Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two former faculty members at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), who were accused of serious misconduct. An independent law firm was hired to investigate the allegations, and the resulting report concluded that the professors had engaged in improper activities. The professors resigned their positions as part of a settlement agreement, with no findings of misconduct or admissions of liability. A former UCLA employee requested the report under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), and the professors objected, leading to a series of legal actions known as "reverse-CPRA" actions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the professors' petitions to withhold the report, concluding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the professors' privacy interests. The court found that the allegations of misconduct were serious and substantial, and that the public had a strong interest in knowing how the university handled such complaints. The professors appealed this decision.While the appeal was pending, the Los Angeles Times made its own CPRA request for related documents, including the investigation report and the settlement agreements. The professors sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of these documents, but the trial court denied their request. The court found that the professors were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, as the analysis for the disclosure of these documents was the same as for the investigation report. The professors appealed this decision as well.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's analysis and found no reason to delay a decision on a matter concerning public transparency. The court concluded that the professors had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim and were therefore not entitled to injunctive relief. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, including the Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. and California Educators for Medical Freedom, who challenged the COVID-19 vaccination policy of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). The policy, which was in effect for over two years, required employees to get the COVID-19 vaccination or lose their jobs. The plaintiffs argued that the policy interfered with their fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.The case was initially dismissed by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which applied a rational basis review under Jacobson v. Massachusetts, concluding that the policy served a legitimate government purpose. The court held that even if the vaccine did not prevent transmission or contraction of COVID-19, it furthered the purpose of protecting LAUSD students and employees from COVID-19.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. During the appeal, LAUSD rescinded its vaccination policy. LAUSD then asked the court to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the case was now moot. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that LAUSD withdrew the policy because they feared an adverse ruling.The Ninth Circuit held that the case was not moot, applying the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The court found that LAUSD's pattern of withdrawing and then reinstating its vaccination policies, particularly in response to litigation risk, was enough to keep the case alive.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The court found that Jacobson did not apply because the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the COVID-19 vaccine does not effectively prevent the spread of COVID-19. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "HEALTH FREEDOM DEFENSE FUND, INC. V. ALBERTO CARVALHO" on Justia Law

In this case, Laurie Barton, a third-year law student at the University of Idaho, was accused of violating the university's honor code by committing academic misconduct during a final examination. Despite denying the allegations, she was sanctioned with degree denial after a series of Honor Court proceedings. Barton exhausted her administrative review options, including an appeal to the Idaho State Board of Education, and then petitioned for judicial review. The district court denied her petition. Instead of appealing this decision, Barton sued the Board of Regents of the University of Idaho and Idaho State Board of Education, alleging nine causes of action, all of which the district court dismissed at summary judgment.The district court's judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. The Supreme Court found that Barton had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the University violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing or that it made a specific promise that induced her action. The court also found that Barton's motion for a protective order was implicitly denied and moot, as the case was resolved on summary judgment. The court concluded that Barton's appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation, and awarded attorney fees and costs to the University. View "Barton v. Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The case involves Kari Schwartz, a high school teacher, who was found guilty of sexual exploitation by a school employee. The charges stemmed from her relationship with a 17-year-old student, A.S., in her art class. Schwartz began spending more time with A.S., both in and outside of school, and started sharing personal, intimate stories. She also made comments about A.S.'s physical appearance and initiated physical contact, including hugging. Schwartz also sent multiple messages to A.S., expressing her love and inviting her to do things outside of school. The most serious incident occurred when Schwartz touched A.S. inappropriately in a school stairwell.The case was first heard in the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, where Schwartz was found guilty. She appealed her conviction and sentence, raising four challenges. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Schwartz then sought further review from the Supreme Court of Iowa.The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court found substantial evidence supporting Schwartz's conviction, including her systematic conduct towards A.S. and the sexual nature of her actions. The court also rejected Schwartz's challenge to the jury instruction, which included hugging as a form of sexual conduct. The court held that the instruction was a correct statement of the law and that the jury was not misled by it. The court concluded that Schwartz was not prejudiced by the instruction and affirmed her conviction and sentence. View "State of Iowa v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of California reviewed a case involving the University of California, Berkeley's (UC Berkeley) plan to build a housing project on a site called People's Park. The plaintiffs, Make UC a Good Neighbor and People’s Park Historic District Advocacy Group, challenged the certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the project, arguing that it failed to consider the environmental impacts of "student-generated noise" and did not adequately consider alternatives to the People’s Park location. The Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of California granted review of the Court of Appeal’s decision. During the review, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1307, which added sections to the Public Resources Code stating that noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not a significant environmental effect for residential projects, and that public higher education institutions are not required to consider alternatives to the location of a proposed residential or mixed-use housing project if certain requirements are met. The plaintiffs conceded that this new law applied to the case and made clear that the EIR was not required to examine "social noise" or potential alternative locations to People’s Park.The Supreme Court of California concluded that none of the plaintiffs' claims had merit in light of the new law. The court held that the new law applied to both the People’s Park housing project and the development plan, and the EIR was not inadequate for having failed to study the potential noisiness of future students at UC Berkeley in connection with this project. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs' alternative locations argument with respect to potential future housing projects. The court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves Little Scholars of Arkansas, AP Consolidated Theatres II L.P., CSRC Charter LISA, LLC, and KLS Leasing LLC (collectively, appellants) who appealed against Pulaski County, Arkansas, and its officials (collectively, appellees). The appellants operate charter schools and lease properties for their schools. The appellees assessed real-property taxes against the schools, which the appellants contested, arguing that the properties used for school purposes are exempt from taxes under the Arkansas Constitution. The appellants also sought a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118, which they claimed the appellees relied on for the tax assessment, is void under the constitution.The case was initially brought before the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The appellees moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the county courts have exclusive jurisdiction over county tax matters. The circuit court agreed with the appellees, dismissing the case on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' claims.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The appellants argued that the circuit court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their illegal-exaction claims. They also argued that their request for a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118 is void does not fall within the county court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellants, affirming the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' claim was not an illegal-exaction claim but an assessment dispute, which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' request for declaratory judgment. View "LITTLE SCHOLARS OF ARKANSAS FOUNDATION v. PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-verbal student, Alexandre Le Pape, and his family who repeatedly requested that the Lower Merion School District change his educational program to include a new communication protocol known as "Spelling to Communicate" (S2C). The school district denied these requests, leading to Alexandre's withdrawal from public education. The family filed an administrative special education due process complaint against the school district, alleging that the district failed to protect Alexandre's rights and denied him a Free Accessible Public Education (FAPE) under various laws. An administrative hearing officer ruled against the family on all claims, leading them to file a suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.The District Court granted the school district's motions for summary judgment on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim and judgment on the administrative record for the denial-of-FAPE claims. The Le Papes appealed the court's decision, arguing that the court granted judgment without applying the summary judgment standard to which they were entitled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the school district on the Le Papes' ADA discrimination claim and judgment on the administrative record for their discrimination claims under both the ADA and Section 504. The court clarified that a denial-of-FAPE claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) can be resolved through an administrative appeal, but ADA and Section 504 discrimination claims seeking compensatory damages, even if on the same facts, should be resolved through summary judgment and, possibly, trial. View "Le Pape v. Lower Merion School District" on Justia Law

A student, Brooklyn, and her parent, Gabrielle M., filed a complaint against the Upper Darby School District, alleging that the district failed to provide Brooklyn with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The family claimed that the district had not fulfilled its "Child Find" obligation to identify Brooklyn as eligible for services under Section 504 until fourth grade, despite requests for a comprehensive evaluation as early as kindergarten. The family also argued that the district's 504 plan for Brooklyn was inadequate.The case was first heard by a special education hearing officer, who ruled that the district had denied Brooklyn a FAPE by providing an inadequate 504 plan, but had not violated its Child Find obligation. The family then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the hearing officer's decision and granted judgment on the administrative record to the School District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court's decision, stating that the court had erred in not separately analyzing the Child Find claim under Section 504, despite the broader definition of disability under Section 504 compared to the IDEA. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case for further analysis of the Child Find claim under Section 504. View "B. M. v. Upper Darby School District" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the funding of Delaware's public schools. The plaintiffs, non-profit organizations with an interest in Delaware's schools, filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging that the state's public schools were not providing an adequate education for students from low-income households, students with disabilities, and students whose first language is not English. They argued that one of the problems was a broken system for funding the schools, which relied on property taxes. The plaintiffs contended that the three counties in Delaware were using decades-old property valuations, which violated state law and the state constitution.The case was initially heard in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. During discovery, the plaintiffs served requests for admission to the counties, asking them to admit that their decades-old assessments resulted in a lack of uniformity in property taxes and violated state law. The counties denied these requests. At trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the counties' assessments violated state law and the state constitution. The court also found that the plaintiffs had proved the facts that were the subject of the requests for admission that the counties had denied.The plaintiffs then requested an award of expenses under Court of Chancery Rule 37(c), which allows the court to order a party to pay the expenses that another party incurred in proving a fact that should have been admitted. The court granted the plaintiffs' request, awarding them expenses of $337,224, which included attorneys’ fees and out-of-pocket costs. Each county was ordered to pay a prorated share of $112,408. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law

The case involves John R. Tibbetts, a teacher, and his employer, the Worth County School District. The District offered Tibbetts a contract for the upcoming school year, but Tibbetts did not return the signed contract within the stipulated time. The District then informed Tibbetts that his employment would end when his current contract expired. Tibbetts sued the District for breach of contract, arguing that the offered contract did not comply with Georgia's statutory requirements for teacher contracts because it was missing terms and contained blanks. Therefore, he contended, his employment contract for the prior school year was renewed by operation of law.The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no existing written contract between the parties that operated to waive sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. The trial court found that the District offered Tibbetts a contract that complied with the statutory requirements, but that Tibbetts did not timely accept that offer.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It determined that the contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year failed to comply with the requirements of the statute; therefore, Tibbetts’s contract for the previous school year was renewed by operation of law and constituted a contract in writing. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Tibbetts’s claim was one for breach of a written contract, and sovereign immunity was waived pursuant to the ex contractu clause.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the District because the employment contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year satisfied the requirements of the statute. Because Tibbetts failed to timely accept this offer, no written contract exists to support Tibbetts’s claim for breach of a written contract. Absent such a claim, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to the ex contractu clause. View "WORTH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. TIBBETTS" on Justia Law