative. View "Gociman v. Loyola University of Chicago" on Justia Law

The University of Kentucky investigated two dentistry professors for entering false data about whether they, or their students, had performed services for patients at a university clinic and who should be paid for those services. The professors had earned more for treating patients than they earned in salary; they had circumvented the University’s system for determining who performed services. While the investigation proceeded, the professors were barred from seeing patients in the clinic but performed their other duties. After the investigation, both professors left the University. The professors sued, alleging violations of their due process rights and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to the administrators on the due process claims involving the suspension of their clinical duties and one claim of constructive discharge. Because the administrators did not violate clearly established law, qualified immunity protects them. Even if the professors had a property interest in their clinical duties, the administrators did not violate any clearly established due process right when they suspended them from working in the clinic and allowed them to continue working in other roles. The court affirmed summary judgment for the administrators on a due process claim involving the early end to one professor’s appointment and on the professors’ First Amendment retaliation claims. View "Cunningham v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court requiring disclosure of Plaintiffs' identities to opposing attorneys while allowing Plaintiffs to keep their names sealed and confidential as to the public and a school district, holding that this Court declines to adopt new standards modeled after federal law.Plaintiffs, a group of parents, sued a school district alleging that a policy adopted by the school district entitled "Guidance & Policies to Support Transgender, Non-binary & Gender Expansive Students" violated their constitutional rights to parent their children and to exercise their religious beliefs. Plaintiffs then moved to proceed using pseudonyms. The circuit court granted in part Plaintiffs' motion to proceed anonymously. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in allowing Plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously but not preventing opposing attorneys from knowing Plaintiffs' identity. View "Doe v. Madison Metro School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cl.G., on behalf of his minor son, C.G., appealed a district court’s dismissal of his case against Defendants-Appellees Cherry Creek School District (District or CCSD) and various employees for alleged constitutional violations stemming from C.G.’s suspension and expulsion from Cherry Creek High School (CCHS). In 2019, C.G. was off campus at a thrift store with three friends. He took a picture of his friends wearing wigs and hats, including “one hat that resembled a foreign military hat from the World War II period.” C.G. posted that picture on Snapchat and captioned it, “Me and the boys bout [sic] to exterminate the Jews.” C.G.’s post (the photo and caption) was part of a private “story,” visible only to Snapchat users connected with C.G. on that platform. Posts on a user’s Snapchat story are automatically deleted after 24 hours, but C.G. removed this post after a few hours. He then posted on his Snapchat story, “I’m sorry for that picture it was ment [sic] to be a joke.” One of C.G.’s Snapchat “friend[s]” took a photograph of the post before C.G. deleted it and showed it to her father. The father called the police, who visited C.G.’s house and found no threat. Referencing prior anti-Semitic activity and indicating that the post caused concern for many in the Jewish community, a CCHS parent emailed the school and community leaders about the post, leading to C.G.'s expulsion. Plaintiff filed suit claiming violations of C.G.'s constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the First Amendment limited school authority to regulate off-campus student speech, particularly speech unconnected with a school activity and not directed at the school or its specific members. Defendants maintained that C.G. was lawfully disciplined for what amounts to off-campus hate speech. According to Defendants, although originating off campus, C.G.’s speech still spread to the school community, disrupted the school’s learning environment, and interfered with the rights of other students to be free from harassment and receive an education. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff properly pled that Defendants violated C.G.’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his post; the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s first claim was reversed in part. The Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff’s further facial challenges to CCSD’s policies. Questions of qualified and absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim were remanded for further consideration. View "C1.G v. Siegfried, et al." on Justia Law

In February 2016, C.M. was six years old and in first grade, when he exhibited behavioral problems. The school district determined that he was ineligible for special education and related services because he was not disabled and did not need them. The child’s parents disagreed and sought redress under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In their administrative grievance, they asserted that the school district violated its statutory obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate children with disabilities, thereby denying their child his statutory right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The parents’ claims did not succeed at the administrative level or in the district court. In April 2017, C.M. was diagnosed with autism. The school developed an individualized education program, which his parents agreed to in August 2017, shortly before their son entered third grade. In July 2019, C.M. enrolled in a private school.The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the school district; the district did not violate its “child find” obligations nor deprive C.M. of a FAPE before April 2017. The parents have not exhausted administrative remedies on their claim for tuition reimbursement. View "J. M. v. Summit City Board of Education" on Justia Law