Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

In June 2016, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed into law 2016 PA 249 (codified at MCL 388.1752b), appropriating $2.5 million in funds for the 2016–2017 school year “to reimburse costs incurred by nonpublic schools” for compliance with various state health, safety, and welfare mandates identified by the Department of Education, such as state asbestos regulations and vehicle inspections. In July 2016, the Governor asked the Michigan Supreme Court for an advisory opinion as to whether MCL 388.1752b violated Const 1963, art 8, sec. 2, which generally prohibited “aid” to “nonpublic schools.” The Court declined this request. In March 2017, plaintiffs sued the state defendants in the Court of Claims, alleging that MCL 388.1752b violated Const 1963, art 8, sec. 2 and Const 1963, art 4, sec. 30, which provided that “[t]he assent of two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature shall be required for the appropriation of public money or property for local or private purposes.” The parties stipulated not to disburse any funds under the statute until the Court of Claims resolved the case. In July 2017, the Legislature amended MCL 388.1752b to appropriate additional funds for the 2017–2018 school year. Also in that month, the Court of Claims issued a preliminary injunction against disbursing the appropriated funds. Defendants sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the panel denied the application. The Supreme Court also declined review. In April 2018, the Court of Claims entered a permanent injunction against disbursing the appropriated funds, concluding the statute was unconstitutional. Meanwhile, in June 2018, the Legislature again amended MCL 388.1752b to appropriate funds for the 2018–2019 school year. In October 2018, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims and remanded for further proceedings, finding the statute did not violate the state Constitution to the extend that a reimbursed mandate satisfied a three-part test. The Supreme Court concluded MCL 388.1752b was indeed in accordance with both the religion clauses of the First Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article 8, sec. 2, as amended by Proposal C in 1970, of the Michigan Constitution. The Court of Appeals was affirmed and the matter remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. v. Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiffs on their Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against a school district for student-on-student harassment and remanded for further findings on the Title IX claim, holding that the district court erred by concluding that Plaintiffs established each of the elements on the section 1983 claim.Plaintiffs, two students and their parents, brought these claims for harassment after two sixth-graders targeted the students with sexual slurs, other insults, and physical assaults. After a bench trial, the district court found for Plaintiffs on both their Title IX and section 1983 claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Title IX's protections against sex-based discrimination extend to prohibit discrimination against homosexual and transgender individuals and discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation; (2) the district court properly found that the harassment in this case was "on the basis of sex for purposes of Title IX; (3) remand was required for further findings on the Title IX claim; and (4) the district court erred in relying solely on the violation of state law to satisfy "deliberate indifference," an essential element of both the Title IX and section 1983 claims. View "Clark County School District v. Bryan" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and three individual school officials in an action brought by a student, alleging claims of sexual abuse and harassment by a teacher and coach, Johnna Feazell.Where, as here, a complaint involves allegations against school officials brought under both Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983, this court has held that an official in these circumstances must have actual notice of the alleged sexual harassment or sexual abuse by a school employee to meet the standard for liability. In this case, a searching review of the summary judgment record reveals no evidence to indicate school officials had actual notice of sexual harassment or abuse by Feazell prior to the events at issue. Rather, when plaintiff's mother met with the school principal with the cell phone containing text messages evidencing a sexual relationship between plaintiff and Feazell, school officials took immediate action by contacting law enforcement and placing Feazell on administrative leave. Therefore, the district court did not improperly weigh the evidence and the summary judgment record established that no genuine dispute exists as to whether the District or any school official had actual notice of sexual abuse or harassment prior to October 13, 2014. View "KC v. Mayo" on Justia Law

Dr. Braun worked at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) for almost 32 years as a research doctor with a specialty in neurological disorders. He obtained tenured status in 2003. In 2016, the NIH, which is located within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, removed Dr. Braun from his position after an audit revealed that his records were incomplete for all but 9% of the human subjects who had participated in his research over the course of six years.The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected Braun’s argument that an NIH policy required de-tenuring of tenured scientists (which NIH had not done in his case) before they could be removed for performance-related reasons and that the NIH committed certain other errors. The Board reasoned that the cited NIH policy allows removal “for cause” without de-tenuring. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The “for cause” provision was properly applied to this case. The evidence permitted the conclusions that Dr. Braun, “over a long period of time,” failed to a “dramatic and disturbing” degree, to comply with protocol requirements that exist “for the safety of the patients and the credibility of the research.” There was no denial of due process. View "Braun v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was found to have violated the University's policies prohibiting sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of sex, and was suspended for two years, he filed suit against the Curators of the University and four individual Title IX investigators.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to compel and the district court's discovery ruling did not prevent plaintiff from adequately opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment; summary judgment on the Title VI claim was appropriate because plaintiff failed to present evidence that his proffered comparators, including the two white students mentioned, were graduate students and thus similarly situated to him in all relevant respects; summary judgment on plaintiff's void for vagueness claim was appropriate because the University's policies provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and the individual defendant's inability to agree on the exact scope of prohibited conduct or the definition of words in the policies does not mean the policies are subject to arbitrary enforcement; summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim was appropriate in its entirety; dismissal of the substantial overbreadth claim was appropriate where plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the University's policies against sexual harassment and stalking have a real and substantial effect on protected speech; dismissal of the sex discrimination under Title IX claim was appropriate where the complaint fails to plausibly allege that the investigation reached an outcome against the weight of the evidence or allege any additional facts suggesting bias based on his sex; and dismissal of the discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) were appropriate where plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for sex discrimination for reasons similar to his Title IX claims. Finally, although the court believed that it was error for the district court to dismiss the state law race discrimination claim, the error was harmless in light of the court's conclusion. View "Rowles v. Curators of the University of Missouri" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs attended licensed Michigan cosmetology schools, each of which includes a clinic salon where students work toward the state’s 965-hour practical experience requirement. The salons are open to the public. Customers pay for beauty services provided by students and can purchase products available in the salon. The schools profit from the salons. Students are not compensated for their time. When not working on clients, students wash and fold towels, clean the studio, and perform other janitorial jobs. Students receive academic credit for the time spent on such tasks.The plaintiffs sued, seeking compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, holding that they were owed compensation for certain cleaning work. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court properly focused on the specific work for which plaintiffs seek compensation, rather than on the entirety of the training program, but failed to correctly apply circuit precedent governing FLSA claims in an educational setting. On remand, the court must apply the primary-beneficiary test. Where students in a training environment seek compensation for some of the work they perform during the educational relationship, the court should consider that the students received academic credit and should evaluate the relationship between the challenged activities and the curriculum. Among the specific factors to be considered: the lack of expectation of payment; the educational value of the tasks under scrutiny; the displacement of paid employees, and the school’s competitive benefit. View "Eberline v. Douglas J. Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for dismissal of all but its order invalidating Rule CKA, a rule adopted by the Unita County School District Number One permitting school personnel to carry firearms on school property, holding that the district court's order invalidating Rule CKA rendered all other issues moot.Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Rule CKA violated the Wyoming Constitution, did not comply with the enabling statute, and was not adopted in compliance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs' count alleging violation of the enabling statute and dismissed or granted summary judgment for the school district on the remaining three counts. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that there were no live issues remaining to be litigated when the district court entered its order invalidating Rule CKA, and therefore, the court should have dismissed the other claims. View "Beppler v. Uinta County School District Number One" on Justia Law

The John A. Logan Community College Board of Trustees voted to reduce the number of full-time faculty members for the 2016-17 school year; 27 tenured faculty members (including the plaintiffs) received layoff notices under the Public Community College Act, 110 ILCS 805/3B. The Board and the union entered into a settlement agreement regarding various matters related to the decision.In 2017, the plaintiffs filed suit, citing section 3B-5 of the Act, which provides: “For the period of 24 months from the beginning of the school year for which the faculty member was dismissed, any faculty member shall have the preferred right to reappointment to a position entailing services he is competent to render prior to the appointment of any new faculty member; provided that no nontenure faculty member or other employee with less seniority shall be employed to render a service which a tenured faculty member is competent to render.” During the 2016-17 school year, adjunct instructors taught courses that plaintiffs had previously taught; they alleged that enough work existed to employ them full-time.The appellate court ruled that adjunct instructors were other “employee[s] with less seniority” under the “bumping rights” provision. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The rights conferred by section 3B-5 apply to individual courses, rather than to positions as faculty members; section 3B-5 prohibits the Board from laying off tenured faculty members and hiring adjunct instructors to teach courses that the tenured faculty formerly taught. View "Barrall v. Board of Trustees of John A. Logan Community College" on Justia Law

Conti attended the University of Michigan, 1999-2003, obtaining a bachelor’s degree in musical arts. Conti obtained private loans from Citibank totaling $76,049. Conti’s loan applications are all expressly “[f]or students attending 4-year colleges and universities.” They request information regarding the school’s identity and the academic year and specify that the student may “borrow up to the full cost of education less any financial aid.” The applications include a section where the school financial aid office can certify the applicant’s year, enrollment status, and recommended disbursement dates. Each application incorporates by reference an attached promissory note, stating that “the proceeds of this loan are to be used for specific educational expenses.” Citibank apparently disbursed each loan to Michigan directly. None of the loan amounts exceeded the cost of attendance at Michigan for the relevant enrollment period minus the maximum sum of Conti's federal Pell grant for the same period. In 2011-2016, Conti made payments on the loans, which were assigned to Arrowood.In 2017, Conti filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing the Citibank loans as dischargeable. Conti filed an adversary proceeding seeking to determine that they were not excepted “qualified education loan[s]” under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The bankruptcy court granted Arrowood summary judgment. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plain language of the loan documents demonstrated they were qualified education loans. View "Conti v. Arrowood Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Foster and the respondent were classmates at the University of Michigan’s executive MBA program based in Los Angeles. Students participated in monthly, weekend sessions at a hotel. Foster developed a friendship with the respondent but they did not have a dating or sexual relationship. The respondent began sending complimentary texts, giving Foster unsolicited gifts, expressing romantic interest. and making unwanted physical contact. He came to her hotel room and removed his clothing. Foster reported the sexual harassment to the University, which arranged that the two not stay in the same hotel, eat together, attend social functions together, or interact in class. Foster was not satisfied with the arrangements. During the next “residency,” the respondent sent vulgar text messages to administrators, violated the restrictions, and was barred from the second day of classes. His communications became increasingly aggressive. Foster obtained a restraining order but the respondent appeared at graduation in Michigan. The district court rejected Foster’s deliberate-indifference claim under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681–1688, on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed but on rehearing, en banc, affirmed. The University was not “deliberately indifferent” to Foster’s plight. At each stage, the University increased protections: from a no-contact order after the first complaint to a requirement that the harasser stay in a separate hotel, to removal from the session, to an order that he not attend graduation. View "Foster v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan" on Justia Law