Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two students, Chad Ayach and Joseph Nofal, who were expelled from the University of California Riverside (UC Riverside) following an administrative hearing. The university's Student Conduct and Academic Integrity Programs office (SCAIP) initiated an investigation into the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity (PGD) after receiving a report expressing concern for the health of a member of the fraternity's pledge class. During the investigation, it was revealed that the fraternity engaged in activities that appeared to meet UC Riverside's definitions of hazing. Ayach and Nofal, who held leadership roles in the fraternity, were subsequently expelled.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after Ayach and Nofal filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging their expulsions. They argued that the university's administrative hearings did not afford them due process because the charging documents and evidence presented used pseudonyms to identify witnesses, and they were purportedly denied the opportunity to confront or cross-examine these witnesses at the hearing. The court denied the petition, and Ayach and Nofal appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the administrative proceedings afforded Ayach and Nofal the process they were due, given the nature of the charges and their response. The court found that the hearings before the committee provided Ayach and Nofal with a full opportunity to present their defenses, which is what due process requires. The court also noted that the credibility of the witnesses was not central to the disciplinary decision, and therefore, the lack of cross-examination, lack of witness confrontation, and the use of pseudonyms in the description of witness statements did not prejudice Ayach's and Nofal's ability to present a meaningful defense. View "Ayach v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by an adult, John Doe D.Y., alleging childhood sexual assault while in elementary school. The plaintiff used fictitious names for all defendants and did not serve any at the time of filing, as required by section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case was assigned to Judge Katherine A. Bacal. In October 2023, the superior court allowed the plaintiff to serve and name Doe defendants under section 340.1. In November 2023, the plaintiff named Doe 1 as Defendant and Petitioner San Diego Unified School District. The District was served with the complaint in December 2023.The District made its first appearance in January 2024, seeking an automatic extension of time to demur and filed a peremptory challenge under section 170.6 against the judge. The superior court denied the challenge as "untimely" without further explanation. The District then filed a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that it had timely filed the challenge within 15 days of its first appearance.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California, concluded that the superior court's review of the certificates under section 340.1 did not constitute a "determination of contested fact issues relating to the merits" under section 170.6(a)(2), and thus did not preclude a subsequent peremptory challenge. The court found that the superior court had erred in ruling the District's peremptory challenge as untimely. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order denying the District's peremptory challenge, and to enter an order granting the challenge and reassigning the case to a different judge. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A mother sued a school district for negligence under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), alleging that her son was injured during a pole-vaulting practice at school when he fell onto an unpadded section of the pole-vaulting box collar area. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the claim was barred by the PSTCA’s “recreational activity” exemption. The mother appealed.Previously, the district court had ruled that the school district was immune from the lawsuit because the student's pole-vaulting activity fell under the PSTCA's "recreational activity" exemption. The court applied a three-part test from a previous case, determining that pole-vaulting fit the definition of a recreational activity, the injuries arose from an inherent risk of the activity, and no fee was charged for participation.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that while pole-vaulting could be considered a recreational activity, it was premature to conclude that the student's injuries necessarily resulted from an inherent risk of that activity. The court noted that the complaint alleged the injuries resulted from the school's negligence in failing to properly pad the pole-vaulting area, supervise the student, and have proper safety protocols in place. The court concluded that a factual record was necessary to resolve the issues raised by the complaint and the assertion of sovereign immunity by the school district. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MacFarlane v. Sarpy Cty. Sch. Dist. 77-0037" on Justia Law

Michele Rawlins, a former school principal and member of the Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York (TRS), was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following a series of incidents involving a disgruntled food-service worker. The worker's behavior left Rawlins feeling threatened and harassed, leading to her inability to perform her job responsibilities. The final incident occurred in April 2019, when the worker, who had been transferred to another location, entered the school and demanded to speak with Rawlins, insisting she had his "belt and wallet." Rawlins interpreted the worker's remarks as having "sexual overtones" and felt she was being stalked. She left the school building and never returned to work following the incident.Rawlins applied for accidental disability retirement benefits (ADR) from the TRS, but her application was denied. The TRS Medical Board determined that she did not sustain an accident in the work setting and that "purposeful conduct by coworkers giving rise to a disabling injury is not an accident within the meaning of the pension statute." Rawlins reapplied for ADR, but the Board maintained its previous determination. Rawlins then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the Board's determination. The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, stating that the Board's determination had a rational basis. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, and Rawlins was granted leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that Rawlins' injury was not caused by an "accident" within the meaning of the statutory scheme. The court declined to adopt a rule that "purposeful conduct by coworkers" can never be the basis for an award of ADR. Instead, the court stated that when a member's disability is alleged to have resulted from the intentional acts of any third party, the relevant question continues to be whether the injury-causing event was sudden, unexpected, and outside the risks inherent in the work performed. View "Matter of Rawlins v Teachers' Retirement Sys. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law

John Sandy Campbell, a Resource Specialist Teacher at Chavez Social Justice Humanitas Academy from 2015 to 2017, was dismissed from her employment with the Los Angeles Unified School District due to excessive absences and other issues. The Commission on Professional Competence upheld her dismissal, and Campbell challenged this decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. The superior court, exercising its independent judgment, denied Campbell’s petition and upheld her dismissal.The proceedings to adjudicate Campbell’s dismissal were extensive, with the administrative hearing spanning 11 days. Campbell contended that the superior court erred in affirming her dismissal because the Commission miscited and applied the wrong statutory subdivisions at her dismissal hearing, and the court failed to apply “new” precedent when determining Campbell’s fitness to teach. The superior court recognized that the Commission cited incorrect subdivisions of section 44932 in its legal conclusions but noted that the Commission accurately listed, by name, the correct section 44932 causes for Campbell’s dismissal in these legal conclusions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed the superior court's decision. The appellate court found that Campbell had not demonstrated error in the lower court's decision. The court also rejected Campbell's insufficiency challenge due to her failure to present all the relevant evidence. Furthermore, the court found Campbell's argument that the superior court erred by not applying a more recent case law unconvincing. The court concluded that Campbell failed to overcome the presumption that the result was correct and affirmed the judgment, awarding costs to the District. View "Campbell v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of disabled students who sued the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Washington State. The students claimed that the state's practice of discontinuing special education services at the end of the school year in which a student turns 21 violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The IDEA generally requires states to provide special education to disabled students until their 22nd birthday, but allows states to discontinue services as early as age 18 if providing special education to older students would be inconsistent with state law or practice. The students argued that because Washington offers certain adult-education programs to 21-year-olds, it should also be required to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the students' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the students had not shown that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The court also concluded that the students were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claim because the adult-education programs in Washington charged a tuition fee, and therefore did not constitute "free public education."The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the students had a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claim because the availability of the adult-education programs in Washington triggered an obligation under the IDEA to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds. The court also found that the students would suffer irreparable harm from the denial of access to special education. The court concluded that the balance of hardships tipped in the students' favor and that an injunction would be in the public interest. View "N. D. V. REYKDAL" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the question of whether a board of cooperative education services (BOCES) can locate a school within the geographic boundaries of a nonmember school district without the district's consent. The petitioner, Education reEnvisioned BOCES (ERBOCES), had entered into an agreement with the Colorado Literacy and Learning Center’s School for Dyslexic Learners (CLLC) to operate a school within the boundaries of respondent Colorado Springs School District 11 (District 11), which is not a member of ERBOCES. Neither ERBOCES nor CLLC sought or obtained District 11’s permission to do so.The district court initially ruled in favor of ERBOCES and CLLC, interpreting the language of section 22-5-111(2) of the Boards of Cooperative Services Act of 1965 (the BOCES Act) to permit ERBOCES to operate a school at any appropriate location, whether inside or outside of a district providing funding for the facilities. District 11 appealed this decision.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling, concluding that section 22-5-111(2) does not allow a BOCES to open and operate schools within the geographic boundaries of nonmember school districts that do not consent. The court of appeals found that the district court’s interpretation did not give effect to the qualifying language 'within or without a school district providing the money for the facilities.' The court of appeals also noted that the BOCES Act’s statutory framework did not grant a BOCES unrestricted extraterritoriality.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of section 22-5-111(2), when read in context, does not permit a BOCES to locate a contract school within a nonmember school district without that district’s consent. The court did not need to decide whether article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which pertains to local control of education, prohibits a BOCES from doing so. View "Education reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colorado Springs School District 11" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mackinac Center for Public Policy and the Cato Institute (Plaintiffs) who sued the U.S. Department of Education and its officials (Defendants) over a one-time account adjustment announced by the Department. The adjustment was intended to count months or years that student-loan borrowers spent in excessive forbearance status towards debt forgiveness. The Plaintiffs, being nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations and qualified public service employers under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, argued that this adjustment would harm their ability to recruit and retain employees.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, where the court dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Plaintiffs lacked standing. The Plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they suffered an injury in fact, a requirement for establishing standing. The court rejected the Plaintiffs' arguments that they had competitor standing and that they were deprived of a procedural right. The court found that the Plaintiffs' claims were speculative and unsupported by specific facts. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Mackinac Center for Public Policy v. Cardona" on Justia Law

The case involves two public school districts, Cajon Valley Union School District (CVUSD) and Grossmont Union High School District (GUHSD), located within the boundaries of the former El Cajon Redevelopment Agency (RDA) in San Diego County. In 1988, the districts entered into “pass-through” agreements with the RDA, which agreed to provide the districts a portion of its annual property tax increment revenue up to a specified dollar cap. After the RDA was dissolved in 2012, the San Diego County Auditor-Controller continued to make payments according to the agreements. The districts sought a writ of mandate to compel the Auditor-Controller to make statutorily defined pass-through payments to them after the caps in their respective agreements were reached. The Auditor-Controller responded that she would not make further pass-through payments to the districts once their respective caps were reached.The trial court denied the requested relief. The court found that under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, when the RDA adopted an amendment lifting the time limit to establish loans, advances, and indebtedness, it triggered a statutory obligation to pay one or the other of two things to affected taxing entities, depending on whether the RDA had entered into a pass-through agreement with any particular entity before January 1, 1994, that required pass-through payments to that entity. If such an agreement did exist, the RDA would need to make the contractually defined pass-through payments. If such an agreement did not exist, the RDA would need to make statutorily defined pass-through payments. The court concluded that the statute does not require other payments and it would not read such a requirement into the plain language of the statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of the statute and found that the districts were not entitled to receive statutorily defined pass-through payments once the payment caps in the agreements were reached. View "Cajon Valley Union School District v. Drager" on Justia Law

A group of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland, challenged the local school board's decision to include LGBTQ-inclusive books in the English Language Arts curriculum without providing parents notice or the option to opt their children out of exposure to these books. The parents, who held various religious beliefs, argued that the board's decision violated their rights under the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the parents' motion for a preliminary injunction, which would have required the board to provide notice and an opt-out option. The parents appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the parents had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court found that the parents had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the board's decision coerced them or their children to act or believe contrary to their religious faith. The court also found that the parents had not shown that their due process rights were likely to be violated. The court noted that the parents still had the right to instruct their children on their religious beliefs and to discuss the topics raised in the books with their children. View "Mahmoud v. McKnight" on Justia Law