Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an elementary school student who has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and severe, disability-related behavioral issues, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) alleging that the school district denied him equal access to a public education because of his disability. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim through the administrative procedures prescribed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as required when a plaintiff seeks relief under other federal statutes for the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE).The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and held that a close review of plaintiff's allegations reveals that the gravamen of his ADA claim is discrimination separate from his right to a FAPE. Therefore, the panel concluded that plaintiff's ADA claim is not subject to IDEA exhaustion. Finally, the panel concluded that there is nothing untoward—or inconsistent with Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017)—in plaintiff's having followed resolution of his IDEA claims with a lawsuit alleging non-FAPE-based violations of another statute. View "D. D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

After the school districts sought modification of existing desegregation consent decrees to allow their exemption from Arkansas's Public School Choice Act, Ark. Code. Ann. 6–18–1906, the district court granted the motions and modified the consent decrees to explicitly limit the transfer of students between school districts. The Department appealed, alleging that the modification imposed an impermissible interdistrict remedy.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a substantial change in Arkansas law after the consent decrees were enacted and the district court's modification was not an impermissible interdistrict remedy. The court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering and crediting evidence of white flight when it determined that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred warranting modification of the consent decrees. Furthermore, based on the court's review of the record and the large degree of deference given to the district court, the court could not find that the district court abused its discretion in modifying the consent decrees. View "United States v. Arkansas Department of Education" on Justia Law

Gabriel Taye, an eight-year-old Carson Elementary student, tied a necktie to his bunk bed and hung himself. Two days earlier, another Carson student attacked Taye in a school bathroom, knocking Taye unconscious for more than seven minutes. The incident was one of 12 "bullying" incidents spanning from Taye’s first-grade year at Carson until his death. The Plaintiffs allege that the then-principal and assistant principal (Jackson and McKenzie) misrepresented the severity of and outright concealed several bullying incidents involving Taye. The Plaintiffs uncovered information about these incidents after Taye’s death. The Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, also alleging state law tort claims of wrongful death, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, failure to report child abuse, and spoliation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jackson and McKenzie’s motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Jackson and McKenzie behaved recklessly; they are not entitled to governmental immunity under Ohio law. Jackson and McKenzie knew the full extent to which Taye was subjected to aggression and violence by his classmates. They had video footage of several of the violent incidents Taye experienced at school. Carson's behavior logs also document other routine aggressive and violent behavior among the student population. View "Meyers v. Cincinnati Board of Education" on Justia Law

Maras's application for tenure as an associate professor at the University of Missouri Department of Educational, School and Counseling Psychology was denied. She filed suit, claiming discrimination on the basis of sex, citing the Missouri Human Rights Act and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and violations of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in her employment contract. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Describing the university's tenure-review process as “elaborate and painstaking,” the court noted that numerous people over four years expressed concerns about Maras's record of scholarship. Many throughout the application process, including people outside the university, expressed similar concerns. That widely shared opinion strongly supports the university's proffered reason for tenure denial. The comparators Maras identified are not similarly situated in all relevant respects to Maras; they did not share the same ultimate decision-maker. One comparator was in a completely different department. Each of them had several positive recommendations at many steps in the tenure process, while Maras did not; it is not obvious that their records of scholarship were no better than Maras's. Maras did not show "that the circumstances permit a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus." View "Maras v. Curators of the University of Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that DCPS failed to provide her son with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) based on his 2017 individualized education program (IEP). The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim as moot, holding that the case presents a fact-specific challenge to particular provisions in an inoperative IEP. Furthermore, the parties agreed to a subsequent IEP and plaintiff does not seek retrospective relief. The court also held that an exception to mootness does not apply where the voluntary cessation doctrine is inapplicable and plaintiff's claim fails to meet the capable of repetition prong because the challenge focuses on a fact-specific inquiry rather than a recurring legal question. View "J. T. v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

In June 2016, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed into law 2016 PA 249 (codified at MCL 388.1752b), appropriating $2.5 million in funds for the 2016–2017 school year “to reimburse costs incurred by nonpublic schools” for compliance with various state health, safety, and welfare mandates identified by the Department of Education, such as state asbestos regulations and vehicle inspections. In July 2016, the Governor asked the Michigan Supreme Court for an advisory opinion as to whether MCL 388.1752b violated Const 1963, art 8, sec. 2, which generally prohibited “aid” to “nonpublic schools.” The Court declined this request. In March 2017, plaintiffs sued the state defendants in the Court of Claims, alleging that MCL 388.1752b violated Const 1963, art 8, sec. 2 and Const 1963, art 4, sec. 30, which provided that “[t]he assent of two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature shall be required for the appropriation of public money or property for local or private purposes.” The parties stipulated not to disburse any funds under the statute until the Court of Claims resolved the case. In July 2017, the Legislature amended MCL 388.1752b to appropriate additional funds for the 2017–2018 school year. Also in that month, the Court of Claims issued a preliminary injunction against disbursing the appropriated funds. Defendants sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the panel denied the application. The Supreme Court also declined review. In April 2018, the Court of Claims entered a permanent injunction against disbursing the appropriated funds, concluding the statute was unconstitutional. Meanwhile, in June 2018, the Legislature again amended MCL 388.1752b to appropriate funds for the 2018–2019 school year. In October 2018, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims and remanded for further proceedings, finding the statute did not violate the state Constitution to the extend that a reimbursed mandate satisfied a three-part test. The Supreme Court concluded MCL 388.1752b was indeed in accordance with both the religion clauses of the First Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article 8, sec. 2, as amended by Proposal C in 1970, of the Michigan Constitution. The Court of Appeals was affirmed and the matter remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. v. Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiffs on their Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against a school district for student-on-student harassment and remanded for further findings on the Title IX claim, holding that the district court erred by concluding that Plaintiffs established each of the elements on the section 1983 claim.Plaintiffs, two students and their parents, brought these claims for harassment after two sixth-graders targeted the students with sexual slurs, other insults, and physical assaults. After a bench trial, the district court found for Plaintiffs on both their Title IX and section 1983 claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Title IX's protections against sex-based discrimination extend to prohibit discrimination against homosexual and transgender individuals and discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation; (2) the district court properly found that the harassment in this case was "on the basis of sex for purposes of Title IX; (3) remand was required for further findings on the Title IX claim; and (4) the district court erred in relying solely on the violation of state law to satisfy "deliberate indifference," an essential element of both the Title IX and section 1983 claims. View "Clark County School District v. Bryan" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and three individual school officials in an action brought by a student, alleging claims of sexual abuse and harassment by a teacher and coach, Johnna Feazell.Where, as here, a complaint involves allegations against school officials brought under both Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983, this court has held that an official in these circumstances must have actual notice of the alleged sexual harassment or sexual abuse by a school employee to meet the standard for liability. In this case, a searching review of the summary judgment record reveals no evidence to indicate school officials had actual notice of sexual harassment or abuse by Feazell prior to the events at issue. Rather, when plaintiff's mother met with the school principal with the cell phone containing text messages evidencing a sexual relationship between plaintiff and Feazell, school officials took immediate action by contacting law enforcement and placing Feazell on administrative leave. Therefore, the district court did not improperly weigh the evidence and the summary judgment record established that no genuine dispute exists as to whether the District or any school official had actual notice of sexual abuse or harassment prior to October 13, 2014. View "KC v. Mayo" on Justia Law

Dr. Braun worked at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) for almost 32 years as a research doctor with a specialty in neurological disorders. He obtained tenured status in 2003. In 2016, the NIH, which is located within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, removed Dr. Braun from his position after an audit revealed that his records were incomplete for all but 9% of the human subjects who had participated in his research over the course of six years.The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected Braun’s argument that an NIH policy required de-tenuring of tenured scientists (which NIH had not done in his case) before they could be removed for performance-related reasons and that the NIH committed certain other errors. The Board reasoned that the cited NIH policy allows removal “for cause” without de-tenuring. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The “for cause” provision was properly applied to this case. The evidence permitted the conclusions that Dr. Braun, “over a long period of time,” failed to a “dramatic and disturbing” degree, to comply with protocol requirements that exist “for the safety of the patients and the credibility of the research.” There was no denial of due process. View "Braun v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was found to have violated the University's policies prohibiting sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of sex, and was suspended for two years, he filed suit against the Curators of the University and four individual Title IX investigators.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to compel and the district court's discovery ruling did not prevent plaintiff from adequately opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment; summary judgment on the Title VI claim was appropriate because plaintiff failed to present evidence that his proffered comparators, including the two white students mentioned, were graduate students and thus similarly situated to him in all relevant respects; summary judgment on plaintiff's void for vagueness claim was appropriate because the University's policies provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and the individual defendant's inability to agree on the exact scope of prohibited conduct or the definition of words in the policies does not mean the policies are subject to arbitrary enforcement; summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim was appropriate in its entirety; dismissal of the substantial overbreadth claim was appropriate where plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the University's policies against sexual harassment and stalking have a real and substantial effect on protected speech; dismissal of the sex discrimination under Title IX claim was appropriate where the complaint fails to plausibly allege that the investigation reached an outcome against the weight of the evidence or allege any additional facts suggesting bias based on his sex; and dismissal of the discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) were appropriate where plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for sex discrimination for reasons similar to his Title IX claims. Finally, although the court believed that it was error for the district court to dismiss the state law race discrimination claim, the error was harmless in light of the court's conclusion. View "Rowles v. Curators of the University of Missouri" on Justia Law