Justia Education Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district in an action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that, where parents refuse special education services for their child under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and bring suit under another act, they must first exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA if the relief they seek in the suit is also available under the IDEA. Therefore, because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA in this case, the school district was entitled to summary judgment. View "E. D. v. Palmyra R-I School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Relator to compel Kent State University to comply with her records request under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Relator was not entitled to additional records beyond those that she had already received pursuant to her request.After Kent State responded to Relator’s records request, Relator filed this mandamus complaint. Following the complaint, Kent State provided additional records. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Kent State did not fail to uphold its duties under section 149.43. The Court granted Relator an award of statutory damages in the amount of $1,000 and granted Relator’s request for reasonable attorney fees but denied her request for court costs. View "State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Relator seeking to compel Kent State University with certain records regarding student-athletes under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Relator failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Kent State failed fully to respond to her records request.Kent State provided several hundred pages of records in response to Relator’s records request. Relator later filed her mandamus complaint alleging that Kent State failed fully to respond to her request. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) despite Kent State’s failure fro comply with Relator’s request within a reasonable period of time, Kent State’s eventual production of all the requested records rendered Relator’s mandamus claim moot; and (2) Relator was entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages and reasonable attorney fees but was not entitled to an award of court costs. View "State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants San Diego Unified School District, Clovis Unified School District, Poway Unified School District, San Jose Unified School District, Newport-Mesa Unified School District, and Grossmont Union High School District (the Districts) appealed an order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer of defendant-respondent State Controller Betty Yee (the Controller) to the Districts' first amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint. The Districts had challenged the Controller's reduction the reimbursement of monies from state funds to the Districts, but the trial court ruled the action was barred by the 90-day statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 341.5. The trial court implicitly found the action was one "challenging the constitutionality of any statute relating to state funding for . . . school districts" within the meaning of section 341.5. The Districts argued on appeal that under its plain language, section 341.5 did not apply because, among other reasons, their challenge involved subvention, not state funding; the dispute was focused on the Controller's actions, not the constitutionality of the statutes under which the Controller acted; and their challenge was not a facial challenge subject to section 341.5. The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions, and concluded section 341.5 applied to the Districts' action, the gravamen of which was a challenge to the constitutional validity of the statued providing one-time general state funding for school districts. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Yee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the superior court’s order dismissing this complaint under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the State, and not a board of county commissioners, is solely responsible for preserving the right of every child in North Carolina to receive a sound basic education pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution.Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant’s continued support and maintenance of a tripartite school district system and its refusal to manage and distribute resources efficiently among the school districts resulted in Defendant’s failure to provide the students of Halifax County an opportunity to receive a sound basic education. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that a board of county commissioners is absolved of any constitutional duty to provide its students the opportunity to receive a sound basic education. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, along with the State, a board of county commissioners is not required to provide the opportunity for North Carolina children to receive a sound basic education. View "Silver v. Halifax County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board"); Tyrone Yarbrough, individually and in his official capacity as the superintendent of the Board; and members of the Board Bernard Martin and Lester Turk, individually and in their official capacities, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing with prejudice all claims against them. Reginald Southall was a teacher at Wilcox Central High School. During a meeting of the Board in April 2013, then Superintendent Yarbrough recommended the nonrenewal of Southall's probationary contract. Five Board members were present during the vote. Normally, the Board consists of six members. One seat on the Board, however, was vacant at the time of the April 2013 meeting, due to an order of the circuit court enjoining the Board from filling the vacant seat. Thus, the Board conducted business with only five members during the April 2013 meeting. Upon a motion to accept Yarbrough's recommendation, three Board members voted in favor of not renewing the contract, one member opposed the recommendation, and one member abstained. Southall filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus, in which he asserted that, because of the vacancy on the Board, the termination of his employment was the result of an illegal vote of the Board in violation of 16-8-4, Ala. Code 1975. Under the limited circumstances of this particular case, a majority of the five members was all that was required to accept Yarbrough's recommendation not to renew Southall's probationary contract. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to the order sought. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order, and to enter an order dismissing the underlying action. View "Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

In 2012, the Campbell Union School District (CUSD) Governing Board enacted a fee on new residential development under Education Code section 17620. The fee, $2.24 per square foot on new residential construction, was based on a study that projected that “it will cost the District an average of $22,039 to house each additional student in new facilities.” This figure was based on a projected $12.8 million cost to build a new 600-student elementary school and a projected $24.4 million cost to build a new 1,000-student middle school. SummerHill owns a 110-unit residential development project in Santa Clara, within CUSD’s boundaries. In 2012 and 2013, SummerHill tendered to CUSD under protest development fees of $499,976.96. The trial court invalidated the fee and ordered a refund of SummerHill’s fees. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the fee study did not contain the data required to properly calculate a development fee; it failed to quantify the expected amount of new development or the number of new students it would generate, did not identify the type of facilities that would be necessary to accommodate those new students, and failed to assess the costs associated with those facilities. View "SummerHill Winchester LLC v. Campbell Union School District" on Justia Law

A county school board may require all applicants for substitute teacher positions to submit to and pass a drug test as a condition of employment. The Eleventh Circuit held that the school board may, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, collect and search -- by testing -- the urine of all prospective substitute teachers. Because the school board has a sufficiently compelling interest in screening its prospective teachers to justify this invasion of the privacy rights of job applicants, the court held that the school board did not violate the constitutional mandate barring unreasonable searches and seizures. The court recognized that ensuring the safety of millions of schoolchildren in the mandatory supervision and care of the state, and ensuring and impressing a drug-free environment in our classrooms, were compelling concerns. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction because plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. View "Friedenberg v. School Board of Palm Beach County" on Justia Law

After a non-USC student filed suit against the University and others for negligence, the trial court denied USC's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal granted USC's motion for a peremptory writ of mandate challenging the denial and held that USC had no duty to protect members of the public from the conduct of a third party at an off-campus fraternity house. In this case, the non-student was injured when she was dancing on a makeshift raised platform and was bumped by another partygoer, causing her to fall to the ground and suffer injuries. View "University of Southern California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their civil rights actions under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking the reinstatement of three claims: a Title IX sex discrimination claim against the University of Mary Washington; a Title IX retaliation claim against UMW; and a section 1983 claim against UMW's former president, Dr. Richard Hurley, for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claim and held that, at the time of President Hurley's challenged conduct, the equal protection right to be free from a university administrator's deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual harassment was not clearly established by either controlling authority or by a robust consensus of persuasive authority. The court vacated the dismissal of the retaliation claim insofar as it is premised on UMW’s deliberate indifference to student-on-student retaliatory harassment. The court affirmed the dismissal of the aspect of the retaliation claim that relied exclusively on President Hurley's June 2015 letter. Finally, the panel vacated the dismissal of the Title IX sex discrimination claim against UMW where plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a sex discrimination claim under Title IX, predicated on UMW's deliberate indifference to the specified student-on-student harassment. View "Feminist Majority Foundation v. Hurley" on Justia Law